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ABSTRACT 
 
BRITISH PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY AND THE EMPIRES OF ANTIQUITY 
Ataç, C. Akça 
Ph.D., Department of History 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. C.D.A. Leighton 
September 2006 
 
Although eighteenth-century British empire may seem a topic much exhausted by 
historians, there is still room for fresh primary sources and new approaches. Ancient 
Greek and Roman histories published in eighteenth-century Britain are in fact valid 
primary sources to contribute to the studies of empire. This dissertation strives to 
place these sources among the vast literature on the eighteenth-century British 
empire. In comparison with other types of history, ancient history was believed to 
play a more significant role in the design of guiding the political nation. Historians 
were attracted to ancient history particularly on account of the belief that the ancients 
had already experienced all the hardship that troubled the moderns in their political 
life. In this sense, the eighteenth century witnessed the publication of an inordinate 
number of texts on ancient history. Throughout the first half of the century, in 
particular, the analogy between Rome and Britain so predominated that the historians 
of antiquity thought of little else than demonstrating a common interest in producing 
the most authentic, well-written and informative Roman history ever, with the hope 
of providing the political nation with all the instruction required. Only from the 
1740s onwards was the attention of the historians with ancient history diverted to 
ancient Greece to a certain degree. Therefore, it was an eighteenth-century truism 
that ancient history had the capacity to offer valuable insights into all contemporary 
political debates among which the question of empire had a prominent place. The 
British looked into a multitude of sources with the hope of finding guidance in the 
unknown path to imperial greatness. Eighteenth-century ancient history writing 
offered insights into imperial matters such as expansion, colonial governance, the 
role of commerce as a substitute for military action, the desirable degree of 
interaction with natives and the fight against decline. Under the influence of Plutarch 
and venerable literary genre, the “mirror for princes,” ancient Roman histories 
elucidated those subjects. As for ancient Greek histories, whose publications mostly 
coincided with the rise of discussions about civilisation, they sought to deliver their 
remarks on empire through comparisons of the states and civilisations that ancient 
Greece sheltered.     
 
Keywords: Eighteenth-century British empire, ancient history-writing, imperial studies 
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ÖZET 
 
İNGİLİZ FELSEFÎ TARİH VE ANTİK ÇAĞ İMPARATORLUKLARI 
Ataç, C. Akça  
Doktora, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. C.D.A. Leighton 
Eylül 2006 
 
Onsekizinci yüzyıl Britanya İmparatorluğu, tarihçiler tarafından çok çalışılmış bir 
konu olsa da, hâlâ taze birincil kaynakların getireceği yeni yaklaşımlara olanak 
tanımaktadır. Onsekizinci yüzyılda Britanya’da yayımlanmış antik Yunan ve Roma 
tarihleri, söz konusu çalışma alanına yeni yaklaşımlar katabilecek niteliktedir. Bu tez, 
bu antik tarih kitaplarının da onsekizinci yüzyıl Britanya İmparatorluğu ile ilgili çok 
sayıdaki eser arasında sayılması gerektiğini savunmakta ve bu şekilde onsekizinci 
yüzyıl Britanya İmparatorluğu ile ilgili literatürü genişletmeyi amaçlamaktadır. O 
dönemde tarihçi, bilimsel nesnelliği hedeflerken tarih bilgisine, hukuk bilgisi gibi, 
ortak bilimsel yöntemlerle ulaşılabileceğini savunuyordu. Bu tartışmalar, İskoç 
Aydınlanması ile birlikte iyice yoğunlaştı. Bu bağlamda antik tarihin, diğer tarihlere 
kıyasla devlet adamlarına rehberlik etmede daha belirgin bir rol oynadığına 
inanılıyordu. Tarihçilerin antik tarihe olan bu ilgisi ve bağlılığı, antikite insanının, 
modern insanın karşılaştığı bütün politik güçlüklerle daha önceden karşılaştığına ve 
hepsine çözüm bulduğuna yönelik inançtan kaynaklanmaktaydı. Antik dönem 
bilgeliğinin, modern insana, tecrübe ettiği bütün zorluklarda rehberlik edeceği 
düşünülüyordu. Bu nedenle de onsekizinci yüzyılda, önemli sayıda antik tarih kitabı 
basıldı. Yüzyılın ilk yarısında, özellikle Roma ve Britanya arasındaki analoji o kadar 
güçlüydü ki, antik tarih yazarları, o zamana kadar yazılmış en doğru ve kapsamlı 
Roma tarihini yazma eğilimi gösteriyorlardı. Özellikle imparatorluk konusunda 
İngilizler, büyüklük ve kalıcılık hedefine ulaşmada kendilerine rehberlik etmesi 
beklentisiyle sayısız kaynağa başvuruyorlardı. Bunlardan bir tanesi olan antik tarihse 
içinde, genişleme, kolonilerin yöntemi, askeri yöntemler yerine ticaret aracılığıyla 
hükmetmek, yerliler ile iletişim ve çöküşün önlenmesi gibi imparatorluk konularına 
yanıtları barındırmaktaydı. Bu nedenle de Britanyalı tarihçilerin bir kısmı, yukarıda 
bahsi geçen konulara, Plutarch’ın etkisinde ve dönemin edebi akımı, “prensler için 
ayna tutma” yöntemini kullanarak yazdıkları antik Roma tarihi ile yanıt aradılar. 
Diğer bir kısmı da, ideal bir imparatorluk yaratmanın yollarını, basımları medeniyet 
ile ilgili tartışmaların gündemde olduğu bir zamana tesadüf eden, esas olarak antik 
Yunanistan’daki farklı devlet ve medeniyetlerin karşılaştırılmasından oluşan antik 
Yunan tarihleri yazarak aradılar.                
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Onsekizinci Yüzyıl Britanya İmparatorluğu, Antik Tarih Yazımı, 
İmparatorluk Çalışmaları 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the eighteenth century, history-writing underwent a considerable change 
consequent to the historians’ attempt at transforming it into a science similar to law 
with a complete set of rules to be followed universally. With the new invaluable 
contribution of archaeology, numismatics, and cartography as well as the application 
of proper footnoting, history reached an advanced level, at which it provided a more 
compendious knowledge of the past than ever before. Of course, not every historian 
who wrote in the eighteenth century emulated his predecessors and excelled in terms 
of style, methodology and fresh approach. Still, discussion of writing good history 
permeated intellectual life and historians felt obliged to live up to the standards put 
forward in such discussions. Failure to produce a high quality text did not go 
unnoticed, as the appearance of a new volume of history was soon followed by a 
critical review in one of the popular journals such as Craftsman or Monthly Review. 
The eighteenth-century historian aspired to “scientific objectivity” and 
claimed that historical knowledge could be acquired and evaluated through scientific 
methods common to all historians in Europe.1 Such claims reached their zenith 
particularly within the Scottish Enlightenment. Through scientific objectivity, 
historians sought to arrive at the truth not only about the wars and diplomatic 
manoeuvres but also the political regimes, legal and administrative systems, 
characters of the monarchs, agriculture, marital practices and social life. Thus, 
history came to be “a means of civilised recreation”2 of every aspect of the past lives. 
                                                 
1 Linda Kirk, ‘The Matter of Enlightenment,’ The Historical Journal, Vol. 43, No. 4 (December 2000), 
p. 1143.  
2 John Kenyon, The History Men: The Classic Work on Historians and Their History (London: 
Weidenfeld&Nicholson, 1993), p. 44. 
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Since the range of topics treated by historians had thus extended from traditional 
issues to encompass political ideal, virtue and liberty, history was enhanced with the 
capacity of providing a solution to the problems that preoccupied the philosophical 
mind. In this way, history as science took on a philosophical dimension.   
A philosophical history, whose more accomplished examples came along 
under the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment in the late eighteenth century, 
sought to display “the past actions and creations of mankind” with the purpose of  
“understanding the human condition.” 3  According to this mindset, the historian 
should be concerned with turning the scattered information from the past into a 
meaningful whole that would shed light on current political, religious and 
philosophical debates, which were in fact not entirely different from those of the 
previous centuries. While recounting the common experiences of mankind, 
philosophical history, to a great extent, dwellt on the rise, decline, and fall of states 
and civilisations. Elaboration of this aspect of history in particular was believed to 
fulfil best the moral responsibility of instructing the men of the age “in civil 
prudence” through examples of the past.4 The “men of the age” were, in the first 
place, the monarchs, prominent politicians and statesmen. Finally, in the 
philosophical history the relevant examples should be acquired from authentic 
sources.5
In comparison with other types of history, ancient history was ascribed a 
more significant role in the design of guiding the political nation. Historians were 
attracted to ancient history particularly on account of the belief that the ancients had 
already experienced all the hardship that troubled the moderns in their political life. 
                                                 
3 Peter Hans Reill, ‘Narration and Structure in Late Eighteenth Century Historical Thought,’ History 
and Theory, Vol. 25, No. 3 (October 1986), 286.   
4 Anon., Reflections on Ancient and Modern History (Oxford: James Fletcher, 1746), 5.   
5 Peter D. Garside, ‘Scott and the “Philosophical” Historians,’ Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 36, 
No. 3 (July-September 1975), 506.   
 2
For every question asked in the mainstream discussions of politics, there was always 
an answer, sometimes explicit and sometimes not, provided by the experiences of the 
ancients. Following the footsteps of the ancient states to grandness and avoiding their 
mistakes would endow any modern state with the potential to endure. Such was the 
conviction in eighteenth-century Britain as well. It was believed that in the capable 
hands of the British historians, ancient history would reflect its own wisdom on the 
topics dominating contemporary political debates.  Among these topics, the ideal sort 
of empire was a major interest for statesmen and political thinkers.            
The eighteenth-century ancient history texts of the British historians, with the 
exception of Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, have not been 
assessed in terms of the instructions they contained about empire. Yet, the current 
studies of the eighteenth-century understandings of the British empire have 
completely neglected these texts’ authority in pinning down the intellectual tenets 
which were to achieve the imperial ideal. This study is hence concerned with the 
ancient Greek and Roman histories of the eighteenth century with the purpose of 
unveiling the imperial lessons embedded in them. With the help of fresh primary 
sources that are by no means exhausted by scholars of empire, it aims at filling a 
long-standing gap in the studies of eighteenth-century British empire. Gibbon’s 
Roman history has already been examined from this imperial perspective and 
therefore is not here dealt with.6        
The eighteenth century witnessed the publication of an inordinate number of 
texts on ancient history, but not all of them fell into the above-defined category of 
philosophical history. Volumes of tracts and pamphlets made copious use of ancient 
history while discussing patristic-based divinity, antiquarian practices and party 
                                                 
6 See Rosamond McKitterick, Edward Gibbon and Empire. Cambridge University Press, 1997.  
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politics. Nevertheless, such works did not intend to assume the task of writing a more 
complete and scientific history than the existing ones, but rather sought “to examine 
the evidence arising from ancient history,”7 for their own polemical purposes. In this 
study, the multi-volume works explicitly intended as histories constitute the principal 
focus. As will be seen in the progress of this dissertation, party politics inevitably 
leaked into the philosophical histories and therefore its reflection on the ancient 
history-writing is assessed, for it provides us with invaluable insight into the varying 
ways in which empire was perceived in eighteenth-century Britain. The party-
political pamphlets, of course, which aimed at scoring in an ongoing political 
polemic and thus borrowed partial information from antiquity for that reason only, 
fall under our exclusion.  
The study is comprised of five chapters. The first two chapters strive to 
provide the necessary background to the topics of eighteenth-century ancient history-
writing and imperial understanding in Britain, whereas the last three chapters seek to 
exhibit the historians’ approach to the question of empire. Chapter I is designed to 
elucidate the meaning that history acquired in the eighteenth century, the mission 
attributed to ancient history-writing and comment on the historians who wrote 
ancient Greek and Roman histories and their politics. To serve a similar introductory 
purpose, Chapter II dwells on the stages through which the British understanding of 
empire evolved, the eighteenth-century definition of empire, the discussions over the 
ideal sort of empire and the political events that had a direct impact on the formation 
of the imperial ideal, particularly within the first British empire. The Scottish 
Enlightenment is also briefly touched upon here, since this contemporary intellectual 
                                                 
7 E. W. Montagu, Reflections on the Rise and Fall of the Ancient Republics: Adapted to the Present 
State of Great Britain (London: A. Millar, 1759), 5. 
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movement so powerfully influenced our historians and in many respects contributed 
to their political debates, including those over the empire.  
The chronological precedence of ancient Greece over ancient Rome is 
disregarded in this study. The chapter on the ancient Roman history texts stands 
ahead of the chapters on ancient Greek histories; for in eighteenth-century Britain the 
appearance of the Roman history texts pre-date the texts dealing with Greece.  
Throughout the first half of the century in particular, the analogy between Rome and 
Britain so predominated that the historians of antiquity thought of little other than 
demonstrating a common interest in producing the most authentic, well-written and 
informative Roman history ever with the hope of providing the political nation with 
all the instruction required. Only from the 1740s onwards was the attention of 
historians with ancient history diverted to ancient Greece, to a certain degree.     
Chapter III deals with the views of empire encompassed by the Roman 
history texts of eighteenth-century Britain. These works have attracted considerable 
attention from the scholars who have studied them with narrow reference to the civic 
humanism of the eighteenth century. It is true that our Roman histories are pervaded 
by remarks, either positive or negative, on republican virtue and liberty. Nevertheless, 
these are not the only political topics embraced by them. The question of empire has 
a prominent place among the other contemporary political debates and no analysis 
has approached these history texts from the perspective of empire. By adopting such 
a perspective, Chapter III argues that the Roman history texts provide valuable 
information about how the ideal empire was perceived. What is clear is that the 
historians made a distinction between empire as a regime and empire as a political 
entity. Empire connoting the authoritarian rule of an emperor exercised not only in 
the periphery but also at the centre and the limitation of liberties this authority 
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brought about were commonly disapproved. On the other hand, empire defined by 
Dominic Lieven as “a specific polity with a clearly demarcated territory exercising 
sovereign authority over its subjects who are, to varying degrees, under its direct 
administrative supervision” 8  was regarded as desirable. Furthermore, British 
statesmen’s reluctance to adopt a specific policy, which would realise such an empire, 
was criticised.  
Adam Ferguson, among the most celebrated Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, 
put forward in his Roman history a definition of empire which reflected the need to 
comply with the rules of progress. Overshadowed by the philosopher’s more famous 
arguments about the progress, of civilisations and civil society, his views of empire 
have been neglected. Chapter III hence seeks to rectify this imbalance. Also 
examined in this chapter are the understanding of Carthage as a purely and 
exclusively commercial and hence despised empire; the optimum degree of 
expansion for empire; and the ways in which luxury exercised a destructive influence 
on the persistence of empire and what other factors led to the decline of empires. Of 
course, the historians’ differing definitions of the Augustan empire and the 
conclusions drawn from that episode of Roman history are probed as well.  
The scrutiny of ancient Greek history texts are pursued in two complementary 
parts, Chapter IV and Chapter V. In Chapter IV, the imperial lessons from Sparta and 
Athens are discussed. The scholars of our day tend to regard these histories from a 
single vantage point, noting merely that the historians favoured Sparta since it was a 
monarchy and employed examples of Athenian history to exhibit the evils of 
democracy. However, since they were founded on the belief that ancient history 
offered universal rules for establishing balance and enduring order under varying 
                                                 
8 Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals (London: Pimlico, 2003), 9.  
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political circumstances, philosophical histories of ancient Greece covered a much 
wider range of topics than the merits of monarchy and the demerits of democracy, 
including the ideal conduct of empire. Chapter IV argues that according to the topic 
selected the tone of the assessments in these texts alternates between pro-Spartan and 
pro-Athenian. Also, it is contended that when eighteenth-century historians of Britain 
turned to the topic of empire, it was Athens, not Sparta that came to the fore as a 
model for the British political nation. 
Finally Chapter V deals with what the ancient Greek historians had 
considered as lesser imperial models, Macedonia and Persia. Though they never saw 
Macedonia as equal to Sparta and Athens in importance, the historians nevertheless 
attempted to provide some useful information about Macedonian imperial practices 
as well. With the exception of the Alexandrian period, no analogy between 
Macedonia and Britain within the context of empire was drawn. The Macedonian 
empire was militaristic in character and governed by an authoritarian regime, which 
curtailed the liberties both in the metropolis and colonies. In this sense, it resembled 
greatly to the imperial ventures of contemporary Spain and France. Furthermore, 
Macedonia overstretched its territory and sank under the heaviness of this unwieldy 
structure. The fear of abundance was a recurrent theme in the eighteenth-century 
discussions of empire and thus echoed in the Greek histories of the age. Alexander, 
however, was an exception in that. His short-lived empire was presented as a 
strategically ideal sort of empire and indeed a source of emulation for the British 
political nation. 
Chapter V is also concerned with the ways that the historians depicted the 
Persian empire. To their minds, the Persian empire did not offer the kind of imperial 
lessons that they most sought. Instead, it was expected to provide the British reader 
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with the knowledge of how to manage relations with an alien and despotic empire. 
Equally important, through the study of Persia the possible role to be played by a 
similarly despotic empire in the eighteenth-century game of balance of power was 
investigated. Of course, there also exist some historians’ positive remarks of the 
Persian empire, so that one can not wholly exclude this alien empire from the list of 
eighteenth-century analogies of Britain. Still, the Persian empire was predominantly 
considered as the bearer of a civilisation incomparable in degree with the 
sophistication and refinement of ancient Greece. It was the quintessential outsider in 
history that would teach the British statesmen how to develop their attitudes towards 
the modern outsiders. In this sense, the way that the ancient Persian empire was 
described bore undeniable similarities with how the eighteenth-century Ottoman 
empire was perceived. 
Ancient Roman and Greek histories are valid primary sources to contribute to 
the eighteenth-century studies of empire. This dissertation strives to place these 
sources among the vast literature on the eighteenth-century British empire.               
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CHAPTER 1 
ANCIENT HISTORY-WRITING IN THE EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY 
 
 
 
With the coming of the Renaissance, history acquired something of the 
prestige that theology had enjoyed in the Middle Ages. It was claimed that it had 
been cleansed of myths and forgeries and born as the prescription of the true and 
ethical life. Throughout the following centuries it continued to enjoy the same 
prestige and came to be considered as the most worthy type of literary prose. Within 
this context, in the eighteenth century, historical practice was not essentially different 
from that of the Renaissance and history was held in high esteem for its unmistakable 
“defining quality of truthfulness,”1 both on the Continent and Britain. Indeed history 
was respected in the first place for unveiling the truth. Then, being true, it was also 
instructive, in the sense that it provided the political elite with political and moral 
lessons taken from truthful stories of the past. The function of history was therefore 
to set the political and moral examples to be followed in public and private spheres 
and thus to serve “as a source of precedent and a means of establishing norms.”2 This 
instructive quality of history would teach members of political society “to conduct 
armies, secure conquests, invent necessary laws, restrain the intemperate rule of 
princes and acquire power and happiness.”3 Additionally, though they were to 
contain serious erudition, histories were to be entertaining. Using dull language was 
                                                 
1 Phillip Hicks, Neo-classical History and English Culture: From Clarendon to Hume (London: 
Macmillan, 1996), 11. 
2 Kenyon, History Men, 2. 
3 Anon., Reflections on Ancient and Modern History, 6. 
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usually criticised equally with offering incorrect historical knowledge. The historian 
who possessed advanced literary skills would be regarded most highly. Thus, 
accepted as true, instructive and entertaining, history enjoyed a great readership, 
intended to include the eminent political figures of the age. 
To understand how history was conceived in eighteenth-century Britain, one 
needs to scrutinise the artes historicae of the age. The artes historicae were the 
manuals which first appeared in the sixteenth century to prescribe “the way or means 
of studying or writing history.”4 The reason why they were widely written and 
published, as Astrid Witschi-Bernz points out, was the Humanist desire to establish 
“a more orderly system among the traditional disciplines.”5 These works would 
parallel those in juridical studies. They attempted to provide a definition of history 
and to put forward certain rules about its methodology. All those rules, of course, 
were to meet the criteria already set by the classical authorities in antiquity.  
Two of the most significant artes historicae of eighteenth-century Britain 
were in fact in French as, in understanding historical theory and practice, the British 
were to a certain degree still dependent on the French historians.6 Pierre Le Moyen’s 
Of the Art Both of Writing and Judging of History (London, 1695) and Charles 
Rollin’s De la Maniere d’Ensiegner et d’Etudier les Belles-Lettres (Paris, 1726-28) 
enjoyed a mass readership and their definitions of history were widely accepted. 
According to Moyen’s definition, history “is a continued narration of things true, 
great and public, writ with spirit, eloquence and judgement; for instruction to 
particulars and princes, and [the] good of civil society”.7 It was essentially addressed 
to the prince and other influential statesmen and aimed to play a prominent role in 
                                                 
4 Astrid Witschi-Bernz, ‘Main Trends in Historical-Method Literature: Sixteenth to Eighteenth 
centuries’, History and Theory, Volume 12, No: 12 (1972), 51. 
5 Idem, 52. 
6 Hicks, Neoclassical History, 10. 
7 Pierre LeMoyen, Of the Art both of Writing and Judging of History (London, 1695), 8. 
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their education. Nevertheless, in the course of time the common individual would 
also be attracted to these ‘truthful’ stories of the past and history would present 
something for his benefit too. According to Rollin, historical instruction would 
definitely make an honnete homme of the common individual.8
As indicated above, these two French artes were not the only examples of 
their kind. In the first half of the eighteenth century, many British tracts also 
appeared aiming to convince the British reader of the utility and the applicability of 
history, as well as to set forth the rules for writing an ideal one. The historians of the 
age submissively tried to keep up with these standards in writing their histories. The 
second volume of Thomas Hearne’s celebrated Ductor Historicus (1714), for 
example, is known to have served as an outline for Edward Gibbon’s Decline and 
Fall of the Roman Empire.9 These texts, therefore, commenting on the purpose and 
methodology of history, established “a specific, reasonably thorough and coherent 
theory of historiography.”10 What is more, as the most prominent ones were actually 
written in order to take part in the eighteenth-century debate between the ‘ancient’ 
and ‘modern’ historians, the Battle of the Books, they achieved mass circulation and 
reached more readers than the artes of the previous centuries did. In the coming 
pages, the British historicae artes will also be studied within the context of the Battle 
of the Books. However, before elaborating on that debate about what kind of history 
would be more relevant and pass as more instructive, I shall further clarify the 
purpose of history, as it was then conceived in Britain with the help of these 
eighteenth-century texts. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Charles Rollin, De la Manier d’Enseigner et d’Etudier les Belles-Lettres (Paris, 1726-28), 13.   
9James William Johnson, The Formation of English Neo-classical Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1967), 223. 
10Ibid, 39. 
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1.1 Importance of History 
 
 
In eighteenth-century Britain, the ways of writing good history and the 
benefits of learning it were extensively discussed in works such as An Essay upon the 
Ancient and Modern Learning (1690) by William Temple, Reflections upon Ancient 
and Modern Learning (1694) and A Defence of the Reflections upon Ancient and 
Modern Learning (1705) by William Wotton, Ductor Historicus (1705) by Thomas 
Hearne, A Dissertation on Reading the Classics and Forming a Just Style (1709) by 
Henry Felton, An Essay on the Manner of Writing History (1746) by Peter Whalley, 
and Letters on the Study and Use of History (1779) by Lord Bolingbroke. Despite 
their differences of opinion on what kind of history should be written and read, these 
authors collectively demonstrated a profound belief in the importance of history in 
creating a moral code which was expected eventually to become a binding tool for 
their political society. 
History had since antiquity been commonly considered as “philosophy of 
teaching by examples how to conduct ourselves in all the situations of private and 
public life.”11 While recounting the past events and the lives of great men, the 
historian aimed “to explore the counsels, unfold the measure and remark the 
consequences that belong to every important action, to distinguish between prudence 
and temerity, design and chance.”12 He presented his findings to the reader as 
instructive lessons hoping that they would be taken as rules. The knowledge of 
complete sequences of events would prove that there were not necessarily different 
causes and effects of various wars, revolutions and invasions that took place in 
                                                 
11 Henry St John [Lord] Bolingbroke, Letters on the Study and Use of History (London: T. Cadell, 
1779), 48. 
12Anon., Reflections on Ancient and Modern History, 5-6. 
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different periods of time. In fact, a thorough study of history would show that past 
events followed a common pattern, had “all their turns and forms” and eventually 
came “about to the same point where they first began.”13 That would enable man to 
design norms to regulate current affairs such as military operations, overseas 
expansions or elections. This commonplace of the age is best expressed in Lord 
Bolingbroke’s words:    
 
There are certain general principles, and rules of life and conquest, which 
always must be true, because they are conformable to the invariable nature 
of things. He who studies history, as he would study philosophy, will soon 
distinguish and collect them, and by doing so will soon form to himself a 
general system of ethics and politics on the surest foundations, on the trial of 
these principles and rules in all ages, and on the confirmation of them by 
universal experience.14    
 
On this account, the examples of the past appeared indispensable in teaching the 
political society what ought to be done, the ideal being “to equally take notice of 
good and evil, to imitate the one and avoid the other.”15
In unveiling the general principles and rules of becoming virtuous and 
avoiding corruption, history essentially aimed to improve the reader.16 The study of 
history inculcated the idea of “a constant improvement in private and public virtue”17 
for the purpose of making better men and better citizens. In this sense, its primary 
motive was in the first place to instruct the monarch and the other statesmen, on the 
grounds that a people could be improved by virtuous and moral rule only. The 
common man could have difficulties grasping the true meaning of the histories. As 
one historian complained, the history texts were “hardly understood beyond the 
                                                 
13 Thomas Hearne, Ductor Historicus: Or, a Short System of Universal History, and an Introduction 
to the Study of it (London: Tim. Childe, 1705), I, 123. 
14Bolingbroke, Study and Use of History, 53. 
15Richard Rawlinson (trn), A New Method of Studying History, Geography and Chronology with a 
Catalogue of the Chief Historians of all Nations (London: Cha. Davis, 1730), I, 24. 
16 [Peter Whalley], An Essay on the Manner of Writing History (London: M. Cooper, 1746), 8.  
17 Bolingbroke, Study and Use of History, 14.  
 13
verge and purlieus of the court.”18 For this reason, as another historian warned his 
reader, “it would be very dangerous for a private person in applying himself to the 
reading of historians, to turn his head to political reflections.” Still, the common man 
too could study the historians, but only those “who have somewhat in relation to our 
own circumstances”, or dealt with those circumstances “we have in common with the 
rest of mankind.” 19 The political reflections were to be left to the statesman. 
According to Thomas Hearne, a history should consist of two parts; the 
narration and the political reflections. Narration was the body of the text that aimed 
to “relate impartially all remarkable actions of this life,” whereas political reflections 
were the soul of it that set forth the examples “to be imitated upon all occasions.”20 
As stated, the political reflections were to instruct and improve the statesman. A 
constant following of these instructions would achieve prosperity, political stability, 
military victories and above all a virtuous people. In this respect, history was 
believed to offer an unmistakable guide to the statesman that would lead him to 
faultlessness, greatness and virtue in governing the country:       
 
The statesman travels in the field of history, to enrich himself with maxims 
of prudence and civil policy; and these, as a map or chart, point out to him 
those rocks and sands he should avoid in the administration of the republic, 
and which those who sit at the helm ought necessarily to be acquainted 
with.21
 
That shows us the reason why in the eighteenth century the study of history was 
considered crucial and why almost all history texts were dedicated to the eminent 
political characters of the age, if not to the king. 
    The definition of history given in these lines certainly was not peculiar to 
the eighteenth century. Since the Renaissance, it had come to be similarly 
                                                 
18 [Whalley], Manner of Writing History, 26. 
19 Rawlinson, New Method, I, 25-26. 
20 Hearne, Ductor Historicus, I, 120. 
21[Whalley], Manner of Writing History, 11. 
 14
formulated. Nevertheless, in the eighteenth century the historians took more 
occasions to prescribe the purposes of history and thus the number of the artes 
historicae published at that time was remarkably high when compared to the 
previous centuries. Besides, in the eighteenth century history did undergo certain 
changes and suffered certain innovations. The historians adopted an ever more 
critical approach to their sources, cross-examining documents in order to confirm 
their reliability, and benefiting from the findings of other disciplines such as 
philology, palaeography and archaeology.22 In this respect, they achieved a higher 
quality of work, as we should see it, than their predecessors and developed a more 
scholarly method of history writing. The chronologies, compilations, collections and 
annals in the humanist tradition were dismissed as ‘plodding’ and ‘uninspired’ on the 
grounds that, generally consisting of a massive list of facts, they lacked detailed and 
illuminating commentary. 23 In most cases, the older history texts were actually the 
verbatim translations of the primary sources and in the others, the texts were not 
histories but long descriptions of various collections by the antiquarians. These 
“unscholarly” and “unhistorical”24 works failed to fulfil the requirement of 
instructing and guiding. Consequently, the eighteenth-century historian pulled his 
sleeves up to reach the historical truth and offer clear instructions by meticulously 
and critically analysing the primary source and commenting on it rather than just 
paraphrasing. In doing that, he adopted the extensive application of footnote, 
appendix and index.  
In this way, history writing grew more complex and better defined, and its 
topics more varied. The range of subjects that preoccupied the historians was 
                                                 
22 John Hale Rigby, The Evolution of British Historiography: From Bacon to Namier (Cleveland, New 
York: World Publishing, 1964), 29. 
23 Laird Okie, Augustan Historical Writing: Histories of England in the English Enlightenment 
(Maryland: University Press of America, 1991), 9. 
24 Howard Erskine-Hill, The Augustan Idea in English Literature (London: Edward Arnold, 1983), 11. 
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eventually enlarged to embrace geography, culture, manners, religion, etc. in addition 
to politics and war. Thus the historians began to offer “new views about how society 
operated in the past and present, by philosophical history, which was concerned with 
all aspects of civilisation.”25 They treated their subjects either as ‘particular’ histories 
that studied particular reigns, events and regions or as ‘general’ histories that covered 
the history of a kingdom or an empire. Within this context, the history texts that 
emerged in the eighteenth century took the forms of ecclesiastical history, universal 
history, natural history, local history, biographies and memoirs. An anonymous 
universal history, for instance, entitled An Universal History from the Earliest 
Account of Time to the Present Compiled from the Original Authors was published 
for the first time in England in thirty-eight volumes between the years 1736 and 
1765. However, the most popular historical subjects at the time were undoubtedly the 
English and the ancient histories. Before proceeding with the well-known eighteenth-
century bent towards ancient history which is of particular interest to this study, I 
shall further elaborate on the English histories, as they too contribute to our 
perception of eighteenth-century historiography. 
English history, both in particular and general studies, was among the 
subjects that fascinated most eighteenth-century historians. With the saddening belief 
that they had failed to live up to both classical and continental standards, these 
historians laboured to produce a history of England which would put an end to the 
discomforting absence of a masterpiece on this subject.26 Their desire to compete 
with the ancient and the contemporary continental historians resulted in a 
considerable number of histories of England, among which the most prominent ones 
were The Critical History of England Ecclesiastical and Civil (1726) by John 
                                                 
25 Philip Hicks, ‘Bolingbroke, Clarendon, and the Role of Classical Historian,’ Eighteenth-Century 
Studies, Vol. 20, No: 4 (Summer, 1987), 471.  
26 Hicks, Neoclassical History, 2 and 4. 
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Oldmixon, A Complete and Impartial History of the Ancient Britons (1743) by John 
Owen, A General History of England from the Invasion of the Romans…to the late 
Revolution (1744-51) by William Guthrie, The History of England (1763-83) by 
Catherine Macaulay and, of course, History of England by David Hume. The general 
histories mostly began with Roman Britain,27 as this area of history attracted 
considerable attention. The reader desired to learn about Britain, “both as part of the 
Empire and, before that, as a vigorous primitive society in its own right,”28 in order 
to find out the true origins of the nation. With the help of topography, archaeology 
and palaeography, not only the Roman but “many pasts of Britain” were 
reconstructed.29 The particular English histories concentrated much on the eventful 
seventeenth century.30
In fact, the eighteenth-century debate on the English past between the Tories 
and the Whigs gradually came to dominate the histories of England. The party 
polemicists began to act as historians and tried to score over their political rivals on 
issues such as the ancient constitution, mixed government, parliament and liberty.31 
Thus a considerable number of English history texts must be regarded as political 
pamphlets in disguise, advocating either the Tory or the Whig cause. Unlike the 
histories mentioned in the above paragraph, these pamphlets were not examples of 
serious erudition. They were polemical works filled with distorted historical facts 
mostly about political factions in history. In this sense, they were not intended to 
serve the purposes spoken of above. On the contrary, they actually “trammelled” the 
                                                 
27 Joseph Levine, Humanism and History: Origins of Modern English Historiography (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1987),. 87. 
28 Graham Parry, The Trophies of Time: English Antiquarians of the Seventeenth Century (Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 2. 
29 Ibid, 358. 
30 Jeremy Black, ‘Ideology, History, Xenophobia and the World of Print in Eighteenth-century 
England’ in Jeremy Black and Jeremy Gregory (eds), Culture, Politics and Society in Britain 1660-
1800 (Manchester University Press, 1991), 205. 
31Okie, Augustan Historical Writing, 2. 
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history-writing business.32 Such was the case in the ancient histories of the age as 
well, as the party authors commonly tried to make their points by using examples 
taken from antiquity, particularly from the works of Polybius and Diodorus.                      
The interdependence of history and politics in the eighteenth century is 
undeniable. As already stated, history texts were considered as providing political 
and moral examples for statecraft. Therefore, it is not possible to come across a 
history which was free of politics and a historian who was completely impartial, 
especially at a time when the favourite topic was the notion of kingship and 
governance as moral activity.33 Even so, there were many historians who abstained 
from writing from an explicit political perspective and tried to stay away from 
“abusive, small minded partisanship”.34 This dissertation will be concerned with the 
works by such historians only who “valued classical correctness next to godliness”35 
in instructing the political society. The other texts which have been well-assessed by 
a wide range of modern scholars, as reflecting eighteenth-century British political 
thought are less relevant to our search.36 Before introducing the ancient history texts 
and their authors that this study will examine in detail, I shall first explain the 
eighteenth-century interest in antiquity in Britain and the motives behind that 
remarkable engagement in ancient history-writing. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Okie, Augustan Historical Writing, 5. 
33 Black, ‘Ideology,’ 208. 
34 Hicks, Neoclassical History, 45. 
35 Richard Jenkyns, The Victorians and Ancient Greece (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 1. 
36 See Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke and his Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine 
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton University Press, 1975); Reed 
Browning, Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs (Baton Rouge and London: 
Louisiana State University, 1982) and J.A.W. Gunn, Beyond Liberty and Property: The Process of 
Self-Recognition in Eighteenth-Century Political Thought (Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1983).   
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1.2 Meaning of Ancient History 
 
 
The eighteenth century witnessed an incredible increase in the number of 
ancient Roman and Greek history texts; that was the emergence of neo-classical 
history. According to J.C.D. Clark, it is not apt to name this “unique historical 
formation” neoclassicism; for the term is “too replete with meanings from the history 
of art in which it signifies a reaction against the Baroque, [is used] to identify a 
cultural formation which included the Baroque and, in its later neo-Grecian phase, 
even distinguished the Romanticism of the years before the 1830s.”37 Nevertheless, 
as this phenomenon still lacks another name, it will be here adopted in the sense used 
by James William Johnson: 
 
…an ideological construct, taking many of its assumptions from traditional 
sources and modifying them by current beliefs with the urge to rediscover 
and preserve all of the ancient culture.38     
 
The chief inspiration that eighteenth-century neo-classicism drew from was the 
common belief in its own utility in better analysing and understanding the British 
past and present by means of ancient examples. “Neo-classicism was thoroughly 
empirical. And it was unashamedly utilitarian.”39 This belief in the utility of the 
ancient histories was based on the completeness and applicability of the ancient 
world in which one could see the complete picture of events, all major and minor 
causes and effects. That would lead us to the “neo-classical conception of cyclism.”40
It was believed that the complete picture of antiquity essentially depicts a 
kind of dynamic cyclism, in which the civilisations rose and fell. It was first the 
                                                 
37 J. C. D. Clark, Samuel Johnson: Literature, Religion and English Cultural Politics from the 
Restoration to Romanticism (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2. 
38 James William Johnson, ‘What was Neo-Classicism?’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 9, No: 
1(1969), 52. 
39 Idem, 53. 
40 Idem, 63. 
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ancients who experienced this cycle of birth, growth, maturation, decline and death; 
but all nations were subject to it. They would follow the same historical patterns and 
inevitably meet the same end, which was irrecoverable degeneration. For British 
statesmen and those who wrote for them, the only way to prevent or at least delay 
this degeneration and to preserve stability was the meticulous examination of ancient 
history. Ancient history was full of lessons and it would teach the nation to follow 
the footsteps of the ancients to greatness and to avoid the mistakes which caused 
their fall. Thus the British would constantly make progress and eventually find the 
universal rules to establish balance and enduring order. 
Works concerned with the ancient world had been in continuous progress 
since the Renaissance. Throughout the early modern period, they appeared in the 
form of either narrative text or antiquarian study. The former which came to be 
called simply ‘history’ was the narrative of events “organised in linear and casual 
fashion”41 without caring much about the tangible remains of antiquity. On the other 
hand, the latter exhibited the “non-literary remnants of antiquity”42 such as the 
philological, geographical, numismatic, epigraphic or archaeological facts, while 
completely ignoring the political narrative. With the coming of the eighteenth 
century, however, the narrative and antiquarian traditions converged amazingly to 
improve the quality of ancient history-writing. Although it is frequently commented 
that the most perfect form of this convergence as philosophical history emerged 
towards the end of the century in Gibbon’s Decline and Fall,43 the eighteenth century 
produced many other successful volumes of Roman and Greek histories that 
attempted to combine the critical narration of events and the antiquarian elements. 
                                                 
41 Mark Salber Phillips, ‘Reconsiderations on History and Antiquarianism: Arnaldo Momigliano and 
the Historiography of Eighteenth-Century Britain’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 57 (1996), 
297-8. 
42 Hicks, Neoclassical History, 32. 
43Phillips, ‘Reconsiderations’, 301. 
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Ancient history’s claim to complete truth was thus enhanced. Before that, however, 
the historians were to fight and learn from the Battle of the Books.     
The eighteenth century opened with the British extension of the ongoing 
continental quarrel between the Ancients and Moderns. During this quarrel, which in 
England was dubbed the Battle of the Books, and in its aftermath, the debate 
remained inconclusive and later faded away. It was fought in different areas such as 
science, technology, literature and philosophy but, in Joseph Levine’s words, this 
was “at bottom a dispute over the uses of the past, a quarrel about history.”44 Both 
sides wrote volumes of ancient histories for the sake of proving their method to be 
the fittest in reaching the truth. The Ancients considered the task of history-writing 
as reinterpreting, sometimes imitating, the accounts of classical authors. They put the 
emphasis on literary style, in other words, on being entertainingly readable and in 
return were attacked on the grounds that they ignored antiquarian scholarship. To 
them, in ancient history there was no room for “the intervention of any critical 
apparatus.”45 The Moderns, on the other hand, depended on the findings of 
archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics or philology. Through “the critical capacities” 
that they developed, the study of ancient history began to bear considerably 
insightful results.46 Although they were criticised for writing unreadable texts 
without elegant narrative and ridiculed as “pedantic and frivolous, purveyors of mere 
curiosities of little value or interest to the rest of society,”47 the Moderns silently took 
over the Ancients’ camp.      
The battle was triggered by William Temple’s An Essay Upon the Ancient 
and Modern Learning (1692) in which he claimed that the modern historians failed 
                                                 
44 Levine, Humanism and History, 156. 
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to supersede the ancients and hence failed properly to instruct the British society. 
The “imperfections of learning” of the age produced a poor quality of statecraft:  
 
It is the itch of our age and climate, and has over run both the court and the 
stage, enters a House of Lords and Commons as boldly as a coffee-house, 
debates of council as well as private conversation; and I have known in my 
life more than one or two ministers of state that would rather have said a 
witty thing than done a wise one, and made the company laugh rather than 
the kingdom rejoice.         
 
Temple believed that it was impossible to produce better histories than those of the 
ancient Greek and Roman historians. Therefore, it would be wiser for the moderns to 
imitate their refined style rather than to invent their own methods of writing ancient 
history. Although Temple stated in the conclusion that “this small piece of justice I 
have done the ancients will not, I hope, be taken any more than it is meant, for any 
injury to the moderns,” 48 his disapproval of modern historians gave way to a 
bombardment of pamphlets from the Moderns. The most famous Modern was 
William Wotton and he fought back against Temple in his Reflections upon Ancient 
and Modern Learning (1694) and A Defence of the Reflections (1705). According to 
Wotton, “[i]f the ancients have so far excelled as to bring them to perfection, it may 
be thought that they did it because they were born before us.” What is more, “there is 
no absolute necessity of making all those melancholy reflections upon the sufficiency 
and ignorance of the present age”, as “by some great and happy inventions, wholly 
unknown to former ages, new and spacious fields of knowledge have been 
discovered.” 49 Temple and Wotton were soon to be joined in this battle by many 
other eminent names of the age, such as Jonathan Swift and Richard Bentley.  
                                                 
48 William Temple in J.E. Spingarn (ed.), Sir William Temple’s Essays on Ancient and Modern 
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49 William Wotton, Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning (London: J. Leake, 1694), 10. 
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As a matter of fact, despite his enthusiasm, Wotton was a moderate Modern 
and did not deny the authority of the ancient texts. To him, the ancient and modern 
scholarships were not mutually exclusive. They were actually complementary. 
It must be by joining ancient and modern learning together, and by studying 
each as originals, in those things wherein they severally do most excel by 
that means, few mistakes will be committed, the world will soon see what 
remains unfinished, and men will furnish themselves with fitting methods to 
complete it: and by doing justice to every side, they will have reason to 
expect, that those that come after them will do the same justice to them…50           
 
Nevertheless, in the eighteenth century there were people who questioned the 
reliability, relevance and usefulness of the ancient history altogether. Its reliability 
was at stake because the ancient sources, particularly those dealt with the early 
period, were filled with fabulous stories rather than authentic accounts of history. In 
an age when even the authority of the most sacred texts were called into question, the 
ancient history texts could well be dismissed as unfit to enlighten their readers. 
Secondly, they were considered irrelevant on the grounds that the modern peoples 
did not follow the footsteps of the ancients. The modern nations evolved in a 
completely different way, so they had nothing to learn from the ancients. Thus, 
ancient history was not capable of improving the society. Such a view was expressed 
in one of the artes historicae:  
But it may very reasonably be doubted whether the histories of ancient times 
are so conducive to these purposes, as we are generally apt to think. It is 
certain, the first ages of the world, though they may supply matter of wonder 
and curiosity can never be fit patterns for our imitation. The plainness and 
simplicity of the early inhabitants of the earth, their wandering and laborious 
life, their ignorance of ambition, and contempt of luxury and riches, can find 
no place among the false improvements of later times. 51            
 
According to the same text, ancient history, particularly Roman history, was an 
insufficient source to instruct statesmen when compared with the modern history. 
Modern history would better inform them of the subtleties of international relations.     
                                                 
50 Wotton, Ancient and Modern Learning, 358-9. 
51 Anon, Reflections on Ancient and Modern History, 6. 
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There is yet a further proof, that the best source of civil instruction must be 
searched for in examples not altogether so remote from our own times. The 
grand business of the Roman policy was only to contain their own 
dominations in order and obedience: on the contrary, the interests of modern 
communities depend entirely on their management of many neighbouring 
states, equal perhaps in power to themselves. It is not now sufficient to 
invent wise regulations, by which the honour of the prince and liberty of the 
subject may be secured at home. Foreign treaties and negotiations are 
become more dangerous than open war.52  
 
The Irish poet Richard Flecknoe also made that same point in his An Essay on Wit 
rather ironically. 
In short, ancient history seems to me, with regard to the modern, what 
ancient medals are in comparison with the current coin: the first remain in 
cabinets; the second circulates in the universe, for the commerce of 
mankind.53  
 
Still, in the eyes of the many ancient history-writing remained as one of the 
most prestigious intellectual activities that could be engaged in and the most 
appropriate way of instructing the statesman and improving society. Lord 
Bolingbroke, among others, argued that the period from the fifteenth century to the 
present was “peculiarly useful to the service of our country,”54 but explained why it 
was impossible to renounce the ancient histories.  
In ancient history, as we have said already, the examples are complete, 
which are incomplete in the course of experience. The beginning, the 
progression, and the end appear, not of particular reigns, much less of 
particular enterprises, or systems of policy alone, but of governments, of 
nations, of empires, and of all the various systems that have succeeded one 
another in the course of their duration.55           
 
The authenticity of the early ancient sources could of course be called into question, 
but then again  
[i]f a thread of dark and uncertain traditions, therefore, is made, as it 
commonly is, the introduction to history, we should touch it lightly, and run 
swiftly over it, far from insisting on it, either as authors or readers.56
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Despite having been frequently attacked, the ancient history texts of the age reached 
to a wide range of readers and proved to be highly influential. As Ogilvie aptly 
points out, 
[t]hey were read universally in all walks of life and by old as well as 
young… They formed the intellectual background to contemporary 
arguments as well as the educational foundation for scholars. Where such 
books – and there are only a few in any generation–  are so widely digested, 
it is reasonable to believe that they contribute to form opinion and to mould 
attitudes.57
 
For that reason, the eighteenth century was more heavily associated with neo-
classicism than any other century. 
As mentioned above, ancient history-writing aimed to guide the reader 
through the problematic political situations of the present. Undoubtedly, in the 
eighteenth century the most challenging situation in which the British were required 
to learn how to preserve their stability was Britain’s gradual transformation into a 
spatially extended empire. Confronting this situation, classical historians of the age 
paid particular attention to the ancient notion of empire and attempted to draw the 
necessary lessons for their own emerging empire. Few texts dealt with this notion in 
the explicit way that William Barron did in his History of the Colonisation of the 
Free States of Antiquity, Applied to the Present Contest Between Great Britain and 
Her American Colonies. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible to grasp the eighteenth 
century British understanding of empire through the general histories of Greece and 
Rome and that will be what this study aims to do.    
 
1.3 Roman History 
 
 
Among the other ancient histories, Roman history stood as the supreme 
source to be consulted in political and legal matters throughout the centuries. As 
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Thomas O’Connor states; “[o]ne could say that as the Scriptures were to worship and 
morals so the history of Rome was to civil government and law.”58 According to the 
eighteenth-century text A New Method of Studying History, the Roman history was 
the second most important area of history requiring study:   
After the sacred history, that of the Romans is the largest, and most 
necessary. It is not only useful for ecclesiastical history, but for that of the 
new monarchies, which are all so many dismemberings of that great empire. 
It is not the history of only one nation, but of the whole world, which in 
process of time was subject to it. 59     
 
While Britain was growing into an empire in the eighteenth century, the British were 
engaged in a constant search for historical archetypes that would guide them to 
greatness. For being the history of nations and hence universal and complete, the 
Roman history appeared to be the most appropriate source. The Romans had 
experienced and overcome all the difficulties of becoming an empire and remaining 
so. Therefore, Roman civilization constituted a role model for every state on account 
of its sophisticated governing mechanisms, just laws, refined culture, strong military, 
above all, on account of its durability. Thus, the interest in the Roman history in 
eighteenth-century Britain was immense. Particularly in the first half of the century, 
volumes of Roman histories were written, each aiming to supersede the existing 
ones. 
However, the uncertainty of its early period made this dependence on Roman 
history highly problematic. The historians generally dismissed the early period of 
ancient nations as ‘fabulous history’ and preferred not to invest much time and work 
in that. Such was the case for the Greek histories of the age, as will be noted in the 
coming pages. Nevertheless, although the Romans had the existence of a dark age “in 
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common with every other people,”60 the British historians were rather reluctant to 
acknowledge the unreliability of even that most uncertain and obscure period in 
Roman history. The only text that was exclusively concerned with this issue was a 
pamphlet of French origin, entitled A Dissertation upon the Uncertainty of the 
Roman History during the first Five Hundred Years, which was published in the 
second half of the century. While this took the view that “[t]he more rude and 
ignorant the first age of the Roman people was, the less wonder it is to find it 
adorned with fables,”61 the general tendency of the British historians was to treat 
those fables as facts. Thomas O’Connor rightly attributes this reluctance of the 
eighteenth-century historians to question the reliability of the early Roman sources to 
the belief in the political continuity of the institutions of antiquity into the modern 
period. In the eyes of the many, in the “justification mechanism of the ancien 
régime”, the Roman history had a prominent place and any sign of disbelief in its 
authenticity would be “an implicit attack on the integrity of the old order.”62                 
The Roman histories of the eighteenth century were preoccupied with 
demonstrating the ways of becoming and being a good monarch. As Armitage holds, 
“the mirror for a prince” was a “humanistic genre” very common in England.63 
Among its prominent eighteenth-century examples, there were Daniel Defoe’s Of 
Royal Education (1728), Andrew Michael Ramsay’s A Plan of Education for a 
Young Prince (1732) and, of course, Lord Bolingbroke’s The Idea of a Patriot King 
(1738). In particular, Bolingbroke’s model of the patriot king acquired a considerable 
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fame as the champion of blue-water policy, which will later be emphasised in the 
coming chapter.64  
Such preoccupation with creating the ideal monarch was revealed in the 
Roman history texts and the British historians of Rome dealt with men a great deal 
more than with events. It was generally believed that the greatness of Rome 
depended on the virtuous character of its men and a study of these characters would 
provide the British reader with a Roman role model.65 The Roman history had been 
proven to be essential in the search for the virtue, as “[t]he characters of great men to 
be met within it are so numerous, that it may be affirmed, that there are models of all 
the moral virtues fit for every one’s imitation.”66 Under the influence of Virgil and 
Horace, the character that attracted the most attention was undeniably the first 
emperor Octavius Augustus (31BC-14AD). This fascination with Augustus gained 
part of the eighteenth century the name of the Augustan age. During the reign of 
Augustus, Rome was transformed from a republic to an empire. The accession of 
territory increased to such an extent that “never before had one man ruled so much of 
the world.” What is more, to the amazement and admiration of the historians, 
Augustus enhanced Roman rule all over the empire, both east and west, despite the 
vastness of the newly acquired lands. In this sense, the history of Augustus’s reign 
was considered as the history of “the idea of empire in the west.” 67 The tradition 
was, of course, very old: Augustus was the subject of much attention and praise, 
since Jesus Christ was born in that extraordinary stretch of time.  
For these reasons, the British historians meticulously studied the reign of 
Augustus as a model for emulation and attempted to draw parallels between 
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Augustus and the British monarchs. At the same time, they also highlighted the 
reigns of Tiberius and Nero, who stood for the bad ruler as a contrast to everything 
Augustus represented. They instructed the present and future kings of Britain to 
become not a Tiberius but an Augustus. The Augustan period witnessed an 
unprecedented territorial expansion and a miraculous peace and order, which were 
thought to be naturally incompatible with spatial expansion. The British Augustus 
was therefore expected to similarly “emerge to settle the world and throw open 
permanently the gates to the temple of peace.”68 On this account, in the modern 
period whenever a monarchical crisis was resolved and the increase in the kingdom’s 
wealth and power began to accelerate, the monarch was hailed as a possible 
Augustus. Charles II’s reign, for example, was commonly accepted as the beginning 
of an Augustan era. Nevertheless, George I and II came to be associated with 
Augustus more than any other monarchs in British history.  
At this point, it should be underlined that the Augustan designation of the 
reigns of George I and II owed a great deal to the party politics of the age. The word 
Augustus was frequently used by the party polemicists while commenting on the 
similarity of the political affairs of their age and those of Augustus. The coronation 
of George I in 1715 was enthusiastically welcomed by the Whigs. George I was 
treated as an Augustus who came to save Britain from the Tories and bring peace to 
the kingdom. When George II, christened George Augustus, ascended the throne in 
1727, this confirmed once again in the eyes of the Whigs that they were living in the 
age of Augustus. Many Whig pamphlets were published in which the similarity 
between George II and Augustus was emphasised. Meanwhile, the Tories also were 
eagerly scrutinising the Roman history, not surprisingly, to disprove the Whig 
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argument associating the Georges with Augustus. In this sense, they claimed that if 
George I was to be identified with a Roman, that would be Julius Caesar rather than 
Augustus on the grounds of “his suppression of individual freedoms.”69  
Nevertheless, the views of Augustus were not always necessarily positive. As 
Erskine-Hill most rightly points out: “[n]o period ever thinks only one thing on a 
subject: it is rare for one person ever to think one thing only on a subject, even at one 
time.”70 Beside Tories who despised the court of Augustus for being corrupted, there 
were Whigs who accused Augustus of wiping out the republican features of Rome. 
Whether Augustus was a fit archetype of a good ruler or whether the Georges were 
fit to be called the British Augustuses were questions extensively discussed in the 
political pamphlets of the age. In such literature, the polemical works, which 
concentrated on Cato of Utica (95-46BC) came fore as the most influential, 
particularly Cato: A Tragedy (1713) by Joseph Addison and Cato’s Letters (1720-3) 
by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon.  Interestingly enough, Cato, who was 
widely known as the ‘last Roman republican’ and whose death indicated the 
beginning of the imperial era in Roman history, became the symbol of both the 
republicans and the Tory opposition in eighteenth-century Britain.  
The varying views of Augustus and Cato in political writings are not of 
particular interest to this study and therefore will not be further examined here. As 
mentioned above, this dissertation is exclusively concerned with the history texts, 
though, of course the history texts were political enough. Additionally, the points, 
where the historians stood politically, did determine whether they would lay positive 
or negative emphasis on certain topics. Therefore, eighteenth-century politics will be 
brought into this study to the degree it was embedded in the ancient history texts and 
                                                 
69Johnson, Neo-Classical Thought, 24. 
70 Erskine-Hill, Augustan Idea, 264. 
 30
not in the way it was reflected in the political pamphlets written by the party 
polemicists who drew analogies between Britain and Rome. 
 
1.4 Eighteenth-Century Roman History Texts 
 
 
From the very beginning of the century, as before, translations of Livy, 
Tacitus, as well as the poets, Ovid, Virgil and Horace were published in great 
number, among which those by John Dryden (1631-1700), Thomas Hearne (1678-
1735) and Richard Bentley (1662-1742) were highly appreciated and enjoyed a 
massive readership. There were also a considerable number of histories of Rome 
which were originally written in French and translated into English. Histoire des 
Revolutions arrivées dans le gouvernmenet de la République Romaine (1720) by 
Abbot de Vertot, Histoire Romaine, depuis la foundation de Rome (1728) by 
François Catrou and Pierre Julien Rouille and Histoire Romaine depuis la foundation 
de Rome jusqu’a la bataille d’Actium (1754) by Charles Rollin were the most 
renowned examples of their kind. We understand from the prefaces of the Roman 
histories written by the British historians that they benefited highly from these 
French works, both in terms of context and methodology. While explaining his aim 
in writing a Roman history, Nathaniel Hooke, for example, overtly expresses his 
admiration of these French historians in his The Roman History from the Building of 
Rome to the Ruin of the Commonwealth thus: 
My design therefore was, to form a general history of the Romans…which 
should be full without being diffuse, and short without being dry…In the 
pursuit of this design I have been chiefly aided by the labours of the learned 
Jesuits Catrou and Rouille, and by the amusements of the ingenious Mr 
Vertou, whose several collections I have compared with the ancient 
writers… 
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Hooke concluded that Catrou, Rouille and de Vertou in fact offered “a more correct 
and more connected summary of the events therein recorded.”71  
In particular, de Vertot’s history was held in higher esteem than the others 
and treated as a masterpiece. Those who read it in French harshly criticised the 
translator John Ozell (d.1743) for not doing justice to the original. Peele and 
Woodward under the pseudonym the “Translators” denounced Ozell’s translation as 
“full of unpardonable blunders.”72 However, none of these works was exempt from 
criticism. On the contrary, the “exhaustiveness” of the French histories of Rome 
could be rightly seen as one of the reasons that led the British historians to write 
Roman histories themselves. Oliver Goldsmith (1728-1774), for instance, states in 
his Roman History that he felt the urge to write a Roman history mainly because the 
French texts were “too voluminous for common use.” Catrou and Rouille’s history 
was in six volumes, whereas Rollin’s history of sixteen volumes reached to thirty 
volumes octavo with the contribution of Crevier, Rollin’s continuator after his death. 
Moreover, the period they dealt with was “entirely unsuited to the time and expense 
mankind usually chose to bestow upon this subject.” 73 Similarly, Hooke criticised 
Rollin’s work for being “diffused and circumstantiated in matters of small 
importance, and too much crowded with speeches, in many of which are but little 
spirit of instruction.”74
Although the first British history of Rome written in the eighteenth century 
was The History of Rome from the Death of Severus Alexander (1701) by the modern 
William Wotton, Basil Kennet’s Roma Antique: Or, The Antiquities of Rome (1696) 
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should in fact be considered as the first on the grounds that Roma Antique cast light 
on how to write good history and thus remained influential throughout the century. 
Basil Kennet (1674-1715) had a countrywide reputation for his remarkable 
scholarship and amiable character which won him a huge circle of friends, which 
included both Whigs and Tories. His eight-volume work went through several 
editions and took its place in the libraries of the coming generation of historians. 
Kennet dedicated Roma Antique to the Duke of Gloucester with the purpose of 
exhibiting “the most celebrated examples of virtue and great achievements” to him, 
even though “this would prove a needless piece of service,” since the Duke already 
“goes on like the Trojan prince.”75
William Wotton’s The History of Rome from the Death of Antonious Pius to 
the Death of Severus Alexander was dedicated not to the Duke of Gloucester but his 
instructor, Gilbert Burnet, the Whig bishop of Salisbury, who “best knew how such a 
prince ought to be educated.”76 It was also widely believed that this history may have 
been “the first piece of Roman history” which George, then Electoral Prince of 
Hanover, read in English.77 In writing it, Wotton aimed to choose “the properest 
examples in the whole Roman history, to instruct a prince how much more glorious 
and safe it is, and happier both for himself and for his people, to govern well than 
ill.”78 As mentioned above, the Roman histories of the eighteenth century were 
designed to arrive at a good Roman prototype which would serve as a role model to 
present and future British monarchs. In this sense, Wotton also adapted the method 
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of exemplifying, using both good and bad examples, in order to better highlight his 
point:   
At first no more was intended than the lives of Marcus and Commodus, and 
of Elagabalus and Alexander. A very bad prince who immediately succeeded 
a very good one; and a most extraordinary prince, who came after one of the 
most profligate of man; were thought the properest instances to set virtue 
and vice, and the consequences of them both in a clear and a full light. And 
real examples, if faithfully set forth, have a greater influence upon the minds 
of men, than any feigned story, though never so artificially related. 
 
He then included other good and bad emperors in order to produce a more complete 
history. In doing that, Wotton, as a Modern, acknowledged how much he benefited 
from the numismatic findings: 
I have all along paid a great deference to the authority of medals, in 
illustrating the history of every emperor, and in fixing the times of their 
greatest actions. That is a field which has not been so thoroughly cultivated 
as most others have been; and it is but lately learned men have had such 
general recourse to these undisputed monuments of antiquity, to explain 
many things which the historians do very lamely tell us. 79
 
At the same time, though confessing that his own method could have made his 
history heavy, he criticised the Ancient obsession with eloquent style. And in return, 
Tory High-church literary men who were won over by the Ancient argument did not 
hide their discontent with this Modern and Whiggish history of Wotton.  
Laurence Echard’s The Roman History from the Building of the City to the 
Perfect Settlement of the Empire by Augustus Caesar in five volumes followed 
Wotton’s work in 1707. Although Echard (1670?-1730) previously produced the first 
two volumes separately, it was in the year 1707 for the first time in five volume 
form. Nevertheless, despite the appearance of all five under his name, only the first 
two volumes were written by Echard himself. He was known as “a moderate 
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Hanoverian Tory” and backed by Tory statesmen.80 The Romans, he considered, 
constituted a perfect example for the British, as  
[i]t was a nation that was virtuous through a true principal of honour; whose 
valour was more the product of the head than heart; a nation that courted or 
avoided danger, from a result of prudence, and knew as well when to expose 
itself, when to retreat, by the dictates of reason; and obtained the sovereignty 
over the rest of the world more by the reputation of its virtue, than the force 
of its arms.81
  
Their history “contains such variety of extraordinary examples, proper for the 
instruction of princes.” Thus, Echard too dedicated the second volume of his work to 
Prince William, Duke of Gloucester, with the expectation that he would “learn the 
deplorable and fatal mischiefs of a boundless tyranny; what flames it raises on earth, 
and what punishments it draws down from heaven.”82 Yet, Echard was a historian 
firmly committed to exhibit the virtue of Roman imperialism with a particular 
emphasis on the Augustan era. Because of its overzealous praise of Augustus, 
Echard’s history was ridiculed in Monthly Review in 1771 as “a tasteless, hurriedly 
composed work.”83  Before that however, it had already been criticised by Nathaniel 
Hooke (d.1763), the author of the next Roman history to appear in Britain, as “too 
dry, too brief and unsatisfactory.”84   
Hooke’s The Roman History from the Building of Rome to the Ruin of the 
Commonwealth dedicated to his friend Alexander Pope was published in 1738 and 
gained him a substantial fame as a historian of Rome. Unlike his predecessors, he 
laid the emphasis on “the civil affairs of the Romans, and the revolutions in their 
                                                 
80 Laird Okie, ‘Ideology and Partiality in David Hume’s History of England,’ Vol. 11, No: 1 (April, 
1985), 7.  It should also here mentioned that Deborah Stephen claims that Echard was, in fact, a Whig 
historian. Deborah Stephan, ‘Laurence Echard- Whig Historian,’ The Historical Journal Vol. 32 No. 4 
(December, 1989), 843-866. Nevertheless, his views with which this study is concerned overlap with 
contemporary Tory ideals.      
81 Laurence Echard, The Roman History from the Building of the City to the Perfect Settlement of the 
Empire by Augustus Caesar (London: R. Bonwick, J. Tonfon, W. Freeman and etc., 1707), I, Preface. 
82 Echard, Roman History, II, epistle dedicatory. 
83 Monthly Review, No. 44 (1771), 529 quoted in Howard D. Weinbrot, ‘History, Horace and 
Augustus Caesar: Some Implications for Eighteenth-Century Studies,’ Eighteenth-Century Studies, 
Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer, 1974), 393.  
84 Hooke, Roman History, I, unpaginated preface. 
 35
government” rather than the wars. Nevertheless, despite all his claims to perfection, 
Hooke included tedious footnotes and massive extracts from Cicero but one cannot 
see much of his own explicit observations and remarks in his work. As he himself 
pointed out, he limited such comments to “principally those on Sir Isaac Newton’s 
objections to the chronology observed by the ancient writers of the Roman story.”85 
Still, what messages he intended to give are clear enough, especially those on the 
liberties of the senate and people. As a matter of fact, his views on the senate proved 
to be highly controversial and were challenged by Conyers Middleton’s Treatise on 
the Roman Senate (1747) and Thomas Chapman’s Essay on the Roman Senate 
(1750). Since Hooke preferred to answer his critics out of his Roman history, this 
study will not further elaborate on this polemic and will only be concerned with 
Hooke’s assessments as they appeared in the Roman History. 
Between Hooke’s work and Thomas Blackwell’s renowned Memoirs of the 
Court of Augustus (1753), a rather insignificant history by John Lockman (1698-
1771) was published in 1740 in the form of questions and answers, principally 
designed for young people. With the concern that the existing Roman histories would 
“convey very imperfect ideas to the mind of a learner and consequently contribute 
very little to his real improvement,”86 Lockman endeavoured to simplify those 
erudite texts. Then Blackwell (1701-1757) published the first two volumes of the 
Memoirs, which was received as a very remarkable account of the Augustan age. He 
stated that his design was never “to write a book of antiquities, to correct an error in 
the Fasti, settle a dubious consul, or determine the precise day of a battle” but “to 
show by what steps a brave and free people, from being the conquerors of the 
western world, came first to forfeit their liberties, and, by degrees, sunk into slavery, 
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and become the meanest of mankind.” In doing that, he considered himself engaged 
in philosophical history, which was, in his words, the “difficult science of men.”87  
Through his court-Whig idealisation of the republican era, Blackwell sought 
to prove that the British could possibly end up as ‘the meanest of mankind’ too, if 
they gave up on their liberties. His attachment to republican politics caused Samuel 
Johnson’s explicit discontent. Still, his work was highly praised by the British reader 
as a product of serious research and scholarly knowledge and translated into French 
in 1781. The less influential third volume, based on Blackwell’s notes, was written 
by John Mills (1717-1786) and published in 1763. Though an author principally on 
agriculture, Mills undertook this scheme to fulfil his duty to the happiness of his 
nation which depended on the governors “whose manners the people are rather more 
ready to imitate than to obey their commands.”88  
In passing, it might be emphasised that agriculture was not considered a topic 
out of imperial discussions. In his Nature’s Government, Richard Drayton holds that 
it was thought desirable that “the research of local plants and their uses” to be 
conducted concurrently and within the imperial ventures with the hope of “the 
discovery of the raw materials for food, medicines, dyes, and perfumes.”89 
Furthermore, acquiring scientific knowledge of “nature’s government” was seen as 
arriving at a way of making “estates, nations or colonies self-sufficient or wealthy.” 
Therefore, advancement in agriculture was imperative in the empire-building process 
and, to some, the ideal man at the service of empire was the Roman type of “the 
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farmer-statesman.” 90 On this account, Mills engagement in Roman history should 
not be seen as a coincidence.          
In 1759, Edward Wortley Montagu (1713-1776) published his Reflections on 
the Rise and Fall of the Ancient Republics.  This was not properly a history text, but 
did include very useful insights into the Roman and Greek histories, particularly with 
reference to the notion of empire. Thus, it will also be examined thoroughly in the 
coming chapters. Coming back to the history texts, Oliver Goldsmith’s The Roman 
History from the Foundation of the City of Rome to the Destruction of the Western 
Empire appeared in 1769. Goldsmith, who was influenced by “a non-religious but 
somewhat high prerogative Tory tradition,”91 became one of the most popular 
authors of his age.  He wrote various kinds of history texts among which the histories 
of Rome and England were more widely read. Although his colleagues generally 
looked down on him as a hack writer, he was rather comfortable with this image and 
did not claim “discoveries,” or to “offer anything…which has not been often 
anticipated by others.”92 In his Roman history, he underlined that he simply aimed 
“to supply a concise, plain, and unaffected narrative of the rise and decline of a well 
known empire” and not to tire his reader unlike “many dull men” of his time.  In 
doing that he reflected Augustus in an extremely positive light throughout his work; 
for Goldsmith was among the men who created the literary cult of Augustus in the 
eighteenth century.  
It is crucial here to note that Goldsmith’s assessment of Rome’s decline, 
which in fact predates that of Gibbon, related the relationship of the Roman Empire 
with Christianity. His non-religious stance gave him the liberty to explain the 
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imperial disarray by the supposed decaying effect of a state religion on the free spirit 
of human beings. Although Gibbon’s conclusion alone is considered as so ground-
breaking as to “permanently alter the study of Roman history,”93 Goldsmith who 
elaborated on the same point before him, continued to be remembered as a hack 
writer. One may surmise that this was because Goldsmith was a name extremely 
associated with the eighteenth-century image of the coffee-houses in “the small and 
gossipy town of London.”94 As elucidated in Peter Gay’s Enlightenment, the belief 
that emancipation from religion would bring along progress was commonsense for 
the ‘enlightened’ minds.95 Therefore, both historians should in fact be considered as 
a mouthpiece for common enlightenment ideas. Nevertheless, it should here be stated 
that there were certainly still religion-oriented historians among those who wrote 
Roman history.                    
Finally, following the publication of the anonymous Roman History in a 
Series of Letters from a Nobleman to his Son (1774) in two volumes, Adam Ferguson 
published his History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic in 
1783 with a dedication to the king. Ferguson (1723-1816) believed that in his age “a 
relation worthy of the subject, simple and unambitious of ornament, containing in the 
parts an useful detail, and in the whole a just representation, of the military conduct 
and political experience” of Rome, were still lacking in Roman history writing.96 To 
know Roman history well was “to know mankind; and to have seen our species 
under the fairest aspect of great ability, integrity and courage.”97 For these reasons 
Ferguson engaged in such an activity and the success of his history was such that his 
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work eventually superseded that of Hooke’s. His account of Augustus was, however, 
singled out as the most hostile. In this respect, he adopted the Whig approach, 
attacking Augustus for bringing an end to the Roman Republic. Also Ferguson, as a 
philosopher of the Scottish Enlightenment, was preoccupied with the question of 
progress and the stages through which a state could evolve. Interestingly enough, he 
adopted such an approach in his Roman history and thus produced one of the most 
philosophical history texts of his age. Although his Progress and Termination of the 
Roman Republic was in the course of time forgotten and his other works, such as the 
Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), received considerably more attention 
from the next generation scholars. The former piece offers valuable insight for our 
research.   
Ferguson’s Roman history was the last prominent example of its sort in the 
eighteenth century. As the political interest began to lean towards the discussions of 
democracy, the history of ancient Greece appeared to be “a more useful polemical 
device” than that of Rome.98                                      
  
1.5 Greek History 
 
     Till the 1740s, although certain “Greek forces” were “visibly operative”99 
in literature, the eighteenth-century British interest in ancient history was 
predominantly in Rome rather than Greece. From the 1740s on, however, there 
developed a profound interest in Greece and much labour was invested in works 
dealing with Greek history, both ancient and modern. Thus “a reorientation within a 
surviving classical tradition from a Roman to a Greek axis” took place. 100 Joseph 
Levine regards this concentration on Greek antiquities and histories as the 
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coincidence of interest and opportunity, which was to “produce a spasm of activity 
that stirred all Europe and prepared the way for the ‘Greek revival.’”101 In Britain, 
the opportunity was provided by newly founded societies with an interest in 
antiquity, such as the Society of Dilettanti (1732?).  This society granted patronage 
for some of the proposed voyages to Greece, among which that of James Stuart and 
Nicholas Revett in 1751 was notable. Although the British had long been acquainted 
with various kinds of sources for the study of Greece, particularly through the Levant 
Company, first-hand information obtained as a consequence of these voyages 
contributed to the prevailing and ever-increasing interest in the Greek history. Stuart 
and Revett’s Antiquities of Athens (1762-1816) which has been highly praised as “an 
important work of scholarship and a magnificent picture book,”102 was followed by 
Richard Chandler’s Antiquities of Ionia (1789) published by the same society. 
Among the future members of the Dilettanti, there was also William Mitford whose 
Greek history became one of the most widely read texts of its time. Such attempts 
unquestionably inspired the idea that Athens, “the nourisher of Rome,” 103 had been 
sadly neglected and that it was time for its rediscovery. Equally important, the 
Ottoman Empire which had for long blocked the way to the East no longer put off 
the ventures of discovering Greece. That made Greece approachable for the first time 
since the fall of Constantinople.    
Particularly from the second half of the century, a large number of historians, 
each one claiming possession of the best method of research and a fuller knowledge 
of Greece, laboured to produce volumes of Greek history. Some of these works were 
texts dealing with ancient history only, while the others were in the form of accounts 
of voyages to Greece with scattered information on its past. Additionally, there were 
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widely read translations of similar works by the French historians, who had 
demonstrated a similar interest in Greek history. Nevertheless, when compared with 
the Roman histories, the Greek histories remained of secondary importance for much 
of the eighteenth century. This was mainly because the Roman history texts aimed to 
provide the reader with “the formulation of personal codes of conduct”104 in the first 
place and the Greek histories did not. In other words, the attempts to celebrate the 
virtuous and honest man in Roman history left Greek studies in the shade throughout 
the century. As Johnson rightly points out: “the roster of Greek heroes and citizens” 
did not much appeal to the Whigs on the grounds that it could not offer “an 
attractive, workable model of conduct.”105 The ancient Greek history texts of 
eighteenth-century Britain bore the undeniable marks of Tory political discourse. 
It is a truism that the impact of Greek culture remained limited in the 
eighteenth century when compared with that of Roman civilisation. The age, after all, 
came to be called Augustan. Nevertheless, though considered secondary, the Greek 
history texts eventually proved not to be insignificant. They too reflected the 
eighteenth-century point of view on certain issues and actually did enjoy a 
considerable number of readers, especially following the remarkable and contagious 
interest of Charles James Fox and his friends in Greek studies.106 Although the 
majority of the Whigs generally seemed unimpressed by the themes from Hellenic 
studies, Fox’s scholarly knowledge and concern made ancient Greece fashionable in 
his own circle of Whig friends. Also, frequent references to Greek history in their 
works by the more famous authors such as Jonathan Swift and Thomas Hearne, 
raised a curiosity for the books of the British historians of Greece. Similarly, the 
English versions of the ancient Greek texts such as those of Herodotus translated by 
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Isaac Littlebury in 1709, and of Thucydides, translated by William Smith in 1753, 
contributed much to public interest. All in all, the men who were preoccupied with 
serious Greek scholarship in the mid-eighteenth century were not many in number; 
but they produced works that left a mark on politics, literature and art. 
The main motive of the historians in writing Greek histories was to exhibit 
the Greek spirit of liberty in a way that showed the British reader the very source of 
his manners and knowledge. They argued that both individuals and nations could 
cultivate themselves by increasing their acquaintance with ancient Greece, 
particularly with the reasons behind its corruption and fall. In advancing this 
purpose, the emphasis was not laid on the man but on the differing characters of 
peoples and civilisations. Of course, many pages were devoted to the lives and 
characters of Solon, Lycurgos, Pericles, Phillip II and Alexander. Nevertheless, the 
accounts of great men in the Greek history texts were actually subordinated to more 
extensive treatments of differences and similarities between civilizations. Another 
recurrent theme in the ancient Greek history texts of eighteenth-century Britain was 
the historians’ undeniable dislike of democracy, in their monarchical convictions.  In 
such analyses, it is generally believed that unlike the partiality for Athens in the 
nineteenth century, in eighteenth-century texts, Sparta attracted much attention and 
was commonly reflected in a positive light, by virtue of its being a monarchy. 
Athens, on the other hand, was not viewed fit to inspire the political nation.  Its 
greatest deficiency was that it had given excessive rights to the common people.  
After producing the most complete, scholarly and elegantly-written text ever, 
the historian’s main motive was to bring his political ideas into his work and thus to 
campaign for the causes which he considered worthy. Thus, many contemporary 
political issues from party politics to parliamentary elections emerged in the ancient 
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Greek history texts of eighteenth-century Britain. When these texts are scrutinized 
theme by theme, however, one sees that judging them as pro-Spartan, solely by 
taking the arguments for monarchy into consideration is an oversimplification. 
Different themes were elaborated by the British historians of ancient Greece from 
differing perspectives which complicates the assessment of eighteenth-century 
ancient Greek historiography. The purpose in this dissertation is to demonstrate that 
if empire alone is picked among numerous political issues prevailing in ancient 
Greek history texts that are prescribed below, the appreciative remarks switch from 
Sparta to Athens. In doing that of course I shall also seek to pin down the notion of 
empire as understood by the British historians, which was the reflection of how the 
political nation perceived, or rather ought to have perceived, the affairs of the 
empire.          
In addition to Athens and Sparta, Macedonia and Persia also concerned the 
historians a great deal, although the views of these states, with reference to the notion 
of empire, were not always as positive as those of Athens. The historians inclined to 
stereotype the Spartan empire as the antithesis of the Athenian imperial venture, but 
it was unquestionably the part of the Greek family which taught the western 
civilization about liberty.  Particularly in the Greek defiance of the Persians, Sparta 
ceased to be depicted as a rival empire with incompatible features to those of the 
Athenian empire and assessed as an ally sharing the same geography, culture, 
language and religion and facing the same enemy as its neighbour. Macedonia, on 
the other hand, received less respect than Sparta as only intermittently included in the 
Greek family. Furthermore, its vast empire, representing an unwise expansionist 
policy, did not exhibit, in the eyes of the historians, an ought-to-be empire to inspire 
the British. Unsurprisingly, at the bottom of the hierarchy of empires there was the 
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Persian empire, which was treated as the alien, hence inferior to the kind of empire 
found desirable. In the next section, the texts from which such argument is derived 
will be briefly introduced.              
 
1.6 Eighteenth-Century Greek History Texts 
No book has been entirely devoted to the ancient Greek historiography of 
eighteenth-century Britain. The existing assessments of the topic take place as 
chapters, or parts of chapters, in the works concerned with larger subjects, such as 
neo-classicism. The most comprehensive examples of the sort are Clarke’s Greek 
Studies in England 1700-1830 (Cambridge, 1945), Ogilvie’s Latin and Greek: A 
History of the Influence of the Classics on English Life from 1600 to 1918 (London, 
1964); and Johnson’s The Formation of English Neo-Classical Thought (New Jersey, 
1967). Nevertheless, though including the most extensive analysis of the historians 
and their texts, Clarke’s approach remains superficial, out of fashion and emotional 
as it is in the example where he calls one of the historians a “superficial moralist.”107 
And, the works of Ogilvie and Johnson lay more emphasis on the Roman side of the 
neo-classical studies. There is also Momigliano’s Ottavo Contributo Alla Storia 
Degli Studi Classici e del Mondo Antico (Rome, 1987) in which the author 
concentrates on only the works of two historians and then shifts his area of interest to 
the nineteenth century. Additionally, there are few articles which show limited 
interest in only some of the ancient Greek history texts by eighteenth-century British 
historians and such works contribute to perpetuate the comments giving the reader 
the impression that these texts consist of monarchical and pro-Spartan arguments all 
along.108
                                                 
107 M.L. Clarke, Greek Studies in England 1700-1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 106. 
108 See Paul Cartledge, ‘Ancient Greeks and Modern Britons,’ History Today, April 1994, Kyriacos 
Demetriou, ‘In Defence of the British Constitution: Theoretical Implications of the Debate over 
 45
The ancient Greek historiography of eighteenth-century Britain has been 
neglected on the grounds of its poor scholarly level which becomes more evident 
when compared to that of the nineteenth century. However, it may be noted that none 
of the works mentioned above provides a complete list of the ancient Greek histories 
of the age discussed. Their analyses focus on only one aspect, which is its 
monarchical tone, and tediously refer to the same words of the same historians, 
namely of John Gillies and William Mitford. For the historians who engaged in 
writing ancient Greek history, their design was to serve a twofold purpose. On one 
hand, the political nation would have read a more accurate and skillfully-written 
account of ancient Greece, but they also sought to make this an invaluable source of 
inspiration. Given the lack of textual criticism and archaeological information, 
eighteenth-century British histories of ancient Greece failed to attain the first 
objective. This failure, nonetheless, does not justify the neglect of these texts by 
modern scholars, as there is insight in them, if indeed a lack of historical accuracy.    
The historians secondly aimed to express their own vantage-point on hotly-
debated contemporary political issues with reference to the political experiences of 
ancient Greeks.  Their works encompass political comments of a wide range and in 
this respect, provide additional insight into eighteenth-century British politics. The 
debate over monarchy is only one of the themes that pervade the ancient Greek 
histories. Therefore the assessment of the subject should not be confined to only this 
theme. Other matters on the political agenda of the British, such as empire-building 
and –administration, deserve attention. For that reason, if not for their scholarly 
value, ancient Greek history texts of the eighteenth century should not be dismissed. 
Particularly on the notion of empire, they present significant information. Ancient 
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Greek history-writing in eighteenth-century Britain was an attempt to understand the 
British empire with reference to ancient examples, both positive and negative. It also 
made reference to the contemporary imperial practices of Spain and France within 
this attempt at negative exemplification.                                        
Certainly, better Greek history was produced in the nineteenth century, which 
proved to be inspiring for the poets and artists in creating a cult of Greece in Britain. 
When compared with the books by Richard Porson (1759-1808), George Grote 
(1794-1871) and Connop Thirlwall (1797-1875), the eighteenth-century histories 
have been criticised as “unsatisfactory” and “incomplete”.109 They unquestionably 
failed to reach high scholarly standards in discovering the unknowns of ancient 
Greece and included some error. As Ogilvie rightly puts it, “ancient Greece seemed 
young,” even at the end of the century.110 Still, it is not the concern of this study to 
discuss these texts, to praise or criticise their efforts to reconstruct ancient Greece. 
These texts were written with the purpose of transmitting certain political messages 
to the public. As indicated before, this study aims to detect and exhibit those based 
on the notion of empire. A closer look at the eighteenth-century British histories of 
ancient Greece and their authors will be taken in the coming pages. 
Unlike the Roman histories, the Greek histories of the French historians were 
not widely translated and published in eighteenth-century Britain. The most 
prominent example among the few was Abrége de l’Histoire Grecque by Pons 
Augustin Alletz which appeared in 1768 with an introductory preface by William 
Robertson, the Historiographer Royal for Scotland. The French texts which appealed 
more to the British public were in fact the accounts of journeys to Greece such as A 
Sentimental Journey through Greece by Pierre Augustin Guys (1773) and Letters on 
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Greece by Claude Etienne Savary (1788). Nevertheless, they did not have much 
influence on the British historians in the way that the works by Rollin and de Vertot 
did. Nor could they compete with the popularity of the Greek diaries of Stuart and 
Revett or Chandler.       
The first examples of British histories of ancient Greece were those by John 
Potter (1673/4-1747) and Thomas Hind. At a time when the Greek history was not 
yet a matter of interest, Potter’s history entitled Antiquities of Greece (1697), was 
received with considerable enthusiasm and interest. Probably on account of his later 
becoming the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Antiquities went through several 
editions and was even translated into German. Though a high churchman, his close 
relationship with the Whig ministers of George I and George II made him a popular 
figure in the Whig circle.   On the other hand, Hind managed only to have the first 
volume of his History of Greece (1707) published, although he aimed to produce the 
first complete history of Greece in English. Apparently he was not as fortunate as 
Potter who, as he stated in his work, “first put me upon this design, and has all along, 
out of his great friendship to me, afforded me his assistance in it.”111 All Greek 
histories published subsequent to Potter’s history in some way aimed to supercede 
his work and develop the parts left unclear by him. William Mitford, for example, 
both admired and criticized Potter for the reason that “after all, his labors, leaves” the 
coming generation “in the dark concerning some circumstances.”112  Even if it was 
the author’s name which brought it success, it would be wrong to doubt the 
scholarship in Potter’s Antiquities of Greece. In fact, Potter was a very learned 
classical scholar and, as their prefaces made clear, his work became a source of 
inspiration for the Greek histories published in the second half of the century.  
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Temple Stanyan (1676/7-1752), for example, the first Englishman to write a 
complete history of ancient Greece in the eighteenth century, acknowledged in his 
Grecian History his admiration for Potter due to “his extensive knowledge in all 
parts of learning.”113 In addition, Richard Jackson (d. 1787), who was the author of 
Literatura Graeca, written for young people, praised him for “giving a form to a 
shapeless mass of antiquities, and reducing it within a convenient compass.”  To 
some minds, however, Potter’s work was fit only “to satisfy one who had advanced 
in letters.” 114
In 1739, Temple Stanyan’s enlarged second edition of Grecian History 
dating from 1707 appeared  and was to be the forerunner of subsequent publications 
on Greek history in the second half of the century. Stanyan’s work ran through 
several editions and was translated into French by Diderot in 1743.115 According to 
Stanyan, “the Grecians were the only people of note” in history who “for many ages 
followed only their first guide, tradition.”116 For that reason, their history deserved to 
be widely read and studied. Though aiming to produce a complete history, Stanyan 
did not include the reign of Alexander in his two-volume work, on the grounds that 
the affairs of Alexander were related more to Macedonia and Persia, rather than 
Greece. The Grecian History, however, failed to keep up with the criteria of textual 
criticism set by scholars such as Bentley and was dismissed as a compilation after the 
arrival of the histories by John Gillies and above all William Mitford. On the other 
hand, the works of Oliver Goldsmith and John Gast failed to supercede Stanyan in 
                                                 
113 Temple Stanyan, The Grecian History: From the Original of Greece, to the Death of Phillip of 
Macedon (London: J. and R. Tonson, 1766), II, unpaginated preface.   
114 Richard Jackson, Literatura Graeca (London: F. Newbery, 1769), vii. 
115 Diderot not only translated Stanyan’s history, but referred to it in the Encyclopedié in 1747. 
According to James Doolittle, Diderot’s reference to Stanyan was in effect a turning point for the 
French philosopher in his transformation from a hack-writer to an accomplished editor. James 
Doolittle, ‘From Hack to Editor-Diderot and the Booksellers,’ Modern Language Notes, Vol. 75, No. 
2 (February, 1960), 133-139.  
116 Stanyan, Grecian History, I, unpaginated preface. 
 49
the eyes of the historians of historiography. Till the publication of Mitford’s work, 
Stanyan dominated the field despite its shortcomings in terms of methodology. 
Although this history has been frequently labeled ‘pro-Spartan’ because the author, 
in an unhidden dislike of democracy, argued that “in Athens the power of the people 
was too excessive,” he equally distanced himself from Sparta as “too limited” a 
monarchy. To Stanyan, hardly surprisingly, the English system which was “the 
middle scheme between these extremes” seemed to be “the nearest to perfection.” 117 
Still, both Athens and Sparta offered invaluable lessons to his eighteenth-century 
reader and that was why he undertook the task of writing a Greek history. When it 
came to the matter of managing an empire, as will be seen in Chapter IV, the lessons 
of Stanyan were mostly derived from Athens.                 
Before the publication of the general history texts by Gillies, Gast and 
Mitford, however, in 1758 a particular history of ancient Greece, entitled The History 
of the Life and Reign of Philip, King of Macedon by the Irish clergyman and 
historian Thomas Leland (1722-1785), who was also known as the translator of The 
Orations of Demosthenes, did appear. In this work of two volumes, following the 
contemporary Roman history-writing tradition and evidently inspired by Plutarch’s 
character sketches, Leland concentrated on the character of Philip and endeavoured 
first “to trace the progress of an artful, penetrating, and sagacious prince,” then “to 
disclose the latent causes of declension and ruin of nations, of the grandeur of kings, 
and the establishment of empires.”118 In this, his history, which aimed to be more 
comprehensive than “the learned” Samuel Puffendorf’s “short” but “perfect and 
accurate” account of Philip from the previous century, was unique among the Greek 
histories read in eighteenth-century Britain and received much admiration. His 
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concluding remark on Philip declaring that “[i]f he was unjust, he was like Caesar, 
unjust for the sake of empire”119 was to become one of the most cited and 
controversial references in those years. Leland’s Philip reflected a highly positive 
view of Athens which contradicts belief in the universality of pro-Spartan sentiment. 
Because the tone of these texts switches from Spartan to Athenian according to the 
themes elaborated, it would not be apt to label the ancient Greek histories of 
eighteenth-century Britain as pro-Spartan altogether. Philip, in this respect, stands as 
a proof of the non-existence of solid Spartan argument in this body of writings.          
The Greek history of Oliver Goldsmith, whose Roman and English histories 
actually became more popular, was not published in the lifetime of the author. This 
may indicate that despite the increasing concern with Greece, the publishers still 
preferred Roman and English histories to the Greek ones in the 1770s. Nevertheless, 
it is known from his very well-documented financial affairs that for his Greek history 
Goldsmith was paid £250, which was an amount rarely paid to a historian of Rome. 
Besides, in 1787 his Grecian History from the Earliest State to the Death of 
Alexander the Great (1785) was abridged for the use of schools. To Goldsmith, the 
history of ancient Greece was basically the history of “a number of petty independent 
states, sometimes at war and sometimes in alliance with one another.” On this 
account, while writing “with as much brevity as is consistent with perspicuity,” he 
regarded the accounts of great men to be of secondary importance.120 Nevertheless, 
despite his wide audience, charming style and claim to offer a better Greek history, 
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his attempts at writing histories, including this one, only contributed to his reputation 
as a great hack-writer.121  
Yet, Goldsmith’s Greek history should not be dismissed as a hack-work 
deprived of any useful insights. It included the author’s personal opinion on many 
contemporary issues, including empire, with reference to similar experiences of 
ancient Greeks, which should be considered as a representative of eighteenth-century 
Tory discourse. In 1784 Goldsmith’s history was superseded by that of William 
Mitford (1744-1827) which was the most monarchical and Tory history published up 
till that day. As a matter of fact, the notable success of Mitford’s history was alone 
responsible for the labeling of eighteenth-century ancient Greek historiography as 
anti-Athenian and pro-monarchy.    
Mitford was convinced by his friend from their militia days, Edward Gibbon, 
to try his hand at the Greek history. Consequently, his five-volume work took its 
place among the most eminent and controversial texts of the age and gained him the 
reputation of the ‘Tory historian of Greece.’ The first volume of this monumental 
work appeared in 1784 and the fifth did not come out before 1810. Apart from the 
first volume, Mitford’s Greek history was preoccupied with the French Revolution 
and attempted to associate the events of ancient Athens with those of eighteenth-
century France. By citing examples from Athens, he condemned democracy as a 
curse to moral government, as also seen in revolutionary France, and enthusiastically 
idealized Sparta at the expense of Athens. He even adopted Montesquieu’s definition 
of despotism, which was at the time very commonly associated with the Ottoman 
Empire, in analyzing the Athenian government. In the light of this definition, Mitford 
contended that the assembled Athenian people represented nothing but “a despotic 
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multitude”122 and for that reason there existed “many marks of kindred between the 
Turkish despotism and Athenian democracy.”123  Thus exhibiting the evils of 
democracy, he sacrificed his ideal of writing good history and desire of “avoiding 
equally negligence and tediousness”124 which was expressed at the beginning of the 
first volume. He ended up with a “lengthy, clumsily written, rather ill-balanced”125 
work which became the subject of disapproving remarks of next generation 
historians such as Grote. Although this work became “enormously popular”126 
among the readers of history, only the first volume, and the second one to a degree, 
might be considered as history and it would be more appropriate to regard the rest in 
the category of political/polemical tracts. Besides, the last three volumes fall out of 
the period of this study.  
Two years after the appearance of the first volume of Mitford’s history, John 
Gillies (1714-1836), the Historiographer Royal for Scotland as the successor to 
William Robertson in 1793, published his Greek history in two volumes in 1786. In 
his own words, Gillies sought to write a “perpetual unbroken narrative” that would 
“promote the great purposes of pleasure and utility.”127 To ensure that it would be 
utilised by the intended person, he dedicated this work to the king with the hope that 
it would demonstrate “the dangerous turbulence of democracy” as well as “the 
inestimable benefits, resulting to liberty itself, from the lawful dominion of 
hereditary kings, and the steady operation of well-regulated monarchy.”128 Evidently 
“in a spirit of decidedly monarchical tendencies,”129 Gillies too brought his political 
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concerns into his history and following the footsteps of Mitford transmitted his 
message in the form of anti-Athenian argument. In Chapter IV, however, it will be 
argued that in his enquiry into ideal empire-building, Gillies’s messages switched to 
pro-Athenian ones. Though considered inferior as scholarship to Mitford’s history, 
Gillies’ work ran through several editions and was also translated into French and 
German. During his retirement later in 1807, he wrote two more volumes elaborating 
on the Greeks, under Roman dominion, as a sequel to his History of Greece. With 
this sequel this study will not be concerned.   
The last Greek history of the age came from an Irish historian, John Gast 
(b.1715), who became the Archdeacon of Glendalough in 1793. This was actually the 
new version of his previously published Rudiments of Grecian History (1753), which 
was bizarrely written in the form of a dialogue between the teaching elder Palaemon 
and the learning youngsters Eudoxus and Cleanthes. As Rudiments was disregarded 
because of its rather unusual form, Gast decided to transform it into an uninterrupted 
narrative in order to reach more readers. Nevertheless, for years he could not succeed 
in finishing this project. Finally, on the publication of histories by Mitford and 
Gillies, he felt obliged to finish his history of Greece and published it consequent to 
an intensified “labor at the expense of ten hours a day writing for two months.”130 
Although he claimed in the preface that he did not feel threatened by these works and 
that “if a work is really worthy of public perusal, and may contribute to the 
improvement of the public manners” 131 it would surely find its way to the 
community, he could not compete with the reputation of Mitford and Gillies. Despite 
his efforts, Gast’s history remained largely neglected even in his lifetime. In the 
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studies of eighteenth-century ancient Greek historiography, Gast’s history is not 
always counted alongside with those of Stanyan, Goldsmith, Mitford and Gillies.  
In the above paragraphs, comment has been made on the eighteenth century 
revival of the ancient history writing, the reasons that led the British historians to 
write ancient Roman and Greek histories and how these texts were received at that 
time. These texts were considered in the first place as a means to instruct and guide 
the monarch and statesmen in current political affairs and therefore included many 
remarks, both explicit and implicit, on the notion of empire. Before attempting to pin 
down this understanding of empire embedded in the ancient Roman and Greek 
history texts of the eighteenth century, however, the British perception of empire 
prevailing in the eighteenth century in general should be examined.       
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CHAPTER 2 
 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF EMPIRE IN THE EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY 
 
 
 
This chapter seeks to provide a general understanding of how the concept of 
empire was developed in the eighteenth century. In doing that, I shall employ only 
some of the quintessential eighteenth-century political pamphlets which dealt with 
the issues of empire, for it is obviously not possible to treat the entire imperial 
literature of the age within the limits of one chapter. Also, as secondary sources, the 
works by the well-known theorists of empire of our day such as Robert Koebner, 
Anthony Pagden, David Armitage, James Muldoon and Kathleen Wilson as well as 
Frederick Madden who studies the legislative aspect of the British Empire, will be 
utilised. Thus, in the end it is aimed to establish the important elements embedded in 
the eighteenth-century definitions of empire which will also be sought in the coming 
chapters, scrutinising the ancient history texts.            
The first British Empire, which is of particular interest to this study, was 
greatly associated with Protestantism, maritime power, commerce, non-aggressive 
settlements and political liberties. The concept of Catholic empire implying universal 
monarchy and conquest, on the other hand, had always carried a negative meaning 
and its constituent parts were not to be justified easily. Despite the incessant 
discussions over the conquest of Ireland, the purported character of the British 
Empire did not include conquered lands. It was commonly believed that Britain 
never aimed to become a universal empire which would grow by virtue of conquest, 
but conversely was committed to preventing that phenomenon’s emergence in 
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Europe at any cost. Even when the territorial expansion began, it was particularly 
stressed by statesmen that Britain was “a protectorate of several interests” rather than 
“a universal state.”1 A universal empire was to confront constantly the problems of 
legitimising and securing its conquests which were “usually as burthensome as 
dishonourable to the conquered” and “seldom of longer continuance.”2 What was 
more, the burden of preserving the overstretched territory of such an empire was 
overwhelming. In order not to confront these problems in its imperial experience, 
Britain had sought to limit the spatial expansion. Utilising its identity as an 
exceptionally great sea power, it successfully replaced conquest with commerce. 
While pursuing that course, it paid close attention to the imperial schemes of the 
continental powers such as the French, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch Empires. All 
of this provoked reflection and discussion, part of which related to those ancient 
empires whose ultimate fate Britain was to seek to avoid. 
 The emergence of these notions and their incorporation into the definitions of 
Britishness and the British Empire were undoubtedly not exclusively or even mostly 
eighteenth-century phenomena. As Kathleen Wilson rightly argues, the eighteenth-
century conception of empire was the outcome of “many systems and ideas, linked to 
each other through often disparate bounds of identity, experience and practice,” 
rooted and developed in the Isles through centuries.3 In this sense, in order to provide 
a better and more complete understanding of the eighteenth-century notion of 
empire, it is imperative to extend the scope of this chapter to cover the imperial 
concepts of the preceding centuries. 
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2.1 Historical Development of Imperial Sentiments 
 
 
Although in Britain, due to its unpleasant implications as a regime, the word 
‘empire’ was used with extreme caution in political discourse; but neither England 
nor Britain ever ceased to claim to be an empire. Obviously, the term carries more 
than one meaning and the one which stood for universal monarchy was only one of 
them. Koebner, Pagden, Armitage and Muldoon agree on the ‘elusiveness’ of the 
term and very skilfully explain its different meanings and varying usages, beginning 
from its first emergence in ancient Rome.4 The Roman term imperium first denoted 
the legitimate sovereignty of the ruler within his territory.5 Then, as Rome extended 
its power, it came to mean rule over multiple kingdoms or dominions. Therefore, 
throughout the period of Roman supremacy, the notion of imperium acquired two 
dimensions – sovereignty and territorial expansion. Later, as Muldoon asserts, there 
emerged the theory of translatio imperii which emphasised the imperial power of the 
pope and viewed rulership of the empire as “an office within the Church” and the 
emperor as established “at the behest of the pope.”6 Following the revival of Roman 
law in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, European rulers became acquainted with 
the idea of dominus mundi. Thus the idea of universal empire emerged.7 Dante’s 
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prescription of a universal Christian rule which would embrace the entire humana 
civilitas in his Monarchia also contributed to the European understanding of empire. 
In addition, during the Renaissance a negative meaning of the term flourished, 
derived from Tacitean history. ‘Empire’ was that “corrupt form of government” 
which put an end to the admirable Roman republic.8 Republican nostalgia was a 
theme which resonated strongly in the ancient history texts with which this study is 
concerned. Then, there was the notion of empire which bore a particular 
eschatological meaning given in the Book of Daniel. In this context, empire signified 
one of the four world governances described in the prophecy, which actually stood 
for the four stages of the divine plan for mankind. According to Daniel’s vision, 
when four world empires had ended there would be a fifth and last stage of the 
providential plan: the fifth empire “which shall never be destroyed, nor shall its 
sovereignty be left to other people. It shall break in pieces all these kingdoms and 
bring them to an end, and it shall stand forever.”9 Hence, empire also denoted the 
eternal kingdom of Christ. The interest of some politicians, historians, clerics and 
philosophers in the topic of the capacity of an empire to achieve permanence and 
resist decline might be partly explained by this religious conviction.    
The historical claim of England to be an empire was essentially grounded in 
the idea we should denominate as sovereignty, seeing each ruler as the emperor in his 
own kingdom: rex in regno suo est imperator. In his realm, the rex imperator 
recognises no other internal or external authority superior or equal to his own and 
thus solely exercises his imperium. This was the legal justification of England when 
detaching itself from papal jurisdiction and the term ‘empire’ never ceased to retain 
this meaning thereafter, even when the territorial expansion began under the name of 
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Britain and thus the term acquired its second meaning. In the second half of the 
twelfth century the English kings ruled over multiple dominions such as Normandy, 
Anjou, Gascony and Aquitaine which were acquired through marriage, conquest or 
inheritance and this entity was known “traditionally, if not quite accurately”10 as the 
Angevin Empire. In truth, territorial implications were attached to the word ‘empire’ 
in Britain much later, in the seventeenth century. Furthermore, the Englishness of 
both the Angevin Empire and its kings has remained a disputed topic. 
 It was undoubtedly during the reign of Henry VIII when the debates on the 
concept of ‘empire’, considered as sovereignty, for the first time became important in 
English political thought to any great extent. During the break with Rome, Henry 
VIII and his parliament asserted that England was an empire. They employed this 
term in the Act in Restraint of Appeals (1533) and the Act of Supremacy (1534) in 
order to claim England’s independence from papal jurisdiction, as well as the king’s 
unrestricted sovereignty over the realm of England. Thus they emphasised that the 
‘imperial crown of this realm’ was sovereign in both ecclesiastical and temporal 
matters.11 The idea remained useful for a long time. An anonymous Tory pamphlet, 
written with the purpose of condemning the execution of Charles I, defines the 
Henrican understanding of sovereignty as being “accountable to none except God.”       
For if there be any power to which princes, or states are accountable, within 
their dominions, let their names sound never so big, they are not sovereign, 
but subject sovereignty, as the very notion implies, being such a pre-eminent 
jurisdiction, as makes all other persons within the lines of it, accountable 
unto it, but it, or the person, or persons invested with it, accountable to 
none.12    
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Sovereign. (London, 1717), 16.  
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In vindicating his claims, Henry VIII and his advisors referred to the most ancient 
historical traditions such as the one claiming that the rulers of Britain inherited the 
‘imperial crown’ from Constantine the Great. Parliament affirmed that 
[i]t was resolved, and so declared, that by sundry authentic histories, and 
chronicles, it is manifestly declared and expressed, that this realm of 
England is an empire, and so has been accepted in the world, governed by 
one supreme head, and King, having dignity and royal estate of the imperial 
crown of the same.13       
 
The role of Parliament could have cast a shadow over this ultimate sovereignty of the 
English king and made England a limited monarchy rather than an imperium. On this 
issue, however, it was most assertively set out that Henry VIII had all the essential 
rights of perfect sovereignty, both as king and king-in-parliament.  
This version of imperium had been extended to the plantations and colonies 
much earlier than the territorial version. During the American crisis, the thirteen 
colonies refused to recognise this imperium, claiming that the supreme authority of 
the British kings and the dissolution of the first territorial empire then followed. Now 
when we return to the definition of imperium in early modern England, we see that 
the English kings were held to enjoy a perfect imperium, at least at times and always 
in the estimation: 
...though the House of Commons bears the show of a democracy, and the 
peers look like an aristocracy among us, yet our government is a perfect 
monarchy, because the supreme power is,…neither in the one, nor in the 
other nor in both together, but solely in the person of the King.14          
 
In accordance with his imperial scheme, in 1541 Henry VIII also made the Irish 
parliament change his title from Lord of Ireland to King of Ireland. With this act the 
crown of Ireland was declared ‘imperial’ as well and the king of England was to be 
the supreme sovereign.  
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Unlike Henry VIII, the other monarchs of the Tudor dynasty never used the 
term imperium to the same degree. In fact, as Muldoon informs us, Edward VI and 
Mary I did not employ it at all in royal decrees.15 Yet, in the years between 1547 and 
1550 much emphasis was put on the Protestant character of the island. Following the 
Scots’ conversion to Protestantism in 1560, it had come to be the bond to unite 
England and Scotland. The foundation of the Protestant conception of the empire, 
which would later emerge, was thus laid. Protestantism in this context was less about 
“any shared conception of doctrines of salvation, the church or of Jesus’ divinity”, 
than the embracing of “a common anti-Catholicism.”16
During the Elizabethan era, there were a few appearances of the term 
‘empire’ in some royal documents, referring to the English crown’s sovereignty; but 
the concept of empire unofficially, as remarked by Frances A. Yates, came to imply a 
“golden age for England” and to carry the eschatological meaning mentioned 
above.17 The restoration of the “pure imperial religion” was enthusiastically 
embraced as the proof of England’s identity as a sacred empire.18 Then, the naval 
power of England, overseas expeditions by English sailors and the defeat of the 
Spanish Armada were considered as the partial fulfilment of the prophecy of “the 
golden age of a world empire,” in which the secrets of God were revealed through 
voyaging and discovery.19 In this respect, it was particularly Elizabeth’s victory over 
the Spanish Armada which symbolised the victory of the empire of England over the 
other spiritual power. As a consequence, Elizabeth was personified as ‘the Virgin 
Astrae’ who ruled England in its golden age.   
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At this point it should be noted together with Yates that the English 
understanding of the golden age did not necessarily denote a militarily aggressive 
and territorially expansionist empire. It rather emphasised the conviction that “the 
world is at its best and most peaceful under one ruler and that then justice is most 
powerful.”20 One of the prerequisites of attaining and distributing this peace and 
justice was the obtaining of the sovereignty of the seas through a powerful navy. 
Based on this belief, the maritime understanding of empire began to develop. The 
first work to delineate the maritime character of England was John Dee’s General 
and Rare Memorials Pertaining to the Perfect Arte of Navigation published in 1576. 
Here Dee put forward a theory of mare clausum which was at odds with the liberal 
naval policies of Elizabeth.           
The reflection of the ‘golden era’ on the following century appeared as the 
emergence of apocalyptic theories of empire. The Fifth Monarchy, which was 
believed to be the last world empire, preceding the kingdom of Christ, was central to 
these theories. The works dealing with the association of England with the Fifth 
Monarchy, such as those by Thomas Brightman, Joseph Mede, Henry More and 
Isaac Barrow dominated the intellectual sphere of seventeenth-century England. Still, 
in the royal decrees the term ‘empire’ preserved its Henrican meaning and, with the 
coronation of James I, once again became the king’s basis of claiming sovereignty 
over his realm.  
When in 1603, James VI of Scotland was declared as the legitimate heir to 
the crown, united in his person, the realm of Great Britain became an imperium in the 
historical sense that England and Scotland had been imperial realms. Like his 
predecessors, he imposed an insular understanding of empire to spread and 
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strengthen his royal authority, resting heavily on his Protestantism, throughout the 
kingdom. The Ulster plantation was founded on this “idea of a larger expanded realm 
united in Protestantism”21 and appeared as the sequel to Tudor empire-building at 
home. On the other hand, the reign of James I also witnessed the first permanent 
settlement in America and the foundation of the Virginia Company on 10 April 1606. 
Therefore, one may point to the emergence of a new imperial perception, in terms of 
the possession of overseas territories, at the beginning of the seventeenth century. 
However, the scope of the overseas activities was confined to “the harassment of the 
Spanish figure”22 and is rather to be evaluated as the overseas phase of the 
Protestant-Catholic rivalry than as a shift of emphasis from the internal empire to the 
colonial one.  
The existing concepts of the British imperium were seriously challenged 
during the Civil War and Interregnum. There is no doubt that in this republican age, 
consequent to the regicide, the term ‘empire’ lost its primary meaning in the political 
discourse, as Cromwell established the ‘Commonwealth of England, Scotland and 
Ireland.’ The conquests of Ireland and Scotland in the 1650s by the Commonwealth 
armies, particularly, damaged the imperial claims of England over these kingdoms, 
which, it was alleged, were not based on conquest. Still, through conquest, Britain 
was more unified than the Stuarts had ever made it and now there emerged the 
problem of what to make of it. When Oliver Cromwell began to set his Western 
Design, although the confusion over its meaning had not yet completely disappeared, 
an imperial scheme parallel to that of Elizabeth came forth. Attacking the Spanish 
once again appeared as “a rather useful instrument of Protestant propaganda;”23 but, 
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in contrast to the Elizabethan wars with the Spanish, this one would be fought 
beyond the ‘line,’ in the Spanish colonies in the West Indies. According to 
Cromwell, defeating the Spaniards overseas would put a definite end to their claim 
that Spain had exclusive rights to America, by virtue of the papal decree of 1494. 
Undoubtedly, the prospect of attacking the Catholic empire encouraged the ongoing 
eschatological theories of empire in Britain. Nevertheless, despite the capture of 
Jamaica in 1655 and the settlement of English Protestants there, the Western Design 
was criticised at home, as hardly fitting well with the monarchy’s imperial legacy, 
which defined the sovereign empire as “a stable and defensive unit.”24 Such 
convictions visibly prevailed in the ancient history texts that this study is concerned 
with. The unusually offensive character of the Western Design was equally despised 
among both royalists and republicans.  In the eyes of the royalists, Cromwellian 
imperium would undermine the historical royal language of empire, whereas 
according to the republicans, such an empire would corrupt ‘republican virtue’.25 The 
failure of the Design terminated these debates as well as the rumours about Cromwell 
becoming the emperor.  
The Commonwealth is a significant phase in British imperial history and not 
only for the reasons mentioned above. In 1656 James Harrington’s Oceana, one of 
the first texts to prescribe what sort of an empire Britain ought to be, was published. 
Harrington, criticising the Western Design, argued that any attempt to acquire 
overseas land would be a wasteful investment and that an oceanic adventure was 
utterly undesirable. What he meant by Oceana was the incorporation of Marpeisa 
(Scotland) and Panopea (Ireland), with the aim of reinforcing the English ‘Empire of 
the Sea.’ He was, in other words, preoccupied with the question of empire in the 
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domestic context. 26 The balanced republican constitution was not yet sufficiently 
fortified and hence too fragile to support an overseas expansion. Nevertheless, 
through naval supremacy and advanced agriculture, Britain, or Oceana, could 
eventually pursue a “godly mission” to expand in the name of “liberty and aid.”27 
The Commonwealth of Oceana, as the text first arrived on the scene, set forth the 
prerequisites for Britain to become an empire of the sea, emphasising, of course, 
maritime efficiency more than anything else.                                    
In the meantime, an empire in the sense of a territorial expansion was in the 
making in North America. Charles I’s proclamation of 1625 made the settlement in 
Virginia directly dependent on the English imperium by declaring that “we hold 
those territories of Virginia and of Summer Islands, as also that of New England… to 
be a part of our royal empire descended upon us.” A similar employment of the term 
also appeared in another proclamation in 1680 which asserted the king’s privileges 
concerning the settlement in Pennsylvania. In this decree, Charles II expressed his 
“commendable desire to enlarge” his “English empire.”28 Till the Anglo-Scottish 
union of 1707, the territorially expanded empire was English and it was associated 
above all with English maritime power. 
 
2.2 The Union of 1707 
 
 
The Union of 1707 was one of the last manifestations of ‘empire’ denoting 
sovereignty, which would be followed by the idea of expanding empire as the 
century unfolded. Once the Union was secured, it raised the hope that Britain, for the 
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first time, would become an empire with vast overseas lands acquired through, not 
conquest but settlement. Koebner stresses that  
in the course of the eighteenth century…in Great Britain and its 
dependencies overseas the name of Empire became overlaid with meanings 
which were unprecedented additions to those which had shaped its former 
career.29
 
In this sense, the Union of 1707 stands for the beginning of an era. It had 
unmistakable imperial implications for both sides, as the English scheme of Union, 
expressed in terms of sovereignty, coincided with the Scottish desire to have 
overseas colonies. Though only one among many elements in the debate about the 
Union, here we must confine ourselves the imperial issues.   
During the reign of William III, the previously shattered dream of an Anglo-
Scottish Union was revived. From the English perspective the union of two 
kingdoms was desirable as this would, in the first place, put an end to the situation of 
two neighbour kingdoms sharing the same monarch.30 More immediately, a unified 
Britain would gain power against its continental rivals, particularly France. Thus, the 
possibility of a Jacobite invasion of England from Scotland and the accession of 
James III to the throne would, it was hoped, be ruled out. However, the union could 
only be in the form of the acquisition of the inferior kingdom by the superior. 
Undoubtedly, this was due to “the intensity of the internal union of the Kingdom of 
England.” Since the breach with Rome, the English monarchs never compromised 
their claims of being the only sovereign, the emperor, within the realm of England. In 
the case of a federating union between two equal empires the ultimate sovereignty of 
the king of England would be challenged, even though he was at the same time the 
king of Scotland. In Pocock’s words:   
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…if the King of England could not conceivably share his imperium with the 
Pope, he could not share it with himself as King of Scots. 31
 
This was because the English political tradition prescribed the king’s imperium to 
consist of two elements, the imperium of the crown and the imperium of the crown-
in-parliament. The union of two equal kingdoms would not defy the imperium of the 
crown but would definitely challenge the imperium of the crown-in-parliament, if a 
wholly new British parliament were to come into existence. Thus, the Scottish 
parliament was to be absorbed in a union and Scotland was to share a common 
legislature with England in an ‘incorporating’ union. 
  On the other hand, till the failure of the Darien venture and beyond, the 
Scots claimed equality on the grounds that the crown of Scotland was as imperial as 
that of England and Scottish sovereignty equally deserved to be preserved. The 
Darien venture (1698-1700) was the Scottish attempt at establishing a colony on the 
Isthmus of Panama. Scotland was highly committed to this venture, with the thoughts 
that a profitable overseas colony would improve its provincial economy as well as 
provide the means necessary to acquire fiscal independence from London, thus 
strengthening its defences against any possible conquest.32 In order to grasp a better 
understanding of what an overseas colony really meant to the Scots, one needs to 
examine the writings of Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, in which is found “the only 
major work in support of the Darien venture.”33 Fletcher wrote that the venture was 
of immense importance to Scotland as  
…the ruin of it, which, God forbid, may very probably draw along with it 
that of the whole trade of the kingdom, and a perpetual discouragement from 
ever attempting anything considerable hereafter.34      
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Indeed when the colony was deserted and the venture failed, all these hopes of 
economic regeneration and independence faded away. Additionally, the negative role 
the English played in this failure made evident the fact that if Scotland aimed to be 
active and successful overseas, cooperation with England was obligatory. As a 
consequence, discussion of a union with England was not back on the political 
agenda. The Union, for Scots, appeared as an “alternative to an independent colonial 
empire.”35  
An anonymous pamphlet by a ‘Scotsman’ entitled A Discourse upon the 
uniting [of] Scotland with England (1702) displayed all the advantages to come, once 
the Scots agreed not to “contend with the greatest naval power that ever yet appeared 
upon the seas, for a dominion, all the world seems to give them the sovereignty of.”36 
The author argued that the Scots were now to choose between “endeavouring a closer 
Union” with the English and “thereby partaking of their wealth and glory” and 
“seeking a more complete separation from them,” which would “quench” their 
growth. Scotland should accept all the English conditions concerning the Union for 
the sake of a prosperous imperial future. 
That the growth of empire therefore may not be hereby diverted or rendered 
uncertain; we must not only quit all thoughts of the project in the union of 
the three northern crowns, of a reciprocal residence of our sovereign in each 
kingdom; but expect for that reason, and our propinquity to the English 
plantations, our trade thither should be burdened like the Irish, and that we 
like them should be obliged to touch in their ports.37  
 
The quotation above indeed reflects a Scottish point of view on the eve of the Union. 
Nevertheless, it was not then common to express it in public in such an enthusiastic 
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tone. This is explained by the fact that the author of the pamphlet was in fact an 
Englishman pretending to be a Scot.38  
Scotland then forget your emulation, forget your name, cancel the imaginary 
bounds of each kingdom; and as our constitutions and customs, shows us 
plainly to be originally the same people; let us no more scruple the calling 
ourselves English, than we do the calling our language so, in any part 
beyond the seas.39                 
 
Still, it is a significant pamphlet exposing the role that the question of empire played 
in debates on the Union. Andrew Fletcher’s writings are equally important in 
reflecting the views of an enemy to the British Empire as well as “all great and over-
grown powers.”40 For the same reasons that England was hostile to the Spanish and 
French empires, Fletcher despised the idea of an expanding Britain. He was 
persuaded that 
[a]ll great government, whether republics or monarchies, not only disturb the 
world in their rise and fall; but by bringing together such numbers of men 
and immense riches into one city, inevitably corrupt all good manners, and 
make them uncapable of order and discipline.41   
 
By the Union of 1707, Scotland acquired free access to the overseas 
settlements of England and the same economic opportunities as the English. 
Although the overseas colonies were to remain under the law of England, on the 
grounds that there no longer existed Scottish colonies after the loss of Darien, the 
Scots did not resent this.  What was granted by Article IV of the Treaty of Union was 
sufficiently gratifying: 
That all the subjects of the United Kingdom of Great Britain shall from and 
after the Union have full freedom and intercourse of trade and navigation to 
and from any port or place within the said United Kingdom and the 
dominions and plantations thereunto belonging.42
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In return, England enforced the monarch’s sovereignty over Britain in terms of both 
the imperium of the crown and the imperium of the crown-in-parliament through the 
incorporating union of the parliaments. The Act of Union, in which imperial 
language was deliberately avoided in order not to offend the Scots, called the new 
entity the ‘Monarchy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and of the Dominions.’ 
The word imperium was employed exclusively to refer to independence from the 
papacy.43 Still, the ultimate outcome of the Union of the two kingdoms was the 
British Empire, endowed with new possibilities of expansion. Henceforth, within the 
British realm the word imperium would not primarily refer to sovereignty. In this 
respect, the Union was in fact “the cornerstone of the British empire-state of the 
eighteenth century.”44
Having built the safeguards at home, Britain turned its eyes to the colonies in 
America. From the beginning, the English (later the British) justified their existence 
there as a mission “to establish themselves, without any expense to the nations, in the 
uncultivated and almost uninhabited countries”.45 This was how they differentiated 
their empire from the universal empires of Europe, which were enlarged by means of 
conquest. Yet, empire was not, as Wilson points, an end in itself, but “the means 
through which national power and ascendancy could be proved and demonstrated.”46 
Within this contradictory context, the relationship between Britain and the colonies, 
in other words the first British Empire, was never explicitly defined. David Hancock 
points out that “no one organised England’s American agricultural-commercial 
dependencies the way the East India Company attempted to order the Indian sub-
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continent.”47  Instead, it was assumed that an informal code regulated American 
affairs. This reluctance of the British monarchs to clarify the official status of these 
territories was to cause immense problems from the second half of the eighteenth 
century. Despite this vague attitude of the Crown, however, in the public mind a 
certain understanding of overseas empire, mostly associated with being Protestant, 
commercial, maritime and free was developing.  
The term ‘British Empire,’ denoting Great Britain and the colonies together, 
came slowly to be employed in the pamphlets dealing with the political, economic or 
military affairs of the age. One of the first uses of it appeared in an eccentric 
pamphlet by a Scotsman, Samuel Vetch, who was demanding assistance for some 
conquests in Canada which, he maintained, would be to the advantage of the entire 
British Empire.48 Nevertheless, it was above all John Oldmixon’s then widely read 
survey of the British plantations which introduced the British Empire to the British 
public. Oldmixon, an imperial topographer, successfully attracted the attention of the 
reader to transatlantic affairs by his British Empire in America, which was published 
in 1708, immediately after the Anglo-Scottish Union. In 1698, his predecessor, 
Nathaniel Crouch, had also attempted to provide a complete picture of the colonies in 
America as “a set of political communities distinct from, though subordinate to, the 
English monarchy.”49 His English Empire in America, however, was solely a 
geographical scrutiny and left out normative remarks on the structure of the empire. 
Oldmixon, on the other hand, extensively delineated the new understanding of 
empire and combined it with the geographical analysis. 
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Following the commonplace of the age, Oldmixon’s conception of empire 
was principally commercial. He argued that the English needed this commercial 
empire because they were ‘inhabitants of an island’: 
…we have no ways of conveying our product and manufactures abroad, but 
by navigation, the best and easiest of all ways; we have no ways of making 
ourselves considerable in the world, but by our fleets, and of supporting 
them, but by our trade, which breeds seamen, and brings in wealth to 
maintain them.50
 
On this account he assessed that “the American plantations are an advantage, and a 
very great one, to this kingdom.”51 In his pamphlet, Oldmixon also attempted to 
answer the criticisms rising at home about the colonies. The main criticism was that 
the colonies were weakening the kingdom “by draining England of her people”.52 
Not surprisingly, he gave examples from antiquity as an answer: 
Did the Athenians and other Greeks lose by the colonies they sent into Asia? 
Or rather, was not Ionia the barrier of Greece, which defended it against the 
Persian usurpation? Did these colonies dispeople Greece? Is there any 
complaint of it in all the Greek story? No certainly! On the contrary, the 
Grecian states thrived after it; their navigation increased and by their 
navigation they became masters of Asia; for had they not destroyed the naval 
power of the Persians, they could not have injured their domination by land. 
But after they were entirely masters at sea, they never ceased till they were 
so at land also. 
 
The other problematic issue was doubt about the profitability of the colonies. 
Oldmixon assured his reader on the matter:  
…that our colonies in America are so far from being a loss to us, that there 
are no hands in the British Empire more usefully employed for the profit and 
glory of the commonwealth.  
 
He asserted that the British colonial system was different from that of the Romans 
and in this respect would be “much more advantageous.”53
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2.3 The Balance of Power 
 
The empire introduced by Oldmixon, as Armitage concludes, was “the British 
Empire in America” or “the British Empire of America,” rather than an empire which 
had emerged as the outcome of firm integration between the colonies and 
metropolis.54 The integration of the Atlantic empire with the motherland did not 
become an issue before the 1750s. Till then continental affairs determined the 
imperial policies and activities of Britain within the framework of the ideal of 
balance of power which was associated with a Whiggish political stance. It should be 
clarified here that the dichotomy of Whig-Tory is a very useful tool while pinning 
down eighteenth-century perceptions of empire. Although the usage of the term 
‘Tory’ became “spotty and uneven”55 between 1768 and 1812 and thus the Whig-
Tory distinction faded away, the stance of both parties, originating much earlier, 
continued to resonate in contemporary political discourse. As to the ancient histories 
published within this specific period, the historians’ political tendency could still be 
categorised as Whig or Tory. Mitford’s explicit support of Tory ideals, for example, 
did not go unnoticed, as he acquired the reputation of the “Tory historian of ancient 
Greece” at a time when “there was a problem applying ‘Tory’ to individuals or 
groups.”56 That the views of empire reflected party ideologies have some importance 
for this study.                    
In early modern Europe, the more common usage of the word ‘empire’ 
connoted “a presumed right of lordship over the entire world” which was grounded 
in the ideal of universal monarchy.57 The Roman legacy of dominus mundi had 
survived through the Middle Ages and was revitalised in the sixteenth century as a 
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consequence of the zealous attempts of the Habsburg monarchs at overseas 
expansion. Spain became the first to pursue the ways to acquire a universal 
monarchy and was followed by Portugal and France. In their quest for an empire 
through conquest, these Catholic powers acted co-ordinately with the papacy which 
provided them with the indispensable bulls to legitimise their expansionist and 
aggressive policies. In return, the title ‘lord of the world,’ whenever earned, was to 
be shared by the pope.  
In the eyes of the English, this concept of empire was that of their enemies. 
Within their aggressive political behaviour and the use of military power for 
conquests, such empires were very likely to “disturb the international relations”.58 
The European empires were considered despicable and dangerous and an English 
understanding of empire was offered, which aimed to be the antidote to the 
continental one. From the late 1680s to the late 1750s, first the English then the 
British perception of empire was shaped by the Whigs and the idea of balance of 
power was central to it. In that period, the Whigs pursued the policy of deep 
engagement in European affairs declaring that they were thwarting the possible 
designs of universal monarchy on the continent. The balance of power was “a system 
of alliances” which basically aimed to stabilise the aggressive powers of France and 
Spain.59 The Dutch Republic and Austria remained the most loyal allies of Britain 
until the 1720s. Subsequent to the decline of Dutch power and the Prussian challenge 
of Austria in the 1740s, however, the profile of the allies that Britain counted on 
changed.       
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The European balance of power was to be preserved and it was the historical 
mission of the British to do so at any cost. Britain had distinguished itself from the 
neighbouring absolute monarchies and thus, in its own eyes, merited to act as the 
umpire of Europe more than any other state. This commonplace found a strong echo 
in the contemporary histories of ancient Greece in particular. Whereas militaristic, 
aggressive and expansionist Sparta and Macedonia were associated with eighteenth-
century France and Spain, Athens engaged in the pursuit of non-aggressive 
mercantile ideals, with Britain. Charles D’Avenant’s An Essay upon Universal 
Monarchy (1701) appears to be the quintessential expression of this Whiggish point 
of view in pamphlet form. What the balance of power stood for will be best 
elaborated from this work.                  
D’Avenant explicated the English understanding of universal monarchy:    
…principalities and commonwealths, finding they increased in fame, and 
value with the world, as they increased in wealth and power, and that success 
covered any crime, and gave it a new name and another sort of lusture, 
proceeded forward still to fresh conquests, till they had subdued all round 
about them; and from thence came what we call universal monarchy or 
empire.60   
 
England came forth as the most fervent adversary of the expansionist policies of such 
empires and as the preserver of the balance of power in Europe. Maintaining this 
international stance was the historical concern of England.61 In particular, following 
the reign of Charles V, England kept a close eye on the Habsburgs, who considerably 
intensified their expansionist activities within and beyond Europe. As the Spanish 
were discussing whether their monarchy was the equivalent of the “world-
monarchies of the Assyrians, Persians, Greeks and Romans,”62 the English were 
extremely alarmed by the threat posed by this Catholic empire rapidly growing to 
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surpass all its European rivals. At the same time, they carefully observed the reasons 
that led to its rise and the causes of its fall. In the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, the English had learned the lesson from the Spanish case that it was 
impossible to maintain the rapid growth in the long term. Indeed, the Spanish 
monarchy “rose too fast to continue long” as “the parts that composed” it “had not 
time to cement strongly together.”63 Therefore the Spaniards could be associated 
with the Macedonians, rather than the Romans and the Assyrians, whose advance to 
empire was a slow process.64   
According to D’Avenant, in addition to rapid growth, Spain committed to 
another fatal error which was actually an inevitable outcome of conquests and 
overseas settlements. The Spanish monarchy “dispeopled” the motherland.65 The 
English apprehension that the territorially overstretched empire would depopulate the 
motherland had been proven right by the fall of the Spanish empire. Colonisation far 
beyond the ability and capacity of Spain had exhausted its military, financial but 
above all human resources. As Linda Colley emphasises, throughout the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, there was serious discussion about whether the population 
of Britain was sufficient to maintain an overseas colonisation.66 Those who argued 
that it was not, based their argument on the depopulation of Spain. The point 
remained as one of the principal lessons deduced from the rise and fall of the Spanish 
empire and continued to preoccupy the British public even during the second British 
Empire. This fixation with population could be explained with the considerably high 
rate of mortality in the earlier part of the eighteenth century. At the very beginning of 
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George II’s reign, for example, “the entire population gained since the Restoration” 
was lost.67          
Similar to the designs of Habsburg monarchs of Spain, the activity of the 
Bourbon monarchs was also continuously monitored by the English.  In order to 
prevent a French universal monarchy, France should never be “left in a condition to 
insult and subdue one nation after another.” Such was the role Whigs desired 
England to play with regard to the Catholic French empire; to block its expansion 
while maintaining the European balance of power. 
Is there a man that does not think it honourable for England to hold the 
balance? Are we not at all afraid that France unopposed may attain to 
universal empire? Do we not all think ourselves safe, led by the King, and 
fighting under his auspicious banners? Will not nations crowd in to 
confederate with a prince, whom, above all the kings of the earth, it most 
imports to preserve the liberties of Europe? 68  
 
This stance of England against the universal monarchies was so enthusiastically 
propagated that it was also adopted verbatim in some of the political pamphlets 
published in other European states. In the English translation of An Introduction to 
the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe (1702) by Samuel von 
Pufendorf, the German jurist and political philosopher, for instance, the position of 
England in Europe was interpreted in these words: 
If we duly consider the Condition and Power of England, we shall find it to 
be a powerful and considerable kingdom, which is able to keep up the 
balance betwixt the Christian princes in Europe; and which depending on its 
own strength is powerful enough to defend itself. For because it is 
surrounded everywhere by the sea, none can make any attempt upon it, 
unless he be so powerful at sea, as to be able entirely to ruin the naval forces 
of England.69                
 
Meanwhile, it was not only the Spanish and French empires against which 
England was to be on its guard; there were also the Protestant Dutch who, in the eyes 
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of the English, aimed at a universal dominion. It was true that in its imperial design 
the Dutch Republic did not follow the same pattern as the Catholic empires which 
entailed conquest and instead enforced an expansionist policy based on commerce, 
similar to the English design of empire. Nevertheless, following the third Anglo-
Dutch war in 1673, England was convinced that the Dutch were equally a threat to 
the European balance. The Dutch claim for freedom of the seas, which was most 
influentially formulated by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) in his Mare Liberum (1609) 
was an effective challenge to the English claim to the control of the seas. Although 
the Elizabethan naval policy was grounded in liberal practices in terms of fishing and 
navigation, since James’s accession to the English throne, the Scottish policy of mare 
clausum came to be executed as the official naval policy of Britain. In this way, the 
sea around the island too was incorporated into the imperium of Britain. This reversal 
of naval practice was formulated and justified by John Selden in his Mare Clausum 
written as a response to Grotius. All in all, the Anglo-Dutch clash of the 1660s and 
1673 was also considered as a threat to the balance of power, this time on the seas in 
the name of mare liberum. At the turn of the century, however, the prospect of a 
closer partnership with the Dutch appeared wiser to the English than the prospect of 
war.70 Thus, through the first half of the eighteenth century Britain sought Dutch 
cooperation to counterbalance French aggression.    
Before the “evident weakness and neutralism”71 of the Dutch Republic, which 
came in the 1740s, the superiority of the Dutch over commerce and their naval power 
made them an important power in Europe. And, on this account, the Republic was an 
example to emulate for the British. It was a common belief that maritime ascendancy 
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was the key to fulfilling a nation’s universal dreams. This point was in fact 
mentioned in Pufendorf’s analysis:  
Holland seems to be the only obstacle that the English cannot be sole 
masters of the sea and trade, though for the rest they have no reason to fear 
the Dutch by land, but only at sea.72    
 
Therefore, the balance of power had not only religious, but also commercial 
connotations. The ascendancy of a commercial power which would be a possible 
threat to the balance in Europe was perceived in a manner similar to the Catholic 
powers’ seeking for universal dominion on the continent. Not only the ascendancy 
but also the decline of such commercial power attracted considerable attention 
among the British. The answer to the question of how permanent a purely 
commercial state could be was sought in the contemporary assessments of the Dutch 
Republic. The Dutch acquired significant power because they achieved the ideal 
combination of being a nation of both patriots and merchants.73 Whenever its 
military assets became insufficient to support its commercial assets, the Dutch 
Republic lost a great deal of its glory and power. This lesson taught the British the 
importance of being at once a military and commercial power. Of course, military 
measures were to be employed as a last resort to safeguarding the commercial 
interests. In antiquity, as will be seen in the next chapter, Carthage stood as the 
typical example of a purely commercial and militarily weak state. Its subordination 
to Rome, for this reason, was no surprise.       
Although the Anglo-Dutch, alternately rivalry and partnership, was an 
important aspect of the British attempt to create and maintain a balance of power, 
attention was concentrated on Spain and France. And from the 1690s to the 1750s, 
the image of the British Empire was determined within this Whig ideal. Britain was 
                                                 
72 Pufendorf, Introduction, 160. 
73 James H. Bunn, ‘The Tory View of Geography,’ boundary 2, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1979), 157.  
 
 
80
to be the opposite of everything that these continental empires were. Where the 
empires of Spain and France were Catholic, aggressive, territorial and enslaving, the 
British Empire was to be Protestant, commercial, maritime and free. Thus, the 
historical sensibilities of the English people were incorporated into the understanding 
of empire which prevailed in the first half of the eighteenth century. Most 
importantly, despite the existence of Catholics on both sides of the Atlantic, this was 
primarily a Protestant empire which aimed to serve to the Protestant cause, not only 
on the continent but overseas, in particular following the Union of 1707. Then, 
contrary to the aggressive polices attributed to the Catholic empires, the British 
Empire was to seek a more benign way of dominance, through commerce. An empire 
kept together by commerce was, despite the hostile interpretation of Dutch power,  
believed not likely to challenge the European balance of power and not to commit 
the same errors which the other empires committed “more for reasons of power 
(often over subject peoples) than plenty.”74 And in terms of territorial settlement, the 
British, it was said, settled on terra nullius only, and hence did not build colonies 
through conquest.  
 Additionally, because circumstances and effort had endowed Britain with 
exceptional maritime power that none of the European states could compete with, or 
so Whig propagandists claimed, the British Empire was to be an empire of the seas. 
Thus, it avoided the undesirable consequences of being a land-based empire, with 
overextended territories and a depopulated homeland. Another unattractive tendency 
of a land-based empire was to turn into an entity that suppressed the liberties of the 
subject, for the conquered lands could not be stabilised and governed otherwise. As 
Madden remarks, keeping up the balance between imperium and libertas which 
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means the balance “between central unity and local autonomy, or between similarity 
and diversity, assimilation and autochthony, authority and justice, interdependence 
and independence”75 was a tough business. The land empires, many Britons came to 
believe would, sooner or later, fail to do that. A maritime empire, on the other hand, 
promoted the liberating effects of commerce in the extra-European territories. In 
other words, the British Empire was alleged to “offer the chance of liberty to remain 
intact” through its ships and sailors.76 Also within this context, it was argued that 
Britain possessed a free constitutional government and that its people enjoyed 
exceptional liberties. Therefore, the British overseas settlements too would be 
granted with the same liberties, as the colonies were the projections of the 
motherland.   
In this period a certain understanding of empire was implanted by the Whig 
writers and it was defined as the opposite of the Spanish and French understanding. 
However, imperial affairs remained secondary, if not utterly neglected, on the Whig 
political agenda, particularly when British concerns are compared with continental 
ones. There is some truth in Edmund Burke’s words that the colonies were “formed, 
grew and flourished as accidents,” under the lack of a “regular plan.”77  
Undoubtedly, there were certain laws enacted but, first of all, they were scattered 
over a long period of sixty years and, moreover, they were primarily designed for 
“fostering the national interest” of the motherland.78 Parliament on one hand issued 
laws which claimed to secure the freedom of all the subjects of Britain, and, on the 
other, overtly sought to eliminate the possibility of the colonies’ competing with the 
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motherland through acts such as the Wool Act of 1699, the Hat Act of 1732 and the 
Iron Act of 1750. Among these, the Molasses Act of 1733 was most fervently 
opposed as virtually inhibiting trade between the thirteen colonies and the rest of 
West Indies and enhancing the British monopoly of sugar.79 There were other 
measures such as the Representation of the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations 
to the Lords Justices (1697), the Representation of the Commissioners of Trade and 
Plantations to the House of Commons (1699), an Act to Encourage the 
Newfoundland Trade (1699), an Act for Suppression of Piracy (1700), an Act 
Securing the Criminal Liability of Colonial Governors (1700), a Naval Stores Act 
(1705), an Act for Encouraging the American Trade (1708) and an Act to Establish a 
General Post Office (1710); but they were far from being the part of a coherent 
imperial plan to unify legislatively the colonies and incorporate them into Britain. At 
that time, the British parliament’s sessions were thoroughly consumed by the 
expensive and tedious engagement in continental affairs.                                            
In the name of maintaining the balance of power, from 1689 to 1763, Britain 
was involved in costly continental wars. The Nine Years War (1689-97), the War of 
the Spanish Succession (1702-14), the War of the Austrian Succession (1739-48) and 
the Seven Years War (1756-63) exhausted the military and financial sources of 
Britain that could have been better employed to strengthen the commercial bond 
between the metropolis and the colonies, though they did preserve the regime from 
overthrow by the Jacobites. Till the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), this ideal of 
maintaining the balance of power remained at the core of the British political 
discourse. Even in the 1740s, when opposing voices began to be heard criticising the 
British engagement in the European affairs, the Whig pamphleteers were attempting 
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to convince the nation that “our figure abroad must depend upon our holding the 
balance of power, and being at the head of that interest which opposes universal 
monarchy.”80 Against the discontent over the land wars and the neglect of imperial 
concerns, it was argued, in an attack on Cardinal Fleury that 
…Great Britain can not safely sit still, see the affairs of the continent go this 
way or that with indifference; …if ever she was bound in interest to bestir 
herself in favour of her neighbours, and against the ambitious designs of an 
overgrown and overbearing power, it was in the present case, when an old 
man, who had gained a high esteem from his character for probity and 
moderation, suddenly threw off the mask, and, by his intrigues, thought to 
subjugate all Europe to the will of his master, that is, to his own.81            
 
It was no time for Britain to bow out: 
But if it shall be ever thought criminal to animate the people of Great Britain 
to imitate their ancestors, to assert their right of holding the balance of power 
and set themselves at the head of such states as are for maintaining the 
independency of Europe, we may soon run back to that low state in which 
we were, when this spirit was treated as Don Quixotism, and have nothing 
else to do but to harass and destroy each other with disputes about forms of 
government which are equally fruitless and endless, and serve only to 
subject the honest, the industrious, and well-being, to the self-interested 
views of cunning and ambitious men.82             
 
Nevertheless, in the 1740s the opposition began to lay emphasis on the point 
that the ideal of balance of power was not compatible with the commercial and 
maritime character of the British Empire. As one pamphlet stated, because of this 
“fatal pretext,” Britain was “excluded from the interests of the empire.”83 The 
balance of power cost much loss in trade which was  
…our present food; our future hope; our strength; our treasure; and the 
source of our recreations, no subject can come within a man’s choice that 
would be more worthy of the time he may bestow upon it, for nature has so 
provided that what remains to us may be improved, and perpetuated if we 
turn our thoughts to the promoting it.84  
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Besides, the commercial loss would eventually put an end to the British superiority at 
sea which “cannot be continued without a return of the trade by which it was 
acquired.”85 Britain should immediately take the necessary measures to promote its 
overseas trade and to maintain its maritime power, as “opportunity seldom makes 
second offers after the first are refused.”86             
Thus, the disillusionment with the Whiggish rhetoric of the balance of power 
made its way into the political pamphlets before the Seven Years’ War. Lord 
Bolingbroke’s Idea of a Patriot King (1738), as cited in the previous chapter, is 
widely accepted as a pioneer work creating a public awareness of what the primary 
duty of a British monarch ought to be. The British engagement in the continental 
affairs had remained as the greatest concern of the Hanoverian kings of Britain, it 
was lamented, and this design sadly wasted the financial and human resources which 
could have been invested in a better management of domestic and colonial affairs. 
What was worse, Bolingbroke cautioned, such engagement could possibly result in 
Britain’s becoming a province of the European confederacy. In this way, the Patriot 
King served as one of the “hymns to blue-water patriotism.”87   
In an anonymous pamphlet, dated 1745, the question was put whether the 
British people had been vainly preoccupied with a distorted version of this notion of 
a balance of power for years: 
They were told of a balance of power, the independency of Europe, the 
Protestant cause, and a multitude of other things, which though they might 
have [had]originally some meaning in them, yet have been so tortured and 
tost about by politicians, that at present I make no scruple of affirming it is 
very hard to know, whether they have any meaning at all; or which is much 
the same thing in other words, it is very difficult, if not possible, to settle 
their true meaning. 
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Ideally, the argument went, “every state should mind its own business and every 
country study and pursue its own interests.” In reality, however, this was reversed as 
if “every state should forget its own interest, and mind that of its neighbours.” 88 The 
true interest of the British nation lay not in maintaining the European balance of 
power but solely in commerce which connected it “not only to the continent of 
Europe, but to Asia and Africa, and more intimately than with any of these to 
America.”89 Still, the conviction that the British should no longer take such great 
interest in continental affairs and instead concentrate on its overseas colonies was 
placed on the top of the political agenda mainly in the period after the Seven Years’ 
War. 
 
2.4 The Blue Water Strategy 
 
Because some considerable part of the British public suspected that the 
Hanoverian kings put the priorities of Hanover ahead of those of Britain and the cost 
of the foreign troops deployed by the British army was overwhelming, the ideal of 
balance of power was gradually replaced with the blue water policy. Blue water was 
based on the Tory notion about Britain that a sea power should not be involved in 
land wars. The resignation of the Duke of Newcastle in 1756, the principal upholder 
of the notion of a balance of power, could be considered as the most notable sign of 
this change. Later becoming a partner in William Pitt’s second ministry in the 
following year, he too pursued the blue water war waged on France, together with 
Pitt.90 Thus, the Tory emphasis on Britain’s natural and historical supremacy on the 
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seas was also embraced by the Whigs in the end. Toryism, then, was ceasing to 
represent “a coherent creed.”91      
According to Niall Ferguson, “[t]he Seven Years War was the nearest thing 
the eighteenth century had to a world war.”92 The European threats of war were 
important. Britain sent off troops to Prussia to hinder any possible attacks from the 
coalition of France, Russia, Austria and Spain. Nevertheless, it was the overseas 
phase which made the war significant in terms of increasing the awareness of the 
blue water strategy that had first emerged towards the end of the War of the Austrian 
Succession. When, in the early 1750s, the French threatened Ohio, the Great Lakes 
and Nova Scotia, some of “the fastest-growing markets” of the motherland, British 
officials recognised the importance of these colonies and how fatal this threat could 
be to their imperial interests.93 It was due to this awareness that the capture of 
Quebec in 1759 was celebrated with remarkable enthusiasm.  
Most briefly, the blue-water policy prescribed overseas expeditions as “the 
most efficient and cost-effective way” to neutralise the French threat.94 In other 
words, through this policy based on naval and colonial strategies, the British could 
more successfully challenge the French far from Europe, where they could deploy 
less expensive and more effective methods. This would also put an end to the 
presence of foreign mercenaries of Dutch and Danish origin at home. Eventually, the 
blue water policy proved itself extremely profitable in the eyes of the British public, 
dissatisfied with engagement in continental campaigns, when Britain seized the 
colonial possessions of France in North America, India and the Caribbean at the end 
of the war. Undoubtedly, those possessions in America had a considerable impact on 
                                                 
91 Langford, Polite and Commercial People, 357.  
92 Nial Fergusson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2003), 34.  
93Nancy F. Kohen, The Power of Commerce: Economy and Gocernance in the First British Empire 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 163. 
94 Gould, Persistence of Empire, 37.  
 
 
87
the motherland and supported the tendency to “national self-congratulation”95 when 
was spoken of.   
At the Peace of Paris in 1763, Britain acquired vast lands of Canada and 
Florida, in return of leaving Guadeloupe to France and Havana to Spain. The general 
tendency of the historians is to point to this treaty as marking the end of the period of 
‘salutary neglect’ of imperial affairs.  Thenceforth, the idea that the incorporation of 
all the British territories in North America into the British empire would enhance 
Britain’s financial, military and imperial power became a commonplace in Britain. 
American affairs turned into one of the most fashionable topics of the age. From the 
early 1760s, for example, a great number of newspapers, magazines and journals 
began to include a separate section on the British plantations in America, a practice 
which boosted their circulation considerably. As Nancy F. Kohen notes, in 1760 9.4 
million newspaper stamps were issued, whereas this figure ten years before was 7 
million. Such increase in the circulation of newspapers should certainly be related to 
the increase in the popularity of the stories and comments about overseas issues 
published in those newspapers.96 Equally, there was an increase in the number of 
political pamphlets in favour of this unprecedented territorial expansion, as against 
those advocating the British mission of maintaining the European balance of power. 
The main concern expressed in these former pamphlets was to find the best way of 
governing the colonies.  
It should be stated here that not everybody was content with the increase of 
territory in North America. The concerns over the issue became more apparent in the 
discussions of whether to give Guadoloupe away in return of the much larger area of 
Canada. The reservations concerning territorial expansion to such an extent was most 
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influentially expressed in the Five Letters Entitled Reasons for Keeping Guadaloupe 
at a Peace Preferable to Canada, raising an anti-expansionist voice, familiar in the 
early years of the century, propagating the notion of an empire based on trade only. 
According to the pamphlet, it was quiet possible that the acquisition of Canada 
would result in depopulation, loss of trade and even in rebellion. On the other hand, 
Britain, unburdened from the cost of managing an extensive empire and holding the 
highly profitable Guadaloupe, would have had the entire sugar island trade in its 
hands. Nevertheless, at that time the more popular approach was in favour of the 
overseas expansion. For this reason, the accession of Canada was accepted with 
much approval, in the belief that it would secure not only the North American 
colonies, but also the sugar islands. In the pamphlet published as a response to the 
letters, this view was stated. 
…what nation so ever shall have the sole possession of North America, that 
nation will always have it in its power to distress and to take the sugar 
islands: but the greatest efforts, that could be made from the West India 
Islands and the North American continent cannot prove the necessity of 
keeping Guadaloupe, in preference of Canada; but on the contrary, it calls 
upon us to maintain and pursue our conquests on the continent, till our 
strength in North America shall be able to make the sugar islands entirely 
dependent upon the measures, which Great Britain shall take, in regard to 
their trade.97                       
 
Still, although these colonies were believed to be of great use and advantage to 
Britain, how to govern them remained a problem not to be solved easily. 
The implantation of a coherent imperial governing policy in the North 
American colonies had not been an issue in Britain before its recent vast acquisitions. 
As one pamphleteer stated, these colonies were far from being integrated into one 
single entity, particularly in terms of legislation. 
The first settlements of most of our colonies in America were made by 
private adventurers; many of the colonies were afterwards incorporated by 
charters or privileges granted by the crown, with a power to make laws, and 
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to establish courts of justice…[R]emote colonies situate near barbarous 
nations…were authorised and empowered to levy, muster and train all sorts 
of men, of what condition so ever…There are several other colonies that are 
more immediately dependent on the crown both with respect to their laws 
and constitutions; yet it has been the pleasure of the crown, to allow them a 
kind of legislative power, under particular restraints and limitations.98         
       
In addition to the varying legislative forms imposed by the motherland, the colonies 
also adapted “variants and substitutes” determined by the local conditions.99 Looking 
at this extremely scattered imperial policy of Britain, one may suggest together with 
Madden that “the post office was probably the only institution common to all British 
America.”100 The blue water strategy, however, required this fragmentation to end, 
for it would have been impossible to defy France otherwise, and to enhance the 
economic relations between Britain and the colonies. Thus, in the pamphlets which 
appeared during the Seven Years’ War and in its aftermath there was a call for a 
union of the colonies “to oblige them to act jointly, and for the good of the whole.”101 
Undoubtedly, this could be attained through a uniform legislation only. The prospect 
of a legislative union was also assessed in the contemporary texts dealing with the 
Greek and Roman histories.  
As much as this diverged in its application and the institutions it created, the 
essence of the legislation did not essentially differ from one colony to another. In all 
the colonies, there was one official to represent the king, who would be supervised 
by a central council and advised by a local one.102 Besides, as one pamphleteer 
comfortingly informed his reader during the Seven Years War, colonial power was 
decidedly limited. 
…the charter governments are entitled to make by laws for the better 
ordering their own domestic affairs, ...they are not entitled to make laws 
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which may have a general effect, either in obstructing the trade of this 
kingdom, or in laying restraints and difficulties on the neighbouring 
colonies: for…their power in a legislative capacity originally flows from the 
crown, under certain limitations and restrictions… 
 
Those circumstances would enable the attempts at uniform legislation to run 
smoothly and eventually cure all the anomalies embedded in the governance of the 
colonies.  As a first step, it was to be made clear to the colonies that they could never 
be “proper judges in their own case.” It was made particularly clear to Rhode Island 
and Connecticut which had recently “enacted laws, that no law shall take effect in 
their colonies, unless it be first authenticated or enacted into a law by them” and thus 
“have made themselves judges of the fitness and expediency of their own laws.”103 
The Currency Act of 1764, which introduced restrictions on the issue of paper money 
and the American Mutiny Act of 1765 which was designed to apply a single military 
code in the colonies were among the legislative measures taken in the post-Seven 
Years War era. Central taxation was to follow as the last step. The role of central 
taxation as a permanent bond firmly attaching the periphery to the centre was 
recurrently assessed by the contemporary historians of ancient Greece and Rome.  
Since the beginning of the Atlantic expansion of the British, it was the first 
time, in the late 1750s, that it occurred to them how crucial these colonies were to 
their financial and military position and equally how disastrous it would if the 
colonies were to achieve some kind of autonomy. The colonies’ claim to “a distinct, 
legislative authority based on colonial charters” had been, though on and off, one of 
the items on the political agenda since 1734.104   These territories had now become 
“the valuable possessions in America” which were “evidently conducive” to the 
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British enjoyment of “true riches and security.”105 Throughout the war, it was argued 
that any thoughts of levying new taxes on the colonies should be put aside and their 
defence against the French at any expense should be made the priority.106 After the 
Treaty of Paris, various schemes of colonial governance, mostly prescribing 
centralisation, were put forward. Among them, Thomas Pownall’s The 
Administration of the Colonies (1764), proved to be the most significant, as the first 
attempt to define and regulate the motherland’s relationship to the colonies. Pownall, 
Governor of the Colony of Massachusetts, defined what Great Britain was or rather 
ought to be.                      
Great Britain may be no more considered as the kingdom of this Isle only, 
with many appendages of provinces, colonies, settlements, and other 
extraneous parts, but as a grand marine dominion consisting of our 
possessions in the Atlantic and in America united into a one Empire, in a one 
centre, where the seat of government is. 
 
It was “the precise duty of government” to turn this entity “into one Empire of which 
Great Britain should be the commercial and political centre.” 107 Only thus, a real 
imperium could be created in this “realm of the same will.”108 By calling attention to 
the inefficiency of the British overseas government and urging the government to 
take centralising measures, Pownall’s proposal belonged to a new phase of British 
imperial history, in which the motherland would adopt a more authoritarian voice. 
His early work entitled Principles of Polity Being the Grounds and Reasons of Civil 
Empire (1752) which aimed to deduce instructive lessons from the imperial 
experience of the ancient civilisations, will be studied in the following chapters. 
The new phase which began in the 1760s witnessed “constant exhortation, 
repeated assertions of certain principles, even an impatient patience” from Britain 
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directed to the North American colonies.109 Firstly, permanent British agencies were 
established in all the colonies. Then, Parliament, having abandoned its long 
negligence, took a primary role in these efforts at centralising and legislating. 
Nonetheless, this was soon to complicate the existing problems rather than solve 
them. Until now, the plantations and colonies had been directly administered by the 
Crown. With the exception of some Navigation Acts, Parliament remained 
indifferent to their governance and let their affairs to be conducted principally by the 
Crown and its advisory bodies. The parliamentary attitude drastically changed when 
Parliament faced the requirement of incorporating the North American colonies into 
another kind of British Empire. This was a scheme in which taxing the colonies was 
a crucial step.  In this respect, Parliament first issued the Sugar Act of 1764 which 
aimed to put one of the finishing touches on the trade regime between the colonies 
and motherland. Though it spread much discontentment, it did not outrage the 
colonists, for it was an external tax levied on imports, mainly to curtail any kind of 
commercial engagement with the French. The next step, which was the Stamp Act of 
1765, however, was to be fiercely rejected on the grounds of being an internal tax. In 
the following year when Parliament openly declared the people in the colonies to be 
dependent on the Crown and Parliament of Great Britain through the Declaratory 
Act, the colonies denied that they were part of the realm of Britain and that they were 
subject to the king’s imperium and his parliament. The stance was maintained despite 
the later revocation of the Stamp Act.                              
The first British Empire, in Muldoon’s words, remained “an empire in search 
of a theory to justify it and a constitutional structure to incarnate it”.110 Till the 
1760s, the British had on one hand successfully avoided ending this search in 
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legislation binding the colonies. Still, they assumed that Britain was an empire with 
its North American colonies. At the first real attempt to establish the rules that would 
lead to a complete integration of the colonies with the motherland, however, Briatin 
dramatically failed. An anonymous pamphlet, dated 1769, recorded that the British 
realised that things had changed in the colonies.       
That the first inhabitants of the colonies were part of the British community, 
and bound to obey its legislative power in all respects, as any other objects at 
the time of the establishment of those colonies, will not be denied. How then 
has that obedience been altered or released?111    
 
Indeed that obedience had been altered and the reaction to the Stamp Act was the 
tangible proof of that. Although, as another pamphlet anonymously argued, the 
British considered it, innocently, as “the only internal tax likely to have operated 
there, from its nature of legalising the transfer of property not valid without it,”112 the 
colonials took a different view. After the Stamp Act crisis, Britain was soon to 
discover that it had enjoyed imperial power only “in the ports and along the shores of 
its overseas colonies.”113  
Evidently, the failure to declare officially the colonies to be financially and 
legislatively dependent on Britain for centuries prevented the emergence of an 
imperial tradition on both sides of the Atlantic. In this respect, the Stamp Act was 
“unprecedented” in the eyes of the colonists and their dependence on Britain was “a 
novelty – a dreadful novelty.”114 At the beginning of the century the British 
perception of empire and empires called for avoidance of the acquisition of new 
territories and to put the emphasis on the navy, trade, and liberty. This was a kind of 
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empire acceptable to the people in the colonies. A Spanish-like spatially extended 
one was not. 
There was a time, when England had no colonies. Trade was the object she 
attended to, encouraging them. A love of freedom was manifestly the chief 
motive of the adventurers. The connection of colonies with their parent state 
may be called a new object of the English laws. That her right extinguishes 
all their rights, -rights essential to freedom, and which they would have 
enjoyed, by remaining in their parent state, is offensive to reason, humanity 
and the constitution of the state. Colonies could not have planted on these 
terms.115          
 
Thus the colonists adapted the same imperial language Britain was once accustomed 
to use. Similarly, in 1775 two Boston lawyers Daniel Leonard and John Adams 
deployed the word imperium in the sense of sovereignty and claimed that America 
was as much an empire as Great Britain. The British failure at home to define their 
overseas empire, it may be said, caused this breakup of ‘the empire of Great Britain’ 
and ‘the empire wielded by Great Britain on the high seas’.116  
In their first empire the British did not succeed in fully establishing a 
legislatively based political and commercial union between the colonies and 
motherland. What was more, although it was thought of as a Protestant empire, to be 
distinguished from those of Spain and France, because of “the denominational 
diversity of the British Atlantic world,”117 the first British empire did not rise on a 
confessional unity either. The colonists were mostly the Dissenters and did not 
recognise the authority of the Anglican Church at home. Envisaging Britain as an 
exceptional source of religious liberty and tolerance in Europe was an important 
notion embedded in the British self-understanding in the eighteenth century. 
Nevertheless, in reality, the place of even orthodox Protestant dissent was strictly 
circumscribed in the British polity.118 The Anglican Church’s attempt at keeping the 
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colonists within its institutional structure was, in fact, considered in the colonies as 
offensive as the Stamp Act. As the ideal conduct of religious matters as a part of 
imperial governance thus appeared crucial, the contemporary historians were 
inevitably preoccupied with this question in their ancient histories. The answer that 
they came up with was to pursue a policy of non-interference.    
Throughout the eighteenth century, the popular perception of empire 
constantly shifted from the cautious, secure and trading empire to the daring, 
expansionist and costly one. From the late 1740s, the latter took over the ‘mitigated” 
attitude “against unbridled enthusiasm for building a vast territorial empire.” 
Nevertheless, the problematic years of the late 1770s once again triggered the 
apprehension that Britain, by annexing new lands so distant from it, would possibly 
end up “overextending the human and financial resources of the nation” like the 
continental powers had done in the previous century.119 When the first empire ended 
in 1783 with the loss of the thirteen colonies, it became apparent in the eyes of many 
that, as one pamphleteer concluded, Britain “never could manage so distant and large 
an empire, but at a great annual and increasing expense.”120 Britain should have 
instead enjoyed “all the pristine benefits of America; without the expense of keeping 
it.”121  
Meanwhile, as the discussions around the political, economic and religious 
administration of the North American colonies were at the peak, a second empire of 
Britain to which India was central, happened to be in the making. After the battle of 
Plassey in 1757, the British rule in the Indian subcontinent extended to “twenty 
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million of people in an area five times the size of England and Wales.”122 Essentially 
different from the American colonies, the Crown governed India through the royal-
chartered East India Company (EIC). From the 1760s on, the EIC, besides its 
“commercial-cum-imperial role,” was to perform a new role as the “Indian ruler.”123 
Of course, being not yet experienced and able enough to exercise power over a vast 
and populous country so far away from the motherland, the EIC remained under the 
strict control of Parliament.  
  Following the loss of the thirteen colonies, the imperial discourse shifted to 
an “increasingly authoritarian and more conspicuously territorial” one.124 India, St 
Lucia, Ceylon, Malaya, South Africa and Quebec under the second British empire 
was governed in accordance with this new conception of empire. Our historians of 
ancient Greece and Rome, however, did not take great interest in the affairs of the 
second empire. Furthermore, the novel imperial understanding which emerged 
towards the end of the eighteenth century conflicted with the notion of empire 
prescribed in their ancient history texts. As will be seen in the coming chapters, the 
topics of North America preoccupied the contemporary historians more.       
During the first empire, Britain failed to arrive at a definite imperial policy 
but remained in constant search of one. In this imperial search, notions such as 
sovereignty, depopulation, overstretching territory, maritime supremacy, commerce, 
liberties, conquest, settlements and the role of religion had arisen as the topics to 
trouble the British. To find precise answers to their questions, they meticulously 
studied the previous imperial experiences of both the modern European powers and 
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the ancient civilisations. In the coming chapters, I will seek to exhibit the answers 
provided by the British historians in the ancient history texts of the age.                                
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 
In his Principles of Polity Being the Grounds and Reasons of Civil Empire 
dated 1752, Thomas Pownall offered a full definition of the word ‘empire.’  
This modelling the people into various orders, so as to be capable of 
receiving and communicating any political motion and acting under that 
direction as a one whole, is what the Romans called by the peculiar word 
imperium, to express which particular group of ideas, we have no word in 
English, but by adopting the word empire. It is by this system only that a 
people become a political body; it is the chain, the bond of union, by which 
very vague and independent particles cohere. It is Livy says, the Circean 
wand, touched by which, men and even brutes grow tame and manageable; 
where this cement is not all things run together into confusion, and fall to 
ruin where there is not this foundation.1
 
In this definition, the emphasis was laid on the binding and regulating aspect of 
empire. It was viewed as a governance, to glue together the disconnected, 
independent and sometimes incompatible components of an expanding state in 
harmony and peace. Imperium was the “power of government” to “extend its entire 
and perfect influence to the putting [of] the whole into motion, in the very direction 
that the power is impressed.”2 What comes to the fore in Pownall’s words is, in fact, 
an understanding of empire in which sovereignty and spatial expansion intertwined 
inextricably. The sovereignty of the monarch spreads and binds as the territories of 
the state expands. Such was the quintessential explanation of what ‘empire’ was in 
eighteenth-century Britain. 
It was also widely believed that the only way of securing an empire was to 
pursue the policy of optimum colonisation. As echoed in William Baron’s History of 
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Colonisation, colonisation was considered as the means to secure and render the 
conquests permanent, to populate or depopulate the motherland and to civilise:    
Colonisation is one of the methods which nations, in all ages, have employed 
to secure their conquests, or to extend their territories. If a tract of country 
had been ravaged and depopulated by war, a colony was provided to re-
people, to defend, or to cultivate it. If it was possessed by inhabitants, few in 
number, and unwarlike, who had territory to spare and would make little 
resistance to the first invaders, it was considered as captivating prey to any 
state advanced in cultivation, or perhaps overloaded with people; and a 
colony was dispatched to seize and appropriate it. Accordingly, we find that 
colonisation proceeds nearly in the same direction, and almost keeps pace 
with the progress of civilisation.3
 
Because colonisation had such great importance for the subsistence of empires, it 
was imperative to arrive at some normative rules concerning the best possible way of 
colonising, inevitably scrutinising histories of the ancient civilisations. Under the 
influence of philosophical history, pamphleteers such as Baron sought to pin down 
the commonalities between the ancient and modern political experiences. Baron, 
whose work aimed to draw analogies between the Roman and the British experiences 
of colonisation and to prove that this was far more efficient than the Carthaginian 
method, attempted to provide his reader with such rules:   
A practice [colonising] so general, it is natural to expect, should be the result 
of some common principles of human nature, or the constitution of civil 
society. A similarity of management, for this reason, would probably be 
adopted by the several states, who at different times, have sent out colonies; 
and, if such management can be discovered, it will lead to the general 
principles of colonisation. If, however, we shall not be so fortunate to ascend 
to principles, it may still be useful to survey, with attention, the conduct of 
cultivated and enlightened nations, as, from their example, we shall probably 
derive the most instruction.4     
 
He argued that it was the Romans who enjoyed “the most extensive authority”5 over 
the colonies and thus who most skilfully confronted the problem of preserving the 
new and the previous acquisitions while continuing to expand. In order to avert any 
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schemes of independence, they implemented varying colonial policies whose degree 
of firmness was determined by the colonies’ attitude to and distance from the 
motherland. Besides, the Romans had always been cautious in establishing colonies 
“either very remote or very large.” These were in part “the maxims and conduct, in 
the management of the colonies” 6 that the British were to take into consideration 
while establishing and governing colonies of their own.   
Like Pownall and Baron, the British historians of Rome too were preoccupied 
with the idea of empire, above all with the issues of expansion and colonisation. In 
his well-known essay, ‘The Tory View of Roman History,’ Addison Ward underlines 
that the Roman histories of the age were examined only from the perspective whether 
they reflected “a Whig or Republican view” of Rome.7 Although these texts mostly 
dwellt on the glorification of the Roman Senate and the promotion of liberty and 
virtue, not all of them exhibited a republican reading of Roman history. There were 
also histories written by authors with Tory tendencies such as those by Echard, 
Hooke and Goldsmith. Therefore, it is not apt to categorise the eighteenth-century 
Roman history-writing as simply republican. Alongside the comments on the 
republican virtues, different views on the ideal sort of empire too pervaded these 
history texts. After all, mixed constitution and liberties were not the only tenets held 
in common by Rome and Britain. Their imperial experience was another equally 
important element in the close analogy drawn between them. Britain, ironically once 
“the peripheral country” within the Roman empire and thought by Virgil as “cut-off 
from the world,” was aiming at becoming a colonial power in the eighteenth century 
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similar to that of Rome.8 The imperial questions preoccupied all British historians of 
Rome. In their quest for a definition of empire, with the exception of Thomas 
Blackwell, they did not directly address the British nation anywhere in their works, 
other than in the prefaces, and avoided explicit association of Rome with Britain. The 
messages they intended to transmit were embedded in their accounts of Roman 
history. This chapter aims to elaborate on such messages and to exhibit how they 
treated the topic of empire. 
                           
3.1 The Rise  
 
In the eighteenth-century histories of Rome, unlike those of Greece, most of 
the historians did not exhibit even slight doubt about the authenticity of the available 
sources on the first days of Rome. The only exception is the author who used the 
pseudonym ‘Nobleman,’ whose work is unique among the Roman histories, being 
written in the form of a letter. ‘Nobleman’ advised his son Frederick not to read “the 
accounts of the origin of the Romans,” which were “no better than oral tradition, 
enveloped in fable, and obscured by the poets”9 and, not surprisingly, did not include 
use of these accounts in his work. Nevertheless, as pointed out in the first chapter, in 
general, the British historians did not demonstrate any scepticism towards the 
sources on the origins of the Roman Empire, for they would thus have implied a 
rupture of knowledge of the Roman political, legal and religious establishment which 
was supposed to be continuous. Only a claim to possess a whole knowledge of the 
Romans would enable the historians to render their points as influential as they 
intended. Even those who argued that the accounts of the foundation of Rome should 
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treated with extreme caution, presented, for example, the reigns of Romulus and 
Remulus to their readers as simple facts, for this aided them to enhance their 
arguments on certain issues. The most significant example in this matter is Nathaniel 
Hooke.  
Though he underlined that the old records of Rome were burnt by the Gauls 
and even the histories of Plutarch and Severus included “great uncertainties in the 
originals of Rome,”10  Hooke put all his scepticism aside while assessing the reign of 
Romulus. While treating that era extensively, he particularly stressed that the 
greatness of Romulus lay in his belief that “the happiness of states depended upon 
the favour of the Gods;” 11 therefore the states, from the very beginning, Romulus’ 
laws sought to increase virtue and piety in the people and win God’s favour. With 
this point which was in compliance with his religious stance, Hooke aimed to call his 
reader’s attention to the point that the religious and legal establishments of the state 
were designed to serve to the future happiness of its people, not only in this but the 
other world as well. In doing that, however, he referred to a piece of history which 
might have been considered fabulous. Thus, Hooke made his point at the expense of 
writing, by his own standards, good history.  
This contradiction in Hooke’s history is significant as it brings us back to the 
argument of Thomas O’Connor saying the most heated political, religious and legal 
debates of the age were going around the assumption of the “very knowability of the 
past.”12 The inclination of historians to consider the Roman history as entirely 
accessible should be evaluated in this wider context. To them, the Roman history 
which stood as the ample proof of continuity in history, was completely unfolded to 
provide every sort of political instruction and moral lesson to modern man. Knowing 
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early Roman history was crucial to showing when Roman greatness began to be 
visible and to what the Romans owed their rise and progress. Thus it was believed 
that early Roman history would serve to exhibit the means through which the Roman 
empire was founded. The essential futures of the Roman empire had already 
appeared in the rude period of Rome. According to Laurence Echard, by studying the 
first Romans the reader would appreciate that from the beginning “they fought for 
dominion, but not for tyranny, and chose rather to be loved than feared” and “this 
made the provinces cheerful in their submission, hearty in their contributions, and 
unwavering in their obedience.”13  
Nevertheless, despite the claims to the ‘knowability’ of the entire history of 
Rome, there were a considerable number of dark or unclear points concerning the era 
of kings which could not be denied by critical minds. In this respect, with the aim of 
undoing the distortions of fact caused by false chronology, Hooke himself put 
forward a system of chronological computation, challenging that of Isaac Newton 
and thus believed to reinforce the authority of Roman history. In the first page of his 
Roman history, Oliver Goldsmith also expressed his distrust of the sources on the 
origins of the nations. For, he said, “where history is silent, they generally supply the 
defect with fable”14 and such was particularly the case for the Romans. Nevertheless, 
in the following pages he praised Romulus as a man of “great temperance and great 
valour”15 while recounting the events of his reign. As a matter of fact, the reign of 
Romulus appeared to be a popular topic among the historians, since it enabled them 
to raise at the very outset the issues they considered important. Laurence Echard, for 
instance, revealed his point of view on the constitutional aspect of state building, 
while elaborating on the constitution implanted by Romulus. With its “robust” 
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founding constitution, which demonstrated “all the manifest signs of a thriving and 
long-lived state,” Rome turned into the most excellent commonwealth.16 The 
greatness of a constitution, his argument went, was determined by whether it left “the 
choice of the government to the people.” The constitution of Romulus did, but even 
that did not prevent the monarchs in the end from being “carried away with some 
pleasing notions of arbitrary government.” 17  
In addition to the end of Romulus, the era of the kings, the transition from 
monarchy to aristocracy and that from aristocracy to democracy, the Twelve Tables, 
the Decemviri, the duties of the senators and patricians and the consular power as a 
check on the conduct of the Senate were among the topics belonging to the period 
before the reign of Augustus which fascinated the historians most. A search through 
these subjects, above all, aimed to enlighten the British reader about the prescribed 
role that ought to be played by Parliament, particularly during times of crisis and 
transition. Either by exposing the errors committed by the Roman Senate or rejecting 
various allegations of corruption, neglect and treachery, the British historians of 
Rome, though not overtly, participated in the ongoing political debates of the 
eighteenth century. As these debates should be evaluated in a different context than 
the imperial affairs and do not include insights on the understanding of empire of the 
age, they will not be further elaborated here. Still, there is one historian whose 
comments on the above-mentioned issues were in fact articulated with particular 
reference to the idea of empire. For this reason, a closer look will be taken at the first 
volume of Adam Ferguson’s history in the section below. 
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3.2 Ferguson’s Empire 
 
As one of the philosophical historians of the Scottish Enlightenment, 
Ferguson presented his ideas of empire in a scientifically written Roman history. 
Adopting the progressive approach in his works, he frequently argued that societies 
underwent certain stages of development and “that the particular modes of 
government appropriate for one stage of development were inappropriate for 
others.”18 Ferguson applied the same rule to his understanding of empire and 
assessed the Roman history in terms of progressive stages. To him, the government 
of Rome first emerged as monarchy, then transformed into an aristocracy and 
eventually became a republic, as each time “a revolution” was needed in the empire 
“in order to preserve it in its former progressive state.”19 In other words, different 
regimes were progressively adopted in Rome according to their capacity of 
sustaining and governing an ever-expanding empire. Ferguson’s moral philosophy 
was grounded in the idea that any topic could be elaborated “from the point of view 
of the improvements of which it is capable.”20 Such view was one of the hallmarks of 
the Scottish Enlightenment and was exactly how Ferguson studied the topic of 
Roman empire.   
In his desire to evaluate the political transformations that Rome had 
experienced in the pre-Augustan era and judge the suitability of each regime to 
govern it, mainly from an imperial perspective, Ferguson was unique among his 
contemporaries who were rather inclined to focus on the issue of empire from the 
reign of Augustus onwards. He underlined that the territorial expansion and the 
exchange of population between the motherland and colonies had already reached a 
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remarkable level during the monarchy of Rome which lasted 244 years. Thus “the 
nursery of Roman citizens” spread.21 He argued, then, that in the beginning “the 
genius of monarchy was favourable to the growth of this rising empire.”22 
Nevertheless, the monarchs in the course of time became subject to their personal 
ambitions and failed to serve to the imperial ideals. Such governance, then, as he 
quoted Montesquieu, “was likely to become stationary or even to decline.” In order 
to live up its imperial progress, the government of Rome became an aristocracy 
which was, in the end, to be replaced by republic, since aristocracy was a regime 
“without any third party to hold the balance” between the nobles and the common 
people. 23 The republic therefore appeared as the next appropriate way of governing 
the empire.  
Offering a Whig’s republican reading of the Roman history, Ferguson laid 
particular emphasis on the republican era of Rome. It was true that during the 
republican era Rome experienced grave internal disruptions; for the Senators were 
lost in shallow personal arguments and domestic peace and union remained in 
danger. However, Ferguson claimed that despite the internal upheavals, the Roman 
state secured its acquisitions and continued growing without “any signs of weakness 
in the foreign wars.”24 Having met the criterion of securing territorial expansion, the 
republic proved to be appropriate and able to run an empire. Therefore, as implied 
here, Britain could be at once a republic and an empire.  
As a matter of fact, Ferguson’s appreciation of the Romans seemed to end in 
the third volume of his history. There he stressed that the republic was terminated on 
the pretext of “its unfitness to remain at the head of so great an empire.” What is 
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22 Ibid., 14. 
23 Ibid., 14 and 17.  
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more, this was “the most plausible excuse” that had been made for the extinction of 
the republic in Rome.25 For Ferguson who believed in the full capacity of republic as 
a regime to sustain a growing empire, the Romans had prematurely ended one of the 
stages of progress before the exhaustion of its capacity.  Although the progressive 
potential of the republic was also eventually to be burnt out, at that time the Romans 
could have waited before they replaced the republican government with an emperor. 
In a comparison between the republic and the rule of an emperor he took stance in 
favour of the suitability of the republic for governing Rome, claiming that during the 
era of emperors, the Romans “retained…their ferocity entire” but “without 
possessing, along with it, any of those better qualities, which, under the republic, had 
directed their courage to noble, at least to great and national purposes.” The 
emperors, as he concluded, “will scarcely gain credit with those who estimated 
probabilities from the standard of modern times.” 26
As the above paragraphs indicate, Ferguson examined the different phases of 
Roman history always from the perspective of empire and attempted to ascertain 
what kind of government would be ideal, of course in terms of progress, for such a 
gigantic political entity. In doing that, he drew a distinction between ‘empire’ as a 
regime and ‘empire’ as a territorially expanding state. As regime, the imperial 
governance with its agents and institutions as well as the extended authority of the 
ruler was not looked on favourably. This will be further elaborated in the coming 
pages focusing on the Augustan era. On the other hand, throughout the entire text, 
‘empire’ as expanding territory through new acquisitions was regarded as desirable 
and to be promoted. In the other histories the empire-based arguments make 
appearance from the end of Republic onwards and in the era preceding that the 
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historians put the emphasis on subjects such as the function and composition of the 
Senate and the electoral issues. Ferguson, however, was alone in relating events, 
especially the extinction of monarchy and republic, to their fitness or unfitness to 
govern the empire. Interestingly enough, although in his Essay on the History of Civil 
Society, the philosopher argued against the possibility of “private and social 
subordination,”27 he never understood the empire as an instrument of exploitation.  
Though not as well-argued as in Ferguson’s theory, there was 
acknowledgment in other historians of the necessity of distinguishing assessment of 
the regime governing the motherland from that suited to acquiring an expanding 
empire. Blackwell, who also belonged to the republican camp, remarked: 
Let us make a distinction between a model adapted to domestic quiet, and a 
constitution calculated for conquest and propagation of empire: they are two 
different ends, and require different means.28       
 
Nevertheless, this approach, unlike the empire-oriented assessment of Ferguson, did 
not attempt to find the best domestic governance to serve as the most suitable regime 
to sustain the empire. Blackwell’s argument goes on: 
[a] nation therefore proposing to live contended within its ancient limits, and 
enjoy peace and ease at home, may obtain these ends, by a form of 
government quite incapable of extending their territory.29      
 
The Roman Empire was the most quintessential example in this sense. All historians 
emphasised that the Roman Empire witnessed an unprecedented expansion when 
there were severe political divisions and unrest at home. That, according to 
‘Nobleman,’ was “the most remarkable thing we meet within the Roman 
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commonwealth”30 and Ferguson too commented on “the curious spectacle of a nation 
divided against itself”31 advancing to imperial greatness. 
Interestingly enough, Blackwell also claimed that the powers that had enabled 
Rome to conquer were embedded in its constitution. In other words, the legal source 
that aimed to regulate internal affairs endowed the Romans with the power to make 
conquests. His concerns were similar to Ferguson’s. Though not in exactly the same 
way Ferguson did, Blackwell in effect ventured to pin down the ideal domestic 
situation to sustain an ever growing empire. According to him, the Roman, of course 
republican, constitution provided this nation with two extraordinary gifts, namely 
with the consular government which was “a restless executive power always on the 
rack when not in action” and with freedom which produced  
a fierce undaunted people to fill their legions, combined with their original 
manners and fortunes, to produce the peculiar predomining character of 
Rome, to wit, a military state equally fitted to make conquests and to keep 
them.32                
 
Therefore, in the eyes of Blackwell too, the factors promoting the growth of an 
empire were effectively dependent on domestic conditions. As such views 
demonstrate, the question of the ideal domestic government to back up territorial 
expansion one way or another preoccupied the British historians of Rome. Ferguson 
uniquely discussed it in explicit, clear language, with coherent argumentation of the 
progressive theory. In other historians’ assessments the subject was stuck between 
the lines or treated rather less meticulously. 
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3.3 Good Prince, Bad Prince           
 
The British historians of Rome wrote their histories in the form of 
comparison between the good prince and the bad prince. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
“mirror for a prince” was still a common literary genre in the eighteenth century and 
generously made use of in contemporary Roman history-writing. Through an 
analysis of the characteristics and the pattern of actions that rendered a prince either 
good or bad, the historians sought to teach the present and future monarchs to be 
good for the sake of the state and the people. As Colley points out, from the 
“immediate euphoria” of the Restoration to most of the eighteenth century, the 
English or British monarchs did not come to be seen as “an unquestioned cynosure 
for national sentiment.” There was always a shortcoming in the public image of these 
monarchs, which prevented their full identification with the good prince, that would 
win over the entire British population. This “intermittent, uncertain quality of the 
monarchy’s public presentation and appeal,” 33 in fact, encouraged the literati to 
assume the responsibility of providing these monarchs with the guidelines of 
transforming them into one of the most virtuous princes in history. Therefore, it is no 
coincidence that the majority of the Roman history texts of the eighteenth century 
appeared during the reigns of George I and George II who, due to their German 
origin, seemed to be desperately in need of such wise guidance.  
Of course, transmitting moral teachings through the lives of good and bad 
characters in history was not a purpose pursued uniquely in the eighteenth-century 
history writing. The origins of this practice could be traced back to the classical 
historians, particularly to Plutarch who as a biographer and moral philosopher aimed 
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to exhibit deeds that were morally good.34 Therefore, following in the footsteps of 
ancients such as Plutarch, our historians too engaged in reflecting moral lessons 
through the mirror of selective biographies. Such an approach was grounded in the 
belief that, in Goldsmith’s words,  
…the characters of the Roman emperors have been intimately connected 
with the history of the state, and its rise or decline might have been said to 
depend on the virtues and vices, the wisdom or the indolence of those who 
governed it.35
 
For this reason, it appeared important to analyse the events in Roman history with 
reference to the character and the ruling capacity of the monarchs and emperors. 
Unveiling completely the reign of a good ruler in the first place, or “the blessings 
which a good prince brings to mankind,”36 had always been the priority of historians. 
William Wotton declared: “something must be learned from every action of great 
men, if it be faithfully and intelligibly told.”37 Despite Goldsmith’s assertion that 
“good subjects generally make good kings,”38 for more interest was invested in the 
accounts of the characters and actions of the emperors than in their subjects.   
Wotton pointed out that being the head of “so vast an empire as that of 
Rome” was “a laborious employment [requiring] abundance of thought, and great 
application to do it.” One of his prerequisites of managing the empire was “a well-
governed court” and only a good ruler could bear “the necessary state and order” of 
it.39 ‘Nobleman,’ on the other hand, argued that, by comparing Numa Pompillius and 
Justinian, it was the content of the laws enacted which determined if a ruler was 
good. In this context, Numa Pompillius was judged good, on the grounds that he 
issued laws “for the political formation of a society, in order to promote their 
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interest, and make them more civil in the manners.”40 Although in his times the 
Roman people were “little better than barbarians” and he was the “legislator of a few 
people” only, he designed laws which promoted liberties and improvement. Numa 
Pompillius, thus, became “the father of his people” whereas the emperor Justinian 
was “a designing tyrant, who wanted to trample on the liberty of the subject.” In spite 
of the fact that, as Nobleman concluded, by the age of Justinian the Roman code of 
law had already reached “a state of perfection” through improvement, the emperor 
terminated this perfection by enforcing suppressive laws and bringing in “very 
iniquitous institutions.” Therefore, the good prince was the one who issued the laws 
that would win him “the approbation of the public” and who did not rule “at the 
expense of fellow-citizens, trampling on their laws, liberties, privileges, and the 
whole of their constitution in government.”41
Almost all historian of Rome in eighteenth-century Britain highlighted the 
reigns of two or three emperors as exemplary; but there was no consensus among 
them on who these monarchs/emperors were, with the exception of Marcus Aurelius 
of course. Those who presented contesting views of Augustus in their works 
collectively agreed that Marcus Aurelius was an adored emperor, who ruled the 
empire in absolute peace and therefore the good prince that the British king ought to 
take after.42 In this sense, many pages were devoted to his reign and his ways of 
ruling. ‘Nobleman,’ for instance, hailed Marcus Aurelius as one whom   
nature had done her best to form a complete emperor, and his innate 
qualifications had been illustrated and brought to a state of perfection by the 
most excellent learning, regulated by judgement and prudence.43      
 
                                                 
40 Anon., Nobleman’s Roman History, I, 13. 
41 Ibid., 12-3.  
42 Wotton, History of Rome, 245. 
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His predecessor Hadrian was worthy of praise too, for, again in the words of Wotton, 
who grounded his entire history of Rome on the comparison of the good prince and 
the bad prince, he “had set the whole business of that vast empire in as exact order, 
as any private man does his domestic concerns.” Till the reign of Commodus, the 
glorious Antonine dynasty managed capably 
the different interests of the several provinces, and many times of different 
cities in the same province; the numberless grievances of such divided 
nations, which must all be redressed by one single person; with a world of 
other difficulties.44   
 
Still, the Augustan age remained as the major concern of historians hoping to arrive 
at the final and binding prescription for a good ruler. Additionally, they paid equal 
attention to bad rulers, such as Tiberius, Caligula and Commodus for contrast. 
The bad prince was in general defined in terms of luxury and tyranny. As will 
be seen in the coming pages of this chapter, luxury had been among the notions that 
concerned the historians most, particularly when the issue was the stable government 
of the empire. Briefly, territorial expansion was, as a rule, to be accompanied by an 
increase of wealth, and “wherever there is a great superfluity of wealth, there will 
also be seen a thousand vicious methods of exhausting it.”45 Rulers in times of 
expansion above all were therefore challenged by the threat of the corruption brought 
by luxury, hence of their subjects and themselves becoming bad. In this context, 
while elaborating on the notion of luxury, Wotton warned his reader, or, more 
precisely, William Duke of Gloucester, that “princes that wholly give themselves up 
to their pleasures, never make themselves masters of their business.” Luxury would 
lead to ‘aversion to business’ and this would lead to the loss of the approbation of the 
people and to an emperor “regardless of his people in all his actions.”46 Echoing 
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Tacitus, he held that the Roman Empire declined on this account, as the bad 
emperors were tempted by luxury and ignored the wellbeing of their people. 
Goldsmith ironically suggested that  
…if we were to enter into a detail concerning the characters of the princes of 
those times, it should be those of the conquerors, not the conquered; of those 
Gothic chiefs who led a more virtuous, and more courageous people to the 
conquest of nations corrupted by vice and enervated by luxury.47               
 
The Roman rulers were contaminated by luxury subsequent to the fall of Carthage.  
 
 
3.4 The Carthaginian Empire 
 
 
The Roman encounter with the Carthaginians and the three Punic wars were 
treated with particular interest, for this was believed to be central to the glorious 
story of Rome growing into a world empire. It was consequent to the first Punic war 
(264-241 BC) that the Romans, for the first time, settled in a territory outside of 
Italy; at the end of the second (218-202 BC) Spain permanently became their 
province; after the third, Carthage fell. Through their century long struggle with this 
rival nation, the Romans came to know themselves, who they were and what their 
strong and weak points were in comparison with those of the Carthaginians. The 
British historians too attempted to attain a fuller understanding of the Romans and 
their empire by means of the Carthaginian experience. What is more, this was a story 
which could provide British statesmen with invaluable lessons in expansion, 
commerce, naval power, the use of foreign mercenaries and luxury. It deserved a 
great deal of attention. 
In prescribing what Britain ought to be, the historians were obviously inclined 
to associate it with Rome, while Carthage, in their eyes, set the example of what 
ought not to be. One of the means to prevent the British reader’s possible 
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identification with the Carthaginians was the Carthaginian practice of human 
sacrifice. Particularly, as ‘Nobleman’s words will demonstrate, the tragic death of the 
Carthaginian commander Hamilcar came to be known as one of the most revolting 
stories from antiquity.  
They were the most barbarous people that ever lived under a regular form of 
government; for they constantly offered up human sacrifices, and they were 
so ungrateful, that nothing was more common among them to crucify their 
bravest generals when they had the misfortune to lose a battle.48   
 
Carthage was also to be criticized for luxury and military effeminacy. Before further 
elaborating on these more important justifications for rejecting the Carthaginian 
model of empire, it should be noted here that there was one exception to this general 
point of view, advanced by Edward Wortley Montagu. According to Montagu’s 
argument,  
[o]f all the free states whose memory is preserved to us in history, Carthage 
bears the nearest resemblance to Britain both in her commerce, opulence, 
sovereignty of the sea, and her method of carrying on her land wars by 
foreign mercenaries.49   
 
Rome, on the other hand, being a military state, was to be identified with France. 
Additionally, it lacked the commercial and naval superiority which Carthage and 
Britain commonly enjoyed. 
In his work, Montagu, as usual, aimed to arrive at prescriptions that would 
prevent Britain commiting the same errors as Carthage. The capital mistake of “the 
Carthaginians, as a maritime power” was “their engaging in too frequent, and too 
extensive wars on the continent of Europe, and their neglect of their marine.” The 
second one was “their constantly employing such a vast number of foreign 
mercenary troops, and not trusting the defense of their country, nay not even 
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Carthage itself wholly, to their own native subjects.”50 Then came “the party 
disunion” and “luxury.” 51 Thus, by drawing parallels between Carthage and Britain, 
he warned the British against too frequent engagements on the continent, hiring 
foreign troops, internal divisions and luxury. As a matter of fact, in the later Stuart 
period such discussions dominated the contemporary political writings of the Whig 
and Tory polemicists.  Despite the erosion of the Whig-Tory dichotomy in the later 
Hanoverian era, similar concerns persisted. 
Therefore, continental engagement, maritime policies and deployment of 
foreign troops occupied a prominent place in the contemporary political discussions. 
Though being a Whig in upbringing, Baron, in his assessment of the reasons behind 
the fall of Carthage, echoed a Tory-like view by arguing for aversion towards 
excessive engagement in the continental wars and resorting to mercenaries as well as 
for necessity of an enhanced maritime emphasis. Under the influence of the Tory and 
Whig political discourse, our historians too meticulously dealt with the fall of the 
Carthaginian empire. Unlike Baron, however, they did not fully associate it with 
Britain, because, despite the commercial and naval resemblances, Carthage and 
contemporary Britain differed on a very essential point. The Carthaginian empire 
was purely commercial and, in that sense, the quintessential example of why such 
empires could not last. The British empire, on the other hand, possessed the 
militaristic means to safeguard its commercial existence. The British, like the Dutch, 
should remain as “a nation of patriots and merchants.”52 For the sake of commercial 
superiority, they should be able to take on arms, when the time came.        
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 Long before the first Punic war, or in Hooke’s words, “from time 
immemorial,”53 the Carthaginians had been known as the most skillful maritime 
nation on earth. Their commonwealth had become a matter of admiration and envy 
among the Romans with its “dominions extending about 2000 miles in length, all 
bordering about the sea.”54 Even a brief look at the history of Carthage would tell 
that it expanded and secured its expansion through commerce and naval power, 
which were qualifications Rome then lacked in their empire building. The Romans, 
on the other hand, had a formidable army, homogenously made up of citizens of 
Rome. Such a benefit the Carthaginians were obviously deprived of, given their less 
warlike army of foreign mercenaries from Gaul, Spain and Africa. Besides, as Basil 
Kennet pointed out, some believed that on the grounds of having “wholly neglected 
all naval concerns for many years,” Rome remained “long in its primitive innocence 
and integrity; free from all those corruptions which an intercourse with foreigners 
might probably have brought into fashion.”55 Kennet here echoed the Platonic 
association of corruption with contact with foreigners.  
As a matter of fact, the comparison of Rome and Carthage endowed all 
eighteenth-century historians of Rome with the opportunity of reassessing the virtue 
of commerce over conquest, naval power over land force and a national army over 
foreign auxiliaries which were topics never absent from the British political agenda. 
The history of Carthage was commonly regarded as the history of “a republic of 
merchants, who understood the value of money, but not the merit of brave 
soldiers.”56 Prior to the Punic wars, Carthage, which had the reputation of being the 
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“queen of the commercial world”57 and the “mistress of the sea,”58 had built a 
glorious and profitable empire. According to Hooke, what the Carthaginians had then 
achieved in terms of commerce, naval supremacy and empire was “not to be 
paralleled in the history of any other nation.”59  However, when young and eager 
Rome challenged them, they eventually lost their empire to the Romans, whose naval 
strength and skill were in fact incomparable to theirs. Hardly surprisingly, this part of 
the history, particularly the reasons behind the tragic end of the Carthaginian sea 
empire, attracted considerable attention among the British historians. Polybius’s 
thesis that the fall of Carthage was due to the incompetence of its Senate, was, of 
course, echoed in some histories of Rome.60 Nevertheless, the majority rather 
elaborated on the reasons gathered under the titles of commerce, luxury and military 
inadequacy. 
Commerce was the foundation on which Carthage was built. A maritime trade 
rendered the Carthaginians the wealthiest nation of the age. Despite all the land and 
sea wars they were involved in, commerce was “what they had most set their hearts 
upon.”61 But the obvious parallel with Britain ran counter to what the British 
historians of the eighteenth century had in mind: to warn the reader against Britain 
becoming anything like Carthage. They were greatly concerned with the end of 
Carthage with the purpose of revealing how fatal the consequences of luxury and the 
use of foreign mercenaries would be for a state.  None disputed the desirability of 
commerce, nor its necessity in creating financial strength. All, on the other hand, 
pointed to the corruptive power of luxury which, throughout history, unmistakably 
followed a great flow of wealth to the country, generally obtained by trade. In this 
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respect, the Carthaginians too suffered from the inescapable evil effects of luxury, 
“for riches had deprived them of valor, and rendered their manners effeminate.”62 
The effeminacy spread to every aspect of life in the empire and, in particular, into the 
military, playing the decisive role in the fall of Carthage. Effeminacy was a 
frequently used term in the eighteenth-century political and philosophical texts 
connoting materialism, selfishness, corruption and relaxed manners.63
Being a wealthy nation, the Carthaginians who, according to Hooke, used to 
fight “for glory, or to give a wider extent to their empire,”64 came to hire foreign 
mercenaries from Spain, Gaul and Africa, instead of fighting wars themselves. Thus, 
in Ferguson’s words, they 
…had exhausted their sources, and consumed the bread of their own people 
in maintaining foreign mercenaries, who, instead of being an accession of 
strength, were ready to prey on their weakness and to become the most 
formidable enemies to the state they had served.65  
 
The Roman army, on the other hand, like that of the early days of Carthage, was 
made up of 
…legions of free citizens, whose predominant passion was glory, and who 
placed the highest glory in facing every danger, and surmounting every 
difficulty, to preserve their liberty, and extend their empire.66   
 
The historians, both the ancient and British, argued that the Roman victory over 
Carthage was due to the Roman soldiers who were all at the same time Roman 
citizens. As an eighteenth-century truism, the real strength of the Roman army rested 
on the absence of hired foreign mercenaries. This made Rome invincible in the face 
of effeminate Carthage. 
In highlighting this episode of Roman history, the British historians intended 
to put forward the norm that an army which consisted of soldiers who are not citizens 
                                                 
62 Anon., Nobleman’s Roman History, I,, 231.  
63 Sher, ‘National Defence,’ 243. 
64 Hooke, Roman History, II, 67. 
65 Ferguson, Roman Republic, I, 101. 
66 Hooke, Roman History, II, 3. 
 120
of the country that they fight for would sooner or later destroy the coherence and 
stability of that country. In the eighteenth century, it was customary for the British to 
hire Swiss, Dutch and mostly German soldiers in their deep engagements in the 
continental wars. This, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was a delicate issue and 
a matter of opposition. Two arguments prevailed in the opposition to the foreign 
troops which accounted for approximately 40 to 50 percent of the entire British army 
in the period 1701-1760.67  Firstly, it was argued that “[i]nstead of paying for 
German mercenaries, England should be nurturing her own seamen.”68 Therefore, the 
mercenaries, which were overwhelmingly Hanoverian in origin, were seen as 
wasteful expenditure putting the national wealth at stake. Secondly, hiring foreign 
troops would kill the manlike spirit of the British nation and degrade them to 
effeminate, corrupt merchants deprived of fighting skills. In this way, the question of 
national defense was discussed “within the wider framework of political economy 
and moral philosophy.” At the hands of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, this 
topic was further treated in the most articulate way.69 British historians of Rome too 
were recipients of the Florentine civic humanist tradition and, by setting Carthage as 
an example, drew the attention of their readers to the possible disastrous outcomes of 
such erroneous national defence policies. 70
Another lively eighteenth-century debate related to national defence was the 
question of a standing army and it was discussed in the same context with that of 
foreign troops. Since the Treaty of Rijswijk (1697), the prospect of maintaining a 
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permanent army had been fiercely discussed by the ideologues of the Whig and Tory 
parties. Interestingly enough, on this particular topic there was no clear-cut 
distinction between the two groups. The Whigs such as John Trenchard and William 
Moyle were as much concerned as the Tories with the possibility that a standing 
army would put the credibility of the constitution into question and grant the 
monarch with “an important source of patronage with which to purchase influence in 
parliament.”71 Furthermore, the question of standing army had the same moral 
implication as in the debate over foreign troops. The virtues of a nation defended by 
a standing army, which was possibly comprised of foreign mercenaries, would 
significantly erode. Entrusting all their military duties to this army, the British 
citizens would lose their sense of patriotism. If the army were corrupted, there would 
remain no other means of national defence. On this account, since Harrington’s 
Oceana the civic humanist tradition had built up a very strong case in favour of 
militias and against standing armies.72
It should here be highlighted that the emphasis on the necessity of a warrior-
like attribute in a nation’s identity was not a call for total militarization. Ideally, the 
polished nations should be governed by lawful authorities under which their liberties 
and rights to life and property were enshrined in the common law and they should 
pursue external relations secured by the mutually benefiting effect of commerce. 
However, they should at the same time be prepared to fight for their liberties, 
commercial assets and, in the end, for their empires. Such was the main thought 
behind the concern with national defence. As will be seen in the coming chapters, the 
British historians of Greece displayed a certain disapproval of the states with a 
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military character and this disapproval became most evident in their comparisons of 
Athens and Sparta. One therefore should expect to come across the same tendency in 
the Roman histories as well. Militaristic attitudes were commended only within the 
context of national security and defence. The warlike spirit of Rome received much 
praise as something imperative in building and defending an empire. Subsequent to 
the Punic wars, the Romans 
…had acquired strength and security, not only by the reputation of great 
victories, but still more by the military spirit and improved discipline and 
skill of their people by sea and land.73                                        
 
Rome thus succeeded in pacifying and subduing all its rivals and grew into a world 
empire. However, militarization of government was a subject of criticism in the 
Roman histories too. Goldsmith, voicing the Tories’ “long-standing horror of 
militarism,”74 denounced the excessive militarization of Rome in its latter days when 
the Romans “began to consider the whole world as their own” and “resolved to treat 
all those who withstood their arms, not as opposers, but revolters.”75
 
3.5 Luxury 
 
Carthage was “the rival state, whose destruction alone could establish the 
Roman greatness”76 and therefore, following its defeat in the third Punic war, Rome 
was left without a rival. The victory over the most formidable enemy should have 
been the beginning of glorious days for Rome and the Romans, but in the eyes of 
‘Nobleman’ and Goldsmith, this was, on the contrary, the beginning of the period 
that would, in the long term, bring the end of the Roman Empire. ‘Nobleman’ viewed 
the fall of Carthage, though “seemingly” one of “the most fortunate events in the 
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Roman history”, as the opening of an era that would lead “to a change of manners, 
and to the extinction of Roman liberty.” After the disappearance of the Carthaginian 
threat, the Roman citizens, who had once been glued together with “the sense of a 
common danger,” eventually “grew altogether ungovernable.” 77 This was followed 
by intolerance, suppression and finally by corruption. Goldsmith however evaluated 
the subject from the perspective of luxury. 
From the end of third Punic war, Goldsmith argued, Rome was transformed 
into the mighty, extensive and wealthy empire, gracious to its citizens and most 
formidable to the enemies. Nevertheless, he also asserted that from the fall of 
Carthage, Rome, at the same time, was to be considered as “a powerful state, giving 
admission to all the vices that tend to divide, enslave, and at last totally destroy it.” 
As the riches from Carthage and other newly-acquired colonies continued to flow to 
the empire, the Romans could not escape from the fate of the Carthaginians; hence 
their manners were eventually softened and corrupted. Although the empire did not 
cease to expand, the name of Rome only grew, not its strength:   
 …their future triumphs rather spread their power, than increased it, they 
rather gave it surface than solidity. They now began daily to degenerate from 
their ancient modesty, plainness, and severity of life. The triumphs and the 
spoils of Asia, brought in a taste for splendid expense, and these produced 
avarice and inverted ambition, so that from hence forward, the history seems 
that of another people.78
 
The most obvious sign of corruption, as Goldsmith’s argument goes, was the change 
in the Roman attitude towards the conquered. Once the “boast” of the Romans had 
been “to use lenity to those whom they had subdued.”79 But that was once. 
The effeminacy of Roman manners brings us back to the question of luxury 
which appears to be a topic requiring further elaboration, being “one of the oldest, 
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most important and most pervasive negative principle for organizing society Western 
history has known.”80 In the eighteenth century, as in the ancient times, luxury had a 
very central place in political, economic and moral discussions.81 Although in the 
second half of the century luxury came to be detached from the negative implications 
of vice and corruption and to be considered, within the context of Scottish 
Enlightenment, as the desirable stimulator of production, trade and progress, the 
more common attitude, which was also adopted by the historians of Rome as a 
whole, remained firmly critical of it. Montagu’s words below reflect that point of 
view well: 
Though there is a concurrence of several causes which bring on the ruin of a 
state, yet where luxury prevails, that parent of all our fantastic imaginary 
wants, ever craving and ever unsatisfied we may justly assign it as the 
leading cause: since it ever was and ever will be the most baneful to public 
virtue. For luxury is contagious from its very nature, it will gradually 
descend from the highest to the lowest ranks, till it has ultimately infected a 
whole people. The evils arising from luxury have not been peculiar to this or 
that nation, but equally fatal to all wherever it was admitted.82       
 
On this account, it appeared crucial to inform the British reader of the erroneous 
steps taken by the ancient empires, for they could be tempted equally by luxury. As 
S. Fawconer asserted in his Essay on Modern Luxury, 
[i]t is natural to imagine, that a prosperous and opulent people, flourishing in 
conquests, and secure from the apprehensions of foreign invasions, would 
indulge themselves in the gratification of all such pleasurable objects, as 
affluence enables them to procure, and ease prompts they enjoy.83                           
 
A considerable number of pamphlets were published to serve as a warning.84  
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In the eyes of the historians, luxury stood as an issue to be particularly dealt 
with, being the common enemy of all empires –past, present and future. For that 
reason, and since it was one of the most fashionable topics of the age, they were 
extremely preoccupied with the question in their works, discussing its emergence, 
contagious effects and prevention. It should also be noted here that in addition to the 
emphasis in his Roman history, Goldsmith engaged in the debates on luxury, 
separately in his ironic article entitled ‘The Benefits of Luxury’ which appeared in 
The Public Ledge as a part of a series of entertaining letters which he wrote under the 
pseudonym Lien Chi Altangi, supposedly a Chinese visitor to London. In that letter, 
he criticized the newly emerging positive understanding of luxury and sarcastically 
commented that  
[t]he greater the luxuries of every country, the more closely, politically 
speaking, is that country united. Luxury is the child of society alone, the 
luxurious man stands in need of a thousand different artists to furnish out his 
happiness; it is more likely, therefore, that he should be a good citizen who 
is connected by motives of self-interest with so many, than the abstemious 
man who is united to none.85            
 
Blackwell, on the other hand, in addition to his Roman history, wholeheartedly 
recommended John Milton’s Treatise on Education to everyone “who wishes to be 
deemed the father of his country, and to prevent Great Britain from undergoing 
sooner or later the dreadful fate of degenerate Rome,”86 which had befallen it 
because of the habit of luxury.   
To put emphasis on the inevitable corruptive effects of luxury British 
historians referred to the same emphasis in the ancient historians, above all Sallust, 
Livy and Plutarch. Luxury had been viewed as the curse of all great nations that none 
had escaped from. All the fallen empires, in origin, were virtuous, courageous and 
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simple, until an external flow of riches from the newly conquered territories, in most 
of the cases from Asia, made its way into the center. In the Roman case, Rome was 
contaminated following the fall of Carthage with the Carthaginian wealth gained in 
Asian trade. In this way, the Romans lost, in Blackwell’s words, “their primitive 
poverty” which was one of the “chief sources…of the Roman virtue” and “afforded 
them neither examples nor fuel for vice.”87 What caused the effeminacy of the 
Carthaginians had the same effect on the Romans and led them into internal 
conflicts, but more importantly, to the demise of the Republic. Cato’s attempt at 
combating this national deficiency bore no successful results and Rome gradually 
sank into irretrievable degeneration.  
In the pages devoted to exhibit the fatal side-effects of luxury, Cato came 
forth as a character immune from all the vices. He was depicted as “rigid”88 as well 
as “brave and indefatigable, frugal of the public money and not to be corrupted”89  by 
Hooke, who echoed Seneca’s remark that “it is easier to prove drunkness to be a 
virtue than Cato to be vicious.”90 According to Goldsmith, he “was one of the most 
faultless characters we find in the Roman history.”91 Similarly Ferguson declared 
that  
he is a rare example of merit, which received its praise even amidst the 
adulation that was paid to his enemies; and was thought, by the impartial, 
equally above the reach of commendation and of censure.92      
 
His struggle with Caesar had been assessed from many different aspects and his 
stance against luxury, hence corruption, was one of them. Cato was an exception in 
this age of luxury when the Romans were blinded, by excessive consumption, to the 
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political corruption. In fact, in some of the Roman history texts, particularly that of 
Goldsmith, the emphasis on Cato within this context of luxury serves as a prelude to 
the Augustan age which was reflected as the miraculous but temporary cure of 
luxury. In the eyes of pro-Augustan historians, Cato’s merits did not infuse itself into 
the other governors of Rome, whereas Augustus succeeded in reinforcing the 
virtuous character of the Roman people and the respectability of their institutions. 
Goldsmith while concluding his remarks on the period subsequent to the fall of 
Carthage, including Cato’s time, argued that “[n]othing can be more dreadful to a 
thinking mind than the government of Rome from this period, till it found refuge 
under the protection of Augustus.”93 Still, it was considered impossible to stop fully 
the prevalence of luxury, once it made its entrance to the society. In this sense, 
despite the Augustan recovery of manners and politics, luxury would have revived 
anyway and had its role in the fall of Rome. At that time, interestingly enough, the 
barbaric nations against which the Romans fought were the virtuous, uncontaminated 
by luxury:    
The character of the people with whom the Romans had to contend was, in 
all respects, the reverse of theirs…Simple and severe in their manners, they 
were unacquainted with the word luxury; anything was sufficient for their 
extreme frugality; hardened by exercise and toil, their bodies seemed 
inaccessible to disease or pain.94   
 
 
3.6 Expansion 
 
Beside luxury, territorial expansion greatly preoccupied the British historians. 
What methods were, and of course ought to be employed to pursue an expansion 
successfully? On what basis could this expansion be justified and how were the new 
acquisitions to be presented? These were among the imperial issues on which the 
British historians put particular emphasis in their Roman histories, as these were also 
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some of the most debated political topics of the eighteenth century despite the lack of 
a “consistent ideology around which to gather and by which to be identified.”95 
However, the Roman history promised a limitless analogy, as an alternative. 
According to Echard, it was crucial to recognize the point that the Romans at 
the outset engaged only in the wars that were “all defensive, or at least, not begun 
without just grounds and provocations.”96 And expansion was simply the inevitable 
outcome of the victories at the end of these just defensive wars. With this, Echard 
aimed to leave out the negative implications of spatial expansion and vindicate the 
acquisition of the territories belonged to other peoples. For expansion did surely 
involve the usurpation of the sovereign rights of the conquered and never ceased to 
be a delicate and controversial matter, which caused imperial affairs to be treated in 
Britain with considerable reserve.  
Once the distance between the centre and periphery undeniably increased, it 
was not sufficient to refer to defensive, just wars. Such was the case for the Roman 
Empire in its heyday and the British historians had to confront the problem. Hooke, 
for instance, stressed that the Roman Empire, following the banishment of the 
Tarquins, “put the Romans in a condition of usurping an authority over other nations, 
the most inconsiderable of which had an extent of country far exceeding theirs.”97 
Ferguson too asserted that “no state has a right to make the submission of mankind a 
necessary condition to its own preservation.” Then what was so glorious about the 
history of Roman Empire and what possible lessons could be deducted from it if 
Rome was a usurper state? At this point, again Ferguson sought to elucidate the 
problematic of expanding without usurping by claiming that “some part of this 
political character, however, is necessary to the safety, as well as to the advancement 
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of nations.” Therefore, a state, though not “many states qualified to support such 
pretensions,” could, for its safety and advancement, pursue expansionist policies.  At 
least, in order to be safe, it could not allow “any ally to suffer by having espoused its 
cause.” 98  
This framework, under what circumstances the idea of expansion and 
conquest as well as the Roman experience could be justified, appeared as one of the 
significant themes that were extensively treated in the Roman histories of the 
eighteenth century. The starting point was commonly the smallness of Rome. Rome 
“had always been confined to a very narrow circuit” and had to grow both 
territorially and demographically. Particularly, the demographic growth, superceding 
the territorial, was underlined as the future “main strength of the state” by Hooke.99 
As a matter of fact, Hooke’s argument on the smallness of Rome bears certain 
similarities to eighteenth-century concerns about the demographic weakness of 
Britain, which, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is discussed in Colley’s 
Captives. The possibility of the depopulation of Britain as a consequence of 
territorial expansion considerably troubled those eighteenth-century minds, who 
viewed the depopulation of the motherland as the main reason behind the decline of 
the Portuguese and Spanish empires. Besides, there had already existed deep worries 
about the smallness of the British population which was only 5.1 million in 1701.100 
Therefore, it is understandable that the prospect of increasing “the nation’s stock of 
manpower” was among the contemporary topics discussed widely.101 Hooke’s above 
comments should be considered as a reflection of these apprehensions. Depopulation 
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should be prevented and the strength of the Roman state was embedded in its ability 
to reverse the flow from periphery to center. 
Undoubtedly, smallness was not always accepted as the legitimate ground to 
initiate such an unprecedented expansion. ‘Nobleman,’ for instance, emphasized that, 
in the case of Rome,  
…their country, although small, was fertile, and able to have satisfied all 
their wants, especially such as were of a reasonable nature; but such was 
their ambition, or rather such was the design of providence that they first 
extended their conquests over the neighboring states of Italy, and then 
throughout every part of the known world.102                   
 
The Roman ambition of conquest and the motives behind it had always been issues 
of great importance in the eyes of the British historians and the smallness of Rome 
was counted as one among many. Also, arriving at a definition of the ideal type of 
conquest appeared to be equally crucial, for, though being an inevitable aspect of 
expansion, not all types of conquest were desirable. While recounting the reign of 
Servius Tullus, Hooke, in this respect, particularly underlined that the ideal conquest 
was not the one pursued “for the sake of glory.” Inspired by Livy, Hooke contended 
that  Servius Tullus “rated the value of his conquests only by their tendency to the 
public good” and that should be the criterion for all rulers who dreamed of expanding 
their territories. In the early Hanoverian era, the political men of Tory origin and 
some court Whigs were extremely disturbed by the thought that in their plans of war 
and expansion the Hanoverian monarchs did not take the public good as a matter of 
importance. As a Jacobite, Hooke elaborated on this point as a chance to extend his 
criticism to the king. Again in the same context he argued that during the reign of 
this good prince Servius “one triumph did not beget the ambition of obtaining 
another.”103 Therefore, the definition of ideal conquest appeared in Hooke’s history 
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as the one that would better the situation in the motherland. Expanding was not to be 
a priority but improving certainly was. 
During its rise when, in Ferguson’s words, the Romans “had not hitherto 
relaxed the industry, nor cooled in the ardor with which the prosperous nations 
advance,” their conquests were far from being complete and there was an undeniable 
urge to proceed. As they conquered new kingdoms and annexed other empires to 
their own, they remained cautious not to set a foot wrong as well as not to expand for 
the sake of expansion. They acted within the limits of their constitution, above all, 
for the common benefit of the Roman people. 104 At this point Blackwell agreed with 
Ferguson that the Romans were more than “brutal bloody conquerors” and their 
dominion not being of short duration was the most ample proof of that. In other 
words, in their conquests they followed a certain pattern which was neither arbitrary 
nor accidental. On the contrary, as commonly argued by the British historians, these 
were ventures in which the Romans took into consideration not only the welfare of 
the Roman people but the differing conditions of the conquered and acted 
accordingly. Thus, as Blackwell concluded,  
…joining unfeigned clemency to the vanquished, and raising themselves as 
it were above the power of fortune, by asking no other terms in their highest 
prosperity than those they had demanded before they were victors; and 
disdaining to accept of any in their lowest state but those they had proposed 
in their most flourishing condition, they became at once the wonder and 
dread of all the nations that heard the name of Rome. 105
 
Of course, not all British historians of Rome were impressed by the Roman 
strategy of conquest, among whom ‘Nobleman’ was the foremost critic. He held that 
“the means by which the Romans conquered the world” did not serve to “promote 
their interests” but to “destroy their city.” What these means were, as argued by other 
historians, will be discussed below in detail. However, the ‘Nobleman’ contended 
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that the Romans first conquered the neighboring cities, kingdoms and empires and 
then, in order to integrate them into the Roman empire, enslaved them through the 
Agrarian and Licinian laws which, “rather colored over with the most plausible 
appearances, were a species of slavery under the name of freedom.” This “improper 
manner” would consequently “excel the vulgar in their actions.”106 Hardly 
surprisingly, in every eighteenth-century history of Rome, the final stages of the 
Roman expansion were viewed with disapproval, for Rome had by far exceeded its 
economic and military resources while expanding its territories, particularly towards 
the east. Ferguson offers one among many examples of the prevailing view.  
But the enlargement of their territory and the success of their arms abroad, 
became the sources of a ruinous corruption at home. The wealth of provinces 
began to flow into the city, and filled the coffers of private citizens, as well 
as those in the commonwealth.107
 
Nevertheless, with the exception of the ‘Nobleman,’ no historian adopted a 
critical approach to that Roman way of conquering or of governing the newly 
acquired territories, which was established in the early days of the empire. In fact, 
one of the principal motives in writing Roman history was to pin down the most 
characteristic features of the colonial system of Rome and exhibit these to the British 
reader for his instruction. In what Armitage calls “the absence of incorporating union 
for the provinces of the empire, direct Parliamentary representation for the colonies 
or ecclesiastical unity,” the British statesmen stood indecisive in front of the ways of 
unifying their empire. On this account, throughout most of the eighteenth century 
“[t]he imperial constitution” remained “even more informal, unsystematic and 
contested than the British constitution itself.” 108 Still, during the inconsistent 
attempts at creating a legal identity for the first British empire, there was a constant 
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search for the right imperial governance and many legal and historical sources, 
among which Roman history held a prominent place, were examined in this search. 
As P.A. Brunt contends, the maxim Divide et impera could not have been Roman, 
for “the tendency of Roman policy was normally to unite her subjects.”109   
The British historians of Rome treated the topics of making conquests and 
keeping acquisitions permanently within the Roman borders separately. More 
emphasis was laid on the means to preserve the newly acquired lands incorporated to 
the empire for there was “nothing so slippery as a new conquest.”110  Through their 
restless and successful attempts at conquest and colonization, the Romans rightfully 
gained the name “the masters of the world”. One point frequently stressed by the 
British historians of Rome was that the Roman rise to greatness was neither 
accidental nor sudden. Blackwell, for example, stated that  
…Rome was no upstart state –no favorite of fortune, of a sudden growth, 
and as sudden decay. It owed its grandeur to no sudden run of felicity, nor 
acquired its dominion by a career of victories obtained without a check.111   
 
Similarly, the ‘Nobleman’ too argued that “the utmost point of grandeur” for Rome 
“cannot be easily ascertained” as “the Romans rose to the sovereignty of the world 
gradually.”112 One might relate this gradual rise of Rome with its differing methods 
of colonial government designed to accommodate the acquisitions of differing 
character and thus to hold them permanently. Needless to say, an upstart state with 
no clever strategy of expansion could not be expected to last, but Rome, it was held, 
by wisely implementing a flexible colonial policy gradually grew and successfully 
incorporated the newly acquired lands into its own empire. Such policies of Rome 
were those needed most by British statesmen.  
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, Kennet’s Roman history was published 
earlier than the other books with which this dissertation is concerned. Nevertheless, 
because the assessments of the feasible possibilities for the unification of the English 
colonies in North America with the metropolis had been in progress since 1643,113 
Kennet also devoted a considerable part of his history to the means through which 
the Romans attached their colonies to Rome. In his work, Kennet, believing they had 
been neglected, stressed the importance of “the several forms of government which 
the Romans established in their conquests.” They were “very well worth our 
knowledge,” but were “seldom rightly distinguished.”114 Nevertheless, in the 
successive histories of Rome although this topic was perceptively treated, the 
categorization of the varying methods of colonial government failed to reach to the 
advanced level set forth by Kennet. While the others examined this system without 
taking the pain to name the differing forms, Kennet elaborated on five types of 
government: colonies, municipiae, the prefecture, federate civitates and provinces. 
Thus he aimed to cast a light on the possible variations of settlement on the 
conquered lands and the relations between the conqueror and the conquered. 
The type of government to be implemented was determined by the attitude of 
the native people towards the Romans. Stronger measures were taken against the 
agitated communities which were likely to trouble Rome in the future, whereas 
remarkable favors were granted to the more docile ones which seemed to get along 
with the center obediently. Of the five forms, colonies, municipiae, the prefecture 
and the federate civitates were modeled on the acquisitions in Italy. Provinces were 
to govern the distant foreign countries of larger extent.       
  Colonies, as Kennet’s argument begins, were the 
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states, or communities, where the chief part of the inhabitants had been 
transplanted from Rome; and though mingled with the natives who had been 
left in the conquered place, yet obtained the whole power and authority in 
the administration of the affairs.115
 
The foremost advantage of this type of acquisition seemed to be the point that it 
would serve as “a very agreeable reward” to the invincible commanders of the army 
who had fought for the glory of the empire by letting them govern these large 
territories in Italy. In such a government dominated by the people of Rome 
themselves, the possibility of an upheaval was considered as minor. In the municipia 
too, there was a rather relaxed form of government in which certain political rights 
were bestowed on the native peoples. In Kennet’s words, they were 
properly corporations, or enfranchised places, where the natives were 
allowed the use of their old laws and constitutions, and at the same time 
honored with the privilege of Roman citizens.116                           
 
There were clearly exceptions to this, as in the case of the Cerites, a people 
who lived in Tuscany. Though Roman citizens, they were denied some of the 
political rights enjoyed by other municipia such as taking part in the public 
administration. The prefectures, on the other hand, were the places which were 
suspected as likely to cause disquiet to Rome and faced “the hardest condition that 
was imposed on any people of Italy:” 
The prefecture[s] were certain towns of Italy whose inhabitants had the name 
of Roman citizens; but were neither allowed to enjoy their own laws nor 
magistrates, being governed by annual prefects sent from Rome.      
 
Then there were federate civitates which stood as the most lenient governing system 
established by the Romans in Italy. These cities or states, as Kennet stated, retained 
“entirely their own customs and forms of government without the least alterations” 
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and “joined in confederacy with the Romans upon such terms had been adjusted 
between them.”117
Concerning the acquisitions out of Italy, Rome made these provinces “upon 
the entire reducing them under the Roman dominion.”118 Nevertheless, in the 
provinces which consisted of multiple communities that inhabited extensive 
territories it was impossible to encounter one single attitude towards the conqueror. 
Some of these communities were on more friendly terms and had “a desire of union 
and agreement,” while, naturally, others were troublesome and “unwilling to part 
with their liberty.” These latter were punished by heavy taxes and finally subdued 
under strict governors, who were appointed annually by Rome. Meanwhile, the 
cooperative provinces enjoyed a more flexible system of taxation to which, in some 
cases, no additional burden had been added since their conquest. Such a government 
in which the degree of subjection of the provinces was determined by their degree of 
loyalty enabled the Roman rulers to focus their attention and the military and 
financial resources of Rome on the problematic areas only. 119  
Undoubtedly, taxation was a crucial instrument in connecting the colonies to 
the motherland and defining mutual rights and obligations. On this account, it had a 
prominent place in the discussions of empire.  George I and George II, however, did 
not appreciate how crucial a well-regulated tax system was to the full integration of 
empire and thus “showed little interest in proposals to impose new taxes on their 
more distant subjects.” For that reason, particularly the reign of George II came to be 
known as an age of neglect in terms of the fiscal policies implemented in the 
colonies. George III, on the other hand, pursued an aggressively persistent policy 
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which resulted in the loss of the American colonies.120 In the first British empire, the 
government failed to create a wise system of taxation that would serve well to the 
imperial designs.    
Though not as systematic as Kennet’s, Hooke’s approach also offered useful 
insight into the Roman method of expansion and called the attention of the British 
reader to the delicate balance to be maintained between the conqueror and 
conquered. He too highlighted the point that not all subdued nations enjoyed the 
same privileges as the most important. On the basis of “the fidelity of the several 
cities and nations and the services they did the republic,” some were awarded a wide 
range of privileges, from retaining customs and laws of their own to the right of 
suffrage and citizenship.121 On the same principle, some, on the other hand, were 
totally subjected to the center. The lesson to be deduced from this aspect of Roman 
history was that a nation aiming at territorial expansion ought to maintain flexibility 
in terms of governing the conquered lands. A single uniform attitude towards the 
subdued nations of differing character, living in differing environments and governed 
by varying regimes would not work.  
What the apt behavior towards the colonies should become remained as an 
issue unresolved for the agents of the first British empire. Ideally, they desired to 
“conceive of themselves as partners in a single polity” in full cooperation with the 
colonies. However, they succeeded in creating neither a single coherent imperial 
policy nor a more sophisticated plan in which different comportments towards the 
colonies in compliance with their peculiarities were regarded. A full commitment to 
arrive at “a mutually-acceptable ideology of empire” would have meant to utter the 
method to deal with “the resolution of contradictions as well as the necessary 
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reforms” which would officially declare whether London allowed autonomy to the 
colonies or exercised strict control over them.122 The British government deliberately 
avoided such a declaration, formulated in the form of a binding clause. Nevertheless, 
this attitude on the official level did not discourage our historians from offering 
examples of ideal colonization from Roman history. In doing that, the historians’ 
political identities, which visibly clashed over other issues such as the Augustan 
empire or the definition of the good prince, seemed to converge within this context. 
Preserving the territorial acquisitions was a subject dear to all.    
Without assessing the differences between the varying modes of governing 
acquisitions, Hooke examined them under the common name of colony. The early 
Roman attempts at colonization, in which the Romans did not tend to settle in the 
newly conquered lands, had taught them that to maintain such an attitude, would 
have cost them dearly. In order to hold their acquisitions permanently and to prevent 
“the ill consequences of that independence,” they began to send permanent 
colonists.123 This time, however, another problem arose which was pointed to, not by 
Hooke, but by Ferguson. According to him, the departure of the colonists from Rome 
for good resulted in the undesired outcome of “losing the people,” for it was possible 
for the colonists to attach themselves to causes detrimental to their mother country 
and become “parties with the vanquished in the quarrel with the victors.” Therefore, 
it was necessary to acknowledge that the mingling of the two groups, despite 
securing the subjection of the conquered, was not always in favor of the conqueror. 
Luckily, in the case of the Romans “the memory of their descent and the ties of 
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consanguinity” preserved their loyalty to the interests of Rome. 124 Still, the danger of 
losing the people was present in all attempts at colonization in history. 
Both Hooke and Ferguson took an interest in the characteristics of two phases 
of Roman expansion, within and beyond Italy. To Ferguson, “mere colonization” 
was sufficient to regulate the expansion within Italy, as was the case in the 
republican era. He held that colonization was a means to sustain the wellbeing of 
“the indigent citizens” by providing them with land to settle on. Nevertheless, after 
having acquired the whole of Italy and left no place unsettled, by building seventy 
colonies, it was proven impossible for the Romans to better the condition of these 
people further within the borders of Italy.125 Therefore, the argument continued, 
overseas expansion became essential at this point, as colonization within failed to 
fulfill its primary purpose. What appeared significant from Hooke’s perspective was 
the criterion on which the Romans decided where to expand. He asserted that the 
Romans cleverly sought for “cheaper and easier” acquisitions in the first place, rather 
than the subjugation of the nations “brave and warlike and independent of each 
other.” This would require the expenditure of much money and blood.126 In this 
respect, expansion towards the east was commonsense. 
Blackwell too was preoccupied with the issue of permanently keeping the 
acquisitions, although his approach remained rather superficial and simplistic, when 
compared to that of Kennet, Hooke and Ferguson. He argued that among the three 
existing methods, the Romans had most wisely chosen to “win the hearts of the 
vanquished by bettering their condition,” instead of the more warlike options such as 
to “extirpate the conquered nation” or to “keep constantly an armed force in the 
country, superior to the natives.” Still, he argued for the necessity of “a body of 
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troops quartered in the utmost province” which, in the Roman case, “made a revolt 
among so many subdued nations next to a miracle.” 127  He made no reference to the 
flexible character of the Roman expansionist policy which was a central matter for 
other writers.  
The main reason for Blackwell’s inadequate discussion of Roman colonial 
policy was in fact his concentration on “a modern instance,” which was, in his eyes, 
“more striking and persuasive than abstract arguments.”128 Because he dedicated so 
many pages to eighteenth-century overseas competition between Britain and other 
major European powers, such as France, Spain and the Dutch Republic, in order to 
pin down the varying and contesting perceptions of empire, the volumes of the Court 
of Augustus published in his lifetime failed to include his comments on the Augustan 
methods of governing, which was obviously Blackwell’s main motive of writing a 
Roman history. The task of compiling his notes on Augustus fell into the hands of 
John Mills who skillfully fulfilled this duty in the third volume. Clearly, not only 
Blackwell’s, but all eighteenth-century British historians’ views of Augustus carry 
significant importance for this study, as they serve well the purpose of understanding 
British ideas of empire. For that reason, the lines below will show how the reign of 
Augustus was treated in the eighteenth-century British histories of Rome. 
 
3.7 The Augustan Empire 
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, a very influential Augustan cult was created 
in eighteenth-century Britain hailing Augustus as the exemplary ruler for 
contemporary monarchs, as well as identifying the Georges with this Roman 
emperor. In this context, volumes of poetry, political pamphlets and history books 
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were published, each seeking to support the conviction that Britain was on the eve of 
an Augustan era. Of course, an equal amount of literature particularly in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, if not more, appeared also to dispute the undeserved 
glorification of Augustus or the Georges’ identification with him. All these made 
Augustus and his reign one of the fashionable topics of the age and it was inevitable 
that analyses of the Augustan way of governing had an extensive place in the Roman 
history texts.  
When used in the positive sense, the word Augustan implied a “stable 
government, the arts of peace, protection by heaven, refinement of style and 
patronage of great authors.” At the utmost, it connoted a state of perfection in which 
the “civilizing forces of permanent achievements” emerged. In its negative sense, the 
Augustan regime was perceived as inducing a “nascent despotism” that would 
eventually destroy all the republican virtues.129 The pro-Augustan reading of Roman 
history was common among the historians of Tory tendency, whereas the negative 
reading was associated with the republican Whig camp. Nevertheless, although such 
categorization generally holds, it should be stated that it is also “liquid, not solid.”130 
Hooke, for example, who sought to challenge the republican interpretation of Roman 
history, exhibited an anti-Augustan stance, because the emperor was the murderer of 
Cicero.         
Tory camp of historians such as Goldsmith, Echard and Mills offered the 
reign of Augustus to their readers as a period of a  miraculous convergence of all the 
ideal political, social and economic conditions whereas the republican camp 
including Ferguson and Wotton, severely condemned the same period as absolutist 
and tyrannical. There is no doubt that these contradicting opinions on the Augustan 
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era were the reflections of the parallel comments of the ancient historians alongside 
the contemporary political ideologies. In this sense, the account of Augustus by 
Echard and Goldsmith, for instance, was no different than that by Paterculus. 
Although in his eighteenth-century translation of Paterculus’s Roman history James 
Paterson claimed that “Paterculus is generally censured, for his excessive and gross 
flattery of Augustus,”131 his and others’ pro-Augustan views commonly prevailed in 
the British texts of Roman history. Nevertheless, the negative depiction of this first 
Roman emperor had an undeniable impact on even the attempts at glorifying him. 
For that reason, the phrase borrowed from the ancient historians saying Augustus 
“did so much hurt to the Roman republic, and to mankind that he ought never to have 
been born; and so much good that he ought never to have died”132 was frequently 
cited by British historians such as Blackwell who was noted for his affirmative 
approach to Augustus. Goldsmith remained alone to leave out any degrading 
comments, even the slightest.  
Although it was under Trajan that the Roman empire reached its largest 
extent, became most “formidable to the rest of the world”133 and thus spread “the 
Roman fame to a larger extent than ever,”134 he was never considered in the 
eighteenth century as an emperor equal to Augustus in greatness. The cardinal reason 
of this was that Trajan exceeded the optimum point fixed by Augustus in terms of 
expansion. As history had taught, territorial expansion was such a delicate issue, and 
nations were to note the point at which to stop, rather than to pursue a limitless, 
uncontrolled acquisition of new lands. Trajan neglected this golden rule and thus 
after his death the Roman empire gradually began “to sink by the unwieldiness of its 
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bulk and the vastness of its own weight.”135 Augustus, on the other hand, was 
exceptionally competent and wise in imperial affairs, as he limited his scheme of 
expansion to the optimum point where the emperor could keep up peace, quiet, 
wealth and happiness equally everywhere from the centre to the remotest corner of 
the empire. When Augustus lost three legions in Germany in 9 AD, he took this as a 
warning not to pursue further expansion in Europe and stopped exactly where he 
should have. Trajan, on the other hand, ignored his predecessor’s wise move and 
engaged in risky campaigns such as in Dacia in 106 AD.136 Although the campaign 
ended in victory, he overextended the imperial territory beyond control. Although 
under his rule the empire came to be seen as an embracing, coherent entity instead of 
“an alien dominion imposed on unwilling subjects by force,”137, at the same time, it 
became too fragile to endure. That was why in the first place Augustus deserved 
much praise or at least was considered as a subject very worthy of examination by 
the imperial historians.   
One of the issues around which heated debates took place was the title of 
Augustus. In his fifth consulship Octavius, on the advice of Macaenas, declared that 
he had become the imperator of Rome and later taken upon the title of Augustus. 
Augustus, as a title, was derived from the word augusta used “for sacred places and 
temples consecrated by Augurs”138 and hence meant there was “something…more 
than mortal” about the emperor.139 All the historians informed us that although 
previously he had considered having the title of Romulus, seen as the founder of the 
empire, he settled for Augustus which was, in Hooke’s words, a “more venerable 
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name and less invidious one.”140 According to Goldsmith, this title “served to 
confirm him in the empire and the hearts of the people.”141 It was not this spiritual 
feature of the title which evoked discussions but its embrace of another concept 
within which was imperator – a title implying authoritarianism. For that reason, 
unlike the French, the British people shared deep reservations about the title. 
Originally, imperator was “the title of the general of the Roman armies” 
which was afterwards acquired by the prince to be used also in peace in order to 
enforce his authority throughout his imperium.142 In the course of time, this authority 
came to be associated with absolutism and tyranny which would sooner or later result 
in the silencing of the Senate.  According to Echard, Octavius attached the title of 
imperator to his other titles in the sense of “the chief command or authority.”143 Still, 
as he continued, by the virtue of becoming Augustus which was more than an 
imperator, Octavius got hold of “a title expressing more dignity and reverence than 
authority.”144 Besides, according to Goldsmith’s attempt at justifying Augustus’s 
titles, it should have been considered as a proof of his good faith that Augustus did 
not acquire “new titles” but “resolved to conceal his new power under usual names 
and ordinary dignities.” Imperator was definitely not an unusual title to assume, yet 
it was sufficient to impose on the people the magnanimity of the ruler.145    
In the other camp of historians, however, the imperator character of Augustus 
was not so easily justified. As Wotton stated, the imperator was the prince who  
lifted men, raised money, declared war, made peace, commanded all the 
forces of empire, legionary or auxiliary, at all times and in all places, and 
could put any senators to death, even within the city upon occasion, as the 
dictators could formerly.146      
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What was more disturbing than these was his “tribunitial” and “censorial” power 
over the Senate, as Augustus “had a negative vote upon any resolutions of the Senate 
which he did not like.” Also the authority of the imperator included the “high 
priesthood” which made him the sole “master of the religion of the empire” who 
could arbitrary add or remove the rituals and ceremonies to or from the religion.147 
Hooke too, though not belonging to the anti-Augustan Whig party, acknowledged 
that Octavius made himself the “perpetual master of manners” of Rome. Although he 
himself was not despotic, for he acquired this power gradually step by step, his 
legacy was: 
Thus the prince got into his hands all the jurisdiction and privileges of the 
several offices of the state; and what was granted to Augustus by degrees 
afterwards conferred upon his successors at once by one single instrument, 
and despotic monarchy established by a law, called afterwards lex regia…148  
 
Lex Regia which was the law issued to transfer the legislative power of the 
Senate to the hands of Augustus, received severe criticism from the British 
historians. From the early modern era, Lex Regia came to be associated with absolute 
monarchy and as in the example of the Danish King Frederick III (1648-1670) and 
the era of Kongeloven provided a basis for absolutist constitutions. In the eyes of our 
anti-Augustan historians too, Lex Regia represented the archetype of the legal code 
that created one of the most despicable governments on earth -an absolutist 
monarchy. Montague, for instance, viewed Augustus on this ground as the man who 
“riveted beyond a possibility of removal” the chains put on the Romans by Julius 
Caesar.149 Nevertheless, the fiercest opponent of Augustus and his governance in 
eighteenth-century Britain was most definitely Ferguson who considered all sorts of 
absolutism equally intolerable. He fervently argued that lex regia which distorted the 
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actual principle of laws as having replaced the people with Augustus simply aimed 
“to guard his person, not only his safety and the authority of his government, but his 
most private concerns.”150 Additionally, he deceived his people by the illusion he 
created around this new code, as if it would serve to restore the ancient rights of the 
Romans lost in the corrupted republic. Ferguson also grieved over the point that 
through lex regia and the absolutist government “all the interesting exertions of the 
national, political, and the military spirit over great parts of the earth were 
suppressed.” Although the Roman empire stretching from Britain to Mesopotamia 
was populated with different “races of men the most famed for activity and vigor,” 
the homogenizing effect of absolutism silenced “every difference of opinion” in this 
cosmopolitan empire and public affairs, unusually, began to be conducted in quiet. 
On this account, in the Roman empire “the materials of history became less frequent 
and less interesting than they had been in the times of the republic.”151 In other 
words, he accused Augustus of suppressing the Roman people to the degree that they 
became dull. This view of Ferguson should remind us of the renowned words by 
John Stuart Mill saying 
A state which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile 
instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes will find that with small 
men no great thing can really be accomplished.152  
 
Sixty years before Mill’s On Liberty, Ferguson was discussing similar ideas by 
reflecting the Roman experience on the British.   
Still, as Ferguson continues, even though it was the story of the usurpation of 
people’s rights by an absolutist monarch and turning them into a dull people, the 
reign of Augustus was to be studied carefully on the grounds that it offered 
invaluable lessons to those “who need to be told under what disguise the most 
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detestable tyranny will sometimes approach mankind.”153 Thus he in fact criticized 
the Augustan historians of his age who, as will be noted below, sought to clean up 
Augustus’s name from the accusations of absolutism and tyranny. Ferguson 
attempted to prove that Rome was governed according to the passions and caprices 
of one individual. In doing that he also intended to prevent the Augustan way from 
being noted in history as “a model for those, who wish to govern with the least 
possible option or obstruction to their power.”154 Augustus was an absolutist 
monarch and caused a recession in the empire with his conduct of imperial affairs. 
Absolutism had nothing to offer to a people then, not only in terms of civil rights but 
in terms of empire also. In that sense, the British empire emerged as a proof of this 
assertion of Ferguson. Britain without employing absolutist measures managed to 
“combine an enormous empire with a minimalist state.” It had, “uniquely among the 
empires of world history,” shown that “libertas at home” would also bring on 
“imperium abroad.”155     
The pro-Augustan historians, on the other hand, did not deny the absolutist 
features of the Augustan government nor contradict the argument that after him these 
features caused Rome to slowly and irretrievably sink into the worst form of tyranny. 
At the same time, however, they collectively aimed to justify Augustan absolutism as 
a measure necessary to rule the Roman empire efficiently. In doing that, they 
highlighted the necessity of separating Augustus from Octavius and claimed that all 
the alleged evils, including the first implantation of absolutism, took place during the 
time of Octavius.156 It could be admitted that Octavius may have had some flaws but 
once he became Augustus, he stayed as “one of the most faultless princes in history,” 
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while exercising his peculiar understanding of absolutism.  In this respect, Echard, 
for instance, argued that Augustan rule was more than the reign of an absolutist 
monarch and it was important to notice the point that “Augustus Caesar became 
supreme governor of the Roman people, neither by inheritance, nor usurpation, nor 
conquest, nor election, yet by means of them all.”157 According to Goldsmith, his 
severe conduct in the triumvirate was “in some measure, necessary to restore public 
tranquility:” 
He gave the government an air suited to the disposition of the times, he 
indulged his subjects in the pride of seeing the appearance of a republic 
while he made them really happy in the effects of a most absolute monarchy, 
guided by the most consummate prudence.158    
 
It was also noteworthy to Goldsmith that throughout his reign, Augustus’s 
interests were always unmistakably compatible with those of the people. In this 
respect while he was governing, so were the people. Based on this he argued that 
“the Romans, by such a government, lost nothing of the happiness that liberty could 
produce and were exempt from all the misfortunes it could occasion.”159 In fact, it 
was his successor Tiberius who corrupted Augustus’s legacy and separated the will 
of the emperor from that of the people. Similarly, Mills asserted that although the 
Roman people compromised on their liberties to a certain degree, Augustus “omitted 
no pains to make them really satisfied and happy.”160 Under the circumstances the 
authoritarian government of Augustus did not appear as despicable as it might have 
been. At this point, taking sides with Goldsmith, Mills and Echard, ‘Nobleman’ too 
offered an explanation of his own to the problematic of liberties under authoritarian 
government. As the following words will demonstrate, he argued that people’s 
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liberties began to be fully exercised only after they were reconciled to the Augustan 
regime:     
The Romans were now arrived at a state of maturity, they were united under 
one head and instead of nominal liberty, for which they had so long 
contended, they enjoyed that which was real, even under a prince clothed 
with sovereign authority.161    
 
Besides, the Augustan government had never been absolutist in the proper 
sense of the term. It was true that he had declared himself emperor, exercised 
military authority over the Roman territories and cause the senate to fall “from their 
ancient splendor,” but Goldsmith at the same time, rather sarcastically contended that 
under Augustus the senate retained some of its former freedom “except in the 
capacity of promoting sedition” and restored some power of the senators except 
“their tendency to injustice.”162 The rights granted to the senate became more 
significant, when it came to imperial affairs. At this point, Mills too agreed with 
Echard as well as with Goldsmith and highlighted that the colonial administration 
that Augustus adopted was “a mixed form of government,” which was “a form useful 
to the prince, and, at last, not less so to the nation.” If nothing had “palliated” the 
alleged misgovernments of Augustus, this should absolutely have.163 In this mixed 
government, “Augustus’s mildness, his moderation, his beneficence” and “his 
virtues” embraced “every order of the state, public communities, as well as private 
persons, cities protected by the empire and the kings in the alliance of the 
Romans.”164   
There is no doubt that the way Augustus governed his empire was 
meticulously examined by all eighteenth-century British historians of Rome with the 
purpose of formulizing the ideal imperial governance. What Ferguson called ‘dull’ 
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was considered by pro-Augustan historians as peace and that appeared as the most 
striking success of this emperor. Therefore the matter of interest was delimited to 
how he attained peace in a gigantic empire comprising Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Illyricum, Panonnia, some parts of Britain, Gaul, Syria and Egypt as well as 
numerous islands of various extent. His monarchy was “so well fixed, and firmly 
settled” that the Romans were convinced that their empire was “indissoluble and 
immortal.”165 What could have been the recipe of achieving such a miraculous 
peace? Among the normative lessons to be reached, the British historians put 
particular emphasis on issues such as leaving religion untouched in the colonies, 
repeopling Italy, being cautious about expansion, building mutual intercourse 
between the center and periphery, uniting the colonies by alliances and finally 
permitting the senate to govern the weak internal provinces of the empire. 
In Echard’s comparison of the republic and the empire, the empire was 
evaluated as 
…something more polite and sociable and never were more glorious, or at                      
least, or more pleasant times than now, all wars and contests ceasing, all arts 
and sciences flourishing, and all riches and pleasures increasing.166   
 
In like manner, ‘Nobleman’ declared how wealthy and refined the empire was:  
The revenues of the empire were equal to its extent, for as we are able to 
judge at this distance of time, near forty millions of our money was yearly 
paid into the treasury. No period ever produced a greater number of learned 
men, witness the immortal writings of Horace, Virgil, Livy, Ovid and many 
others, whose names will be celebrated as long as the Latin language is 
taught.167   
 
The reason why the Roman empire turned out to be such a glorious empire, the most 
exemplary in history, was in the first place Augustus’s concern to keep the religion 
intact, in the exact form he had found it. Although, aside with Augustus and 
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imperator, Octavius took upon himself the title of high priest and therefore was 
entitled to interfere with the established rites, ceremonies and prayers of Rome and 
its colonies, he deliberately avoided that. Augustus, still in Echard’s words, 
appreciated “how tender a point that was, and how dangerous such alterations might 
prove in an unsettled empire.”168 Thus the preservation of religion in its original 
form, no matter how offensive its components could be, emerged as an imperative 
measure to be taken in building an empire. Interestingly enough, the British, in their 
territories in the Indian sub-continent, acted in this exact way, pursuing a strict policy 
of non-interference in matters of religion till the early nineteenth century.169 Here one 
can assume that the British statesmen may well have developed such a policy from 
their acquaintance with Roman history as well as on their own experiences.  
     Secondly, Augustus, by establishing twenty-eight colonies in Italy, 
prevented the depopulation of the motherland which had been “much enfeebled and 
exhausted” by endless wars.170 As noted in the previous chapter, the British viewed 
the possibility of the motherland’s depopulation as one of the worst case scenarios 
that could have happened when they thought of the problem of expansion. However, 
the imperial governance of Augustus had demonstrated that expansion did not 
necessarily lead to an emptied motherland. Even if it did, ‘repeopling’ it would 
always be a possibility. In fact, what the pro-Augustan historians of the eighteenth 
century argued is today an established fact for the archaeologists and contemporary 
historians. Augustus maintained a world empire through “a paradoxically modest 
scale of exploitation of resources.”171 Human resources should be included in this 
category. Augustus firstly kept his army small and prevented his men from scattering 
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around the empire and settling in new places. The periphery was not “annexed to 
provide Romans with new homes.”172 This attitude of the emperor, therefore, could 
be considered as an important factor explaining why Rome was not depopulated.     
 Thirdly, it was argued that his cautious attitude towards acquiring new 
territories played a crucial role in rendering the empire of Augustus stable and 
peaceful. Goldsmith, putting into words this common belief, pointed that “he had 
made it a rule to carry on no operations, in which ambition, and not the safety of the 
state was concerned.” This naturally made him “the first Roman…who aimed at 
gaining a character by the arts of peace alone.”173 Augustus did not set a foot wrong 
in terms of acquisition which could have jeopardized the atmosphere of quiet 
prevailing throughout the empire and here the British historians came across another 
important instruction on the imperial affairs. Imperial power was not enshrined in the 
limitless extent of the territory. Instead of ambitiously stretching the boundaries, the 
ruler should have concentrated on lands only whose acquisition would improve the 
empire, in terms of security or wealth. This feature of the Augustan reign was, 
however, not equally appreciated by Ferguson who studied Roman history from a 
progressive perspective and believed that “[u]nder the establishment now made by 
Augustus, conquests were discontinued or become less frequent.”174 To him this 
appeared as recession rather than stability. 
Even though he had a reputation as anti-Augustan, it is still interesting to find 
Ferguson defying the virtue of such an imperial policy, which was only 
commonsense. Besides, in the following pages of the same volume he not only 
warned his reader of “the troubles to which so extensive a territory was still 
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exposed”175 but praised “the fabric of the empire”176 which secured its existence long 
after Augustus’s death. The truth of the matter is that Ferguson, never ceasing to be 
critical of Augustus for what he did to the perfect Roman republic, did not employ so 
severe a language on imperial issues. As mentioned above, Ferguson distinguished 
between empire as regime and empire as entity. Thus, while he on one hand despised 
Octavius’s title of imperator as well as his imperial regime, the Roman empire on the 
other was reflected in an extremely positive light in his history. He believed that the 
way Augustus managed the growing empire was “a conduct so popular, and in many 
particulars so worthy of empire.”177 What is more, it was Ferguson who called 
attention to the requisite of building mutual alliance and support between the 
provinces, colonies and the center.178 The exceptionally long duration of the Roman 
empire owed much to this connection established by Augustus. It was crucial to 
create an awareness of belonging to a greater entity among the provinces and 
colonies through intercourse and alliances. In short, Ferguson was against Augustan 
but not against his empire.   
Building alliances in particular was commonly accepted by the British 
historians as the key to an enduring empire. Mills, for example, highlighted among 
the principal characteristics of Augustan rule that he treated even the rulers of the 
friendly kingdoms “as a sort of members of the empire” and sought “to unite them by 
alliances and to preserve peace in their families.”179 Goldsmith too underlined a 
similar idea of binding the empire together by the “invigorating principle of 
patriotism to inspire its subjects in its defence.”180 Nevertheless, efficiently and 
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peacefully governing an expanding empire as well as generating a feeling of 
patriotism among its components was a task, in Augustus’s own words, 
“which…none but the immortal Gods were equal to.”181 In fulfilling this task, 
Augustus aimed at designing an imperial governance in which he shared this burden 
with the senate to a limited degree.  
In the overseas venture, the role to be played by the Parliament had 
increasingly preoccupied the political nation, starting from Hugh Chamberlen’s 
proposal in 1702 suggesting the union of England, Scotland, and Ireland with the 
American colonies “under the same liberties and legislative, as well as executive 
power.”182 For that reason, much attention was devoted to this aspect of the Roman 
empire by our historians. It was noted that the senate was allowed to govern the 
internal provinces which were not likely to pose a threat to the safety of the empire, 
whereas the administration of the provinces which required the permanent presence 
of the Roman army, remained under the direct power of Augustus. This point was 
stressed by Goldsmith, not only as a feature of successful imperial administration, 
but as the disproof of Augustus’s absolutism.183  
All in all, Augustus’s empire was an invaluable case study for the British 
historians of the eighteenth century who were preoccupied with pinning down the 
characteristics of an enduring and stable empire. What made this entity so glorious 
and successful in their eyes was its capacity of bringing peace to the territories it 
comprised. Under Augustus, as Echard concluded,                               
[a]ll the provinces of the Roman empire were now in a profound peace 
and quiet, and as much as we know, all the nations in the world were 
in the same state; and Augustus at present had but small employment 
besides his daily receiving those honors and acknowledgements paid 
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him by foreign nations, and by the greatest monarchs and potentates 
upon earth.184
 
In this atmosphere of peace, in the twenty-fifth year of the Augustan rule, Jesus 
Christ was born in Bethlelem of Judea within the boundaries of the Roman empire. 
This divine birth led to the conviction that once peace was established in the empire, 
the divine grace would eternally be upon it. Here was added reason for understanding 
the ways of achieving peace everywhere in the empire. For as the Bible foretold, the 
Second Advent of Christ, as his birth did, would take place in the empire of peace- 
when “the greatest part of mankind” would once again be “possessing obedience to 
one monarch, and in perfect harmony with each other.”185  
For all these reasons cited above, the empire of Augustus was meticulously 
dissected by the British historians of the eighteenth century who enthusiastically 
aimed at discovering his secret of perfect imperial governance. The rise of this 
empire to greatness and the means deployed to preserve it that way as long as 
possible were considered as two of the most instructive topics included in the Roman 
history. Undoubtedly, to these topics it should be added the factors bringing on the 
demise of the empire, which was obviously a subject that deserved equal attention 
with the other two. As ‘Nobleman’ stated, “the rise and fall of empires, if the causes 
are properly attended to, are among the most important lessons that can be learned.” 
Nevertheless, the events, particularly those leading to the end of an empire “happen 
in so imperceptible a manner, that we seldom discover them till it is too late to repair 
the loss.”186 Therefore, it was not an easy task to completely name the causes of the 
fall; but the historians arrived at certain normative rules which appeared as recurrent 
themes in the eighteenth-century histories of Rome.  
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3.8 The Decline 
 
The reasons behind the decline of empires, governments and regimes have 
much concerned political thinkers since antiquity. In her ‘Uncertain Inevitability of 
Decline in Montesquieu,’ Sharon Krause distinguishes the ancient and modern 
approaches to decline with the point that the modern philosophers argue for the 
permanency of a state or regime and rule out the inevitability of decline, whereas the 
ancients excluded the possibility of permanent political entities and embraced the 
prospects of “decline and revolution” as “intractable aspects of political life.” 
Seeking normative rules “based on universal rules of human nature, natural right and 
reason,” the moderns are committed to arrive at the prescription of enduring states 
and regimes. To the ancient philosophers, on the other hand, decline in politics was a 
natural and inescapable phenomenon. In the eighteenth century, the shift from the 
ancient understanding of decline to the modern one was already in progress.187 
Nevertheless, our historians, who were much acquainted with the ancient tradition, 
dwellt only on the inevitability of decline and made use of ancient “morals for 
survival of their own empire.”188 In doing that they considered luxury as one of its 
most significant causes. To them, once peace, prosperity and an advanced level of 
civilization was achieved, man’s tendency of indulgence emerged.      
Luxury, as previously stated, was the main factor that brought the end of the 
Roman empire. The inescapable corruptive power of luxury could ruin any state and 
in the Roman case it was the Carthaginian luxury that destroyed the virtuous manners 
of the Romans irreversibly. In order to avoid repetition, the role of luxury in the ruin 
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of Rome will not be further assessed here, but other destructive factors will be noted 
and examined. In this respect, the revolutionary changes implemented by the 
emperors, without perceptively considering all possible outcomes, appeared as 
another issue which in the eyes of historians also had a disastrous effect on the 
stability of the empire. Throughout his short reign, Helvius Petrinax, for example, 
labored with good faith to undo the disastrous reign of Commodus. In doing that, 
however, he set out “too hasty a reformation” which eventually proved that such 
precautions could not work as desired in a “corrupted state.”189 Aiming at improving 
all the deteriorating components of the empire at once may have very well resulted in 
a situation opposite to that planned. Similarly, Constantine’s change of the imperial 
seat from Rome to Constantinople was a measure with serious implications, which 
should by no means have been taken without finding permanent solutions to the 
problematic issues of the empire. 
Although Constantine succeeded in sustaining peace and stability in the 
Roman empire to a certain degree and earned “the surname of great, an honor 
unknown to former emperors,”190 he failed to revive that perfect political mechanism 
which worked to regulate automatically all aspects of imperial affairs. Convinced 
that the eastern territories would be more tightly integrated into the Roman empire 
with his presence there and thus eliminating the Persian threat, he declared 
Constantinople to be the new imperial seat as “nature seemed to have formed it with 
all the conveniences, and all the beauties, which might induce power to make it the 
seat of residence.”191 This alteration caused no violent reactions over the short term, 
in which the Romans silently, though reluctantly, submitted to the fact that Rome 
was no longer the seat of the empire. Nevertheless, within a few years, when the 
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Goths first harassed then ravaged the western empire, this had been proven to be the 
most unwise decision taken by any Roman emperor. On this account, according to 
the historians of Rome, “the removal of the imperial seat” was considered as “a 
principal cause of its ruin.”192
Thus having diagnosed the principal cause of the fall, it was now necessary to 
suggest what should have ideally been done to save the empire and keep Rome as the 
imperial residence. To this end, the historians focused on the reason which led 
Constantine to reside in the east in the first place. According to Echard, the 
overstretched empire trapped the emperor in “laboring under so vast a bulk and 
plethora as nature could not govern”193 and forced him to take the decision. Here the 
problematic of territorial expansion was once again stressed as the issue to be 
tackled. Under Augustus, the Roman empire reached its optimum point in terms of 
spatial expansion. It has been sometimes asked by scholars of our day why Augustus 
did not seek “further major territorial expansion” through “a larger army and a 
slightly increased level of expenditure.”194 Roman manpower and the treasury could 
have allowed that. Nevertheless, it has also been contended that only by the 
abondment of ambitious designs such as the conquest of the whole of Germany and 
by the toleration of “the existence of such weak and disunited, or distant ‘neighbors,’ 
” Rome found a way to become “a workable approximation” of a world empire.195  
Our historians too seemed collectively to appreciate this point.  
The expansion pursued after Augustus’ death, however, weakened the 
imperial structure and slowly exterminated the empire itself. The lesson to be 
deduced from this episode addressed all the nations aiming at universal empire. If 
                                                 
192 Echard, Roman History, II, unpaginated preface. Also see Kennet, Roma Antique, 25. 
193 Ibid., 558. 
194 Fulford, ‘Territorial Expansion,’ 295.  
195 George H. Quester, Offence and Defence in the International System in the International System 
(New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction, 1988), 21.    
 159
they did not possess “a genius as extensive as their dominions,”196 their empire 
would be doomed to end. Thus, changing the seat of the empire was not ingenious, 
but implementing a perceptively assessed expansionist policy which also set an 
optimum point most definitely was. This, then, “ought to remain as a striking lesson 
to all those sovereigns or commanders who want to extend their conquests beyond 
proper bounds.”197
Apart from limiting the burden of governance, limiting the extent of 
expansion was imperative to determine whom the empire would have borders with. 
Bordering with the barbarians in the east led to the degeneration of the Romans, 
including the emperors, with Asian softness, indolence and luxury.198 With the 
switching of the center to the periphery by Constantine, the manners of the center 
were also replaced by those of the periphery. Among the Roman manners which 
were thus relaxed and softened, the military discipline was proven to be the most 
fatal in terms of imperial endurance. Henceforth, the Romans, inadequate to maintain 
security, adopted the Carthaginian way of hiring foreign troops, a method despised in 
the glorious days of the Roman empire. In ideal imperial governance, the borders 
should have never extended eastwards toward Persia, whose corruptive power had 
already been displayed in Greek history.  
Obviously, the foreign troops also should by no means have been hired in an 
empire aiming to survive. The loss of the Roman military virtue was superceded by 
the admittance of the Gothic barbarian troops into the empire as military aid which 
was, in Echard’s words, “the greatest piece of madness” in the history of Rome.199 
Receiving the Gothic tribes so many in number at the heart of the empire, as all 
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British historians would agree, only served to “complete the empire’s destruction.”200 
The barbarians grew to be formidable, destructive and corruptive no longer on the 
other side of the border but within the empire. Thus, according to Echard again, the 
end of the Roman empire came as “a violent subversion” rather than “a natural 
dissolution.”201 Echard particularly underlined that the Roman empire did not fall 
because of the inevitable destiny of the empires. It was because the Romans 
committed simple errors with devastating consequences, ending the Roman empire 
long before its actual lifetime. However, not many historians took sides with Echard 
on the issue, for they almost unanimously viewed the decline of the Roman empire as 
what inevitably happened when the original virtues and principles of a mighty nation 
were exhausted. That was the typical explanation of the fall of the empires- 
incompetent princes committing simple errors. Among many remarks, Ferguson’s 
words can be quoted, reflecting this point of view:   
The military and political virtues, which had been exerted in forming this 
empire, having finished their course, a general relaxation ensued, under 
which, the very forms that were necessary for its preservation were in 
process of time neglected. As the spirit which gave rise to those forms was 
gradually spent, human nature fell into a retrograde motion, which the 
virtues of individuals could not suspend; and men, in the application of their 
faculties even to the most ordinary purposes of life suffered a slow and 
insensible, but almost continual decline.202     
 
Therefore, similar to Montesquieu’s perception of decline, the fall of the Roman 
empire was presented by Ferguson as a natural phenomenon.203 Still, it was crucial to 
be able to name the factors bringing on the inevitable end in order to delay its arrival 
as long as possible. 
To Goldsmith, another reason that played an important role in the fall of the 
Roman empire appeared to be religion. He argued that it was a breaching of the 
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Augustan rule of religious non-interference, when Constantine declared Christianity 
to be the official religion of the empire. Although in this way he “established a 
religion that continues the blessing of mankind,”204 the Roman empire “lost a great 
deal of its strength and coherence,” for “that enormous fabric had been built and 
guided upon pagan principles.”205 Undoubtedly, this was the reflection of a much 
wider eighteenth-century discussion on Christianity’s possible negative impacts on 
the progressive dynamics of a state. In the Roman case, it was argued that the 
Christian doctrines inherently hindered the flourishing Roman manners of courage, 
vigor and dynamism, which were the legacy of Romulus, and subsequently replaced 
them with passiveness and inactiveness. Christianity, by teaching non-aggression to 
the Romans, “introduced a poorness of spirit that made them careless and insensible 
of their ancient glory.”206 It was widely accepted that the Romans owed their 
greatness to pagan virtue and principles. Even Kennet, despite his religious title, 
admitted that the pagan “virtue and fortune were engaged in a sort of noble 
contention for the advancement of the grandeur and happiness of the people” and 
repeated the words of St. Augustine saying “God would not give heaven to the 
Romans because they were heathens; but he gave them the empire of the world 
because they were virtuous.”207 Nevertheless, Goldsmith remained alone in relating 
the fall of the Roman empire to the adoption of Christianity. To the rest, the Roman 
history was designed to prove “that both principles and practices, very opposite to 
those enjoined by the Gospel, occasioned its ruin.”208 It was not that Christianity was 
incompatible with the Roman virtues but in the reign of Constantine the Romans had 
already irretrievably lost their virtuous and moral character, and were brought low by 
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luxury, excessive expansion, close contact with the east and the conduct of 
inadequate princes. As Blackwell opined, “virtue is the sole guardian of the dearest 
and most precious treasure of a happy nation.”209
As the readers of Cassius Dio’s 80-volume Roman History, it was customary 
among our historians to point to the end of Marcus Aurelius’s reign as the beginning 
of decline in the Roman empire. Because the Roman history was assessed by British 
historians of the eighteenth century in terms of good and bad princes, the period 
following Aurelius would be the display of bad princes mostly and the harm they did 
to the Roman empire.  This period was considered to demonstrate “how much the 
welfare of a nation depends upon the dispositions of its prince.”210 As the decline of 
the Roman empire was unfolded, the British reader would reach to the definition of 
the bad prince as well as a sort of imperial code prescribing the ways to prevent the 
fall of empires and acknowledge that, in Goldsmith’s words,  
[s]uch was the end of this great empire that had conquered the world with its 
arms and instructed them with its wisdom that had risen by temperance and 
fell by luxury that had been established by a spirit of patriotism and that fell 
into ruin when the empire was become so extensive that a Roman citizen 
was but an empty name.211                             
 
Europeans have acquired from the Romans a “continuing aspiration” for 
unity.212 Rome’s history has been read as the ultimate guide to a unified, coherent 
empire, although the definition of the word empire has been considerably modified 
throughout history. This chapter has sought to study the attempt of  the British 
historians to reach the normative rules of governing an empire in the Roman sense, 
keeping it at the peak and delaying its inevitable fall as long as possible, through 
their meticulous scrutiny of Roman history. In the next chapter an attempt will be 
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made to unveil the similar scheme of their contemporaries, this time focusing on the 
histories of Greece.  
 
 164
  
 
CHAPTER 4  
EMPIRES OF ANCIENT GREECE: SPARTA AND 
ATHENS 
 
Ancient Greek history-writing in eighteenth-century Britain, except for a few 
scattered treatments, has not received much attention from observers of it, who noted 
the poor quality of scholarship that the texts contained, when compared to the 
masterly level attained in the following century by George Grote and Connop 
Thirlwall in their histories of ancient Greece. Also, for the reason that the 
contemporary English and Roman histories, such as Hume’s History of England and, 
obviously, Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, enjoyed more fame and 
success than the ancient Greek histories, ancient Greece did not seem to catch the 
attention of the political nation. In the studies of eighteenth-century British 
historiography, ancient Greek history-writing is considered as a discipline not yet 
fully formed, whose accomplished examples belonging to the subsequent centuries. 
Still, ancient Greek history texts by eighteenth-century British historians have not 
gone completely unnoticed and have been briefly assessed in the books devoted to 
larger topics such as historiography and neo-classicism. Clarke’s Greek Studies, 
Ogilvie’s Latin and Greek and Johnson’s Formation of English Neo-Classical 
Thought are the pre-eminent examples of this sort. The topic has also been treated in 
more recent articles as an issue of secondary importance. The analyses of these texts 
in these articles are merely confined to making the point that the historians favoured 
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Sparta on grounds of being a monarchy and employed Athens to exhibit the evils of 
democracy.1  
 Nevertheless, we should not dismiss the ancient Greek history texts of 
eighteenth-century Britain altogether as works of no significant value. Grounded in 
the conviction that ancient history offers universal rules to establish balance and 
enduring order under varying political circumstances, ancient Greek histories cover a 
wide range of topics from party politics and elections to the ideal governance of 
empire. Additionally, according to the theme selected, the tone of assessments switch 
alternately from pro-Spartan to pro-Athenian. Therefore, to concentrate only on one 
single aspect and classify ancient Greek history texts of eighteenth-century Britain 
altogether as simply monarchical and pro-Spartan would do them an injustice. 
Although these texts, when judged by present criteria, contain insufficient, 
sometimes inaccurate, historical information, they nonetheless provide useful insight 
into how some lively political issues, including empire, were discussed in eighteenth-
century Britain. Having reflected on the ancient Greek experience in dealing with the 
political challenges that were also troubling the British statesmen in the eighteenth 
century, the historians, in effect, aimed to fulfil their duty of guiding the political 
nation through turbulent times.  
This chapter will pick the issue of empire from the political debates which 
permeated the ancient Greek histories and show that when discussions of the 
understandings of empire are taken into account, Athens, not Sparta, comes to the 
fore as the source of emulation. Eighteenth-century British historians contributed to 
the quest for ideal imperial governance by proposing the Athenian model. Sparta, on 
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the other hand, was identified with the undesirable empires of the eighteenth century, 
namely France and Spain. David Armitage contends that the British empire  
deploys resources from a wider tradition of political thought, stretching back 
to classical sources in ancient Greece and, especially Rome, but also 
encompassing contemporary Spain and the United Provinces, as a part of a 
wider European dialogue within which the various empires were defined and 
defended.2  
 
It will here be argued that though not occupying a place as prominant as the history 
of Rome, ancient Greek history was accepted as a viable source to refer to in the 
eighteenth-century quest for empire. It was employed to comprehend not only the 
empire of Britain but those of other European states also. Consequent to a scrutiny of 
ancient Greek history texts of eighteenth-century Britain, one should replace ‘the 
United Provinces’ with France in the above statement of Armitage and add contested 
next to defined and defended.      
4.1 Politics of the Historians  
The works of Mitford and Gillies are the most widely discussed examples of 
ancient Greek history in eighteenth-century Britain, but they were by no means the 
only ones. The popularity of these texts has resulted in the categorization of 
eighteenth-century ancient Greek historiography as pro-Spartan. They were 
unmistakably so. Nevertheless, when other texts are also taken into consideration and 
all studied together from the perspective of empire, the outcome is quite the contrary. 
Potter, Stanyan, Leland, Goldsmith, Mitford, Gillies and Gast were collectively 
concerned with the topic of empire, alongside other political issues, particularly with 
the optimum ways of building and preserving one. In discussing empire, although, 
except for Mitford and Goldsmith, they did not exhibit an explicit commitment to the 
Tory standpoint, these historians presented two kinds of empire, one desirable and 
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the other undesirable, in a fashion greatly resembling the Tory political discourse on 
imperial affairs.  
It should here be stated that the publication of some of our texts may not 
coincide with the days when Tory opposition ideas were most fervently expressed. 
Nevertheless, these views evolved through a long period of time before they were 
fully formulated and they endured as political traditions long after they had been 
overtaken by other items on the immediate political agenda. For that reason, although 
it has been established that “Tory is not usually a helpful word”3 in many eighteenth-
century contexts and that in the period between 1760 and 1812 the dichotomy of 
Whig and Tory faded away a great deal, the historians explicitly and constantly 
referred to the political tradition originating in early eighteenth-century Tory 
argumentation. For instance, echoing the Tory opposition to the constant engagement 
in land war, they criticised approached to the military attitude of the Spartan empire 
which produced an insatiable search for new opportunities of land war. Also, the 
appreciation of the commercial maritime empire of Athens was in harmony with the 
Tory understanding of empire, which matured through the implementation of the 
‘Blue Water’ strategy.  
In addition to the contemporary political tradition, while treating the topic of 
empire, the historians of ancient Greece also turned to some notions which deeply 
concerned the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment. Therefore, the ancient Greek 
histories of eighteenth-century Britain, were not just founded on party political 
discourse, but rather were a blend of parliamentary politics and extra-parliamentary 
discussions of the ideal, through reflections on politics, society and civilisation. The 
historians brought the discussion about empire with reference to the contemporary 
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problematic of commercial vs. militaristic into their works. The Whig understanding 
of balance of power also resonated in the texts of ancient Greek history. However, 
the result of elaborating on this concept was not agreement with the Whig standpoint. 
Anyway, the balance of power had grown in eighteenth-century Britain into a topic 
too common to be peculiar to the whiggish camp.   
As will be seen below, the notion of balance of power was rather utilised to 
emphasise that ancient Greece consisted of similarly formed and governed states and 
therefore resembled a civilisation not inherently different from modern Europe. 
Ancient Greece as a whole represented a civilisation of high refinement and depicted 
in the way that the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment understood modern Europe. 
As to the treatments of individual Greek states, when the understandings of empire 
are taken into account, Athens, with the exception of Pericles’s rule, was analysed as 
similar to the eighteenth-century British empire or how it ought to be. Sparta, on the 
other hand was the anti-empire.  
 
4.2 Ancient Greece as Inspiration: non-despotic, precursor of modern Europe, 
inventor of the balance of power and small     
 
 
Roman history-writing in eighteenth-century Britain chiefly sought to 
associate Rome with Britain. The emphasis laid on Rome, perceived as Britain, was 
so solid that a shift of interest rarely did happen even in the most voluminous works. 
The focus remained on Rome which was viewed as one gigantic entity tangled with 
the problem –beside many others- of managing the vast territories, comprised of 
colonies stretching from Europe to Asia and to Africa. This was the representation of 
what Britain was to become. The periphery was never considered equal to Rome, nor 
the conquered nations believed to be the victims of the Roman expansionist policy, 
jeopardising the balance of power. One of the tasks of the historians was to expose 
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the optimum way of governing the empire. The evaluation of the entire Roman 
history from the perspective of good prince-bad prince was the most ample proof of 
that. In the Greek case, on the other hand, the method to be followed appeared as the 
comparison of not individuals, but the characteristics of the eminent states 
constituting Greece. 
In ancient Greek history-writing in eighteenth-century Britain, despite some 
generalisations about ancient Greece common to all historians, the focus did not rest 
on Greece as a whole, but obviously shifted from Sparta to Athens, from Athens to 
Macedonia and from Macedonia to Persia. As Goldsmith stated, ancient Greek 
history was “not so much the history of any particular kingdom, as of a number of 
petty independent states, sometimes at war, and sometimes in alliance with one 
another.”4 Still, the innumerable accounts of these states allowed for some safe 
generalisations on the Greeks and Greece. Despite the differing tones in the 
individual treatments of the Greek states, generalisations were all unequivocal in 
recommending ancient Greek history to the political nation. Ancient Greece was 
presented as a source for teaching invaluable lessons on the grounds that it promoted 
the spirit of liberty, and a stance against despotism. It further exemplified one 
civilisation shared by similarly sovereign states and of course the rules of preserving 
the balance of power among these states.   
  Since they were praising ancient Greece, the deployment of excessively 
romantic language inevitably made its way to the ancient Greek history texts written 
by the British historians, who occasionally replicated verbatim the ancient historians’ 
idioms. Even the land where ancient Greece was geographically located received 
admiration in an unusual degree, for being “the spot peculiarly chosen by heaven as 
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the scene, on which mankind were destined to display in the utmost perfection, all 
the superior faculties that distinguish them so highly above the other animals on this 
earth.”5 Such was the claim of the ancient Greeks about themselves, alongside other 
pretensions, that “their origin was from the land which they inhabited” or “their 
antiquity [was] co-equal with the sun.”6 Such sentiments recurred throughout the 
ancient Greek histories of eighteenth-century Britain. In his Archaeologia Graeca, 
Potter stressed the point that because, “of families, cities, countries the most ancient 
have always been accounted the most honourable” throughout history, there “arose 
one of the first and most universal disputes that ever troubled mankind, almost every 
nation, whose first original was not very manifest, pretending to have been of an 
equal duration with the earth itself.”7 For that reason, the Greeks together with the 
other peoples of antiquity such as the Egyptians, Scythians and Phyrigians competed 
for being the first race of mankind on earth. 
Though they perpetuated some of the mythical stories of the ancients, the 
British historians of ancient Greece distinguished “times unknown” and “times 
fabulous” from “times historical”8 and, unlike those of Rome, made no claims about 
the knowability of the entire Greek history. The possible defectiveness of Greek 
history, particularly the chronology, was well-known fact. In his The Chronology of 
Ancient Kingdoms Sir Isaac Newton maintained that through a comparison of the 
writings of “the Greeks of those times” and the accounts of Plutarch it appeared 
“how uncertain [was] their chronology and how doubtful it was reputed.”9 On this 
account, the historians did not aim, in Goldsmith’s words, “to give an historical air to 
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accounts which were never meant to be transmitted as true.” 10  Instead, 
acknowledging the limits of their sources, they sought to arrive at truth of a certain 
degree “through the mist of fables”11 and speak of the emerging of the Greeks from 
rudeness to civility. The historical times of ancient Greece sufficiently provided the 
emulative lessons required for the guidance of British statesmen. In spite of the fact 
that their degree of admiration varied with regard to the individual experiences of the 
Greek states, ancient Greece was thus commonly eulogized. In this context, the 
Greeks were hailed as “men of excellent genius and great application” and believed 
“not to have been alone superior to other nations, but to have arrived very near the 
summit of perfection in every art and science.”12 Their commitment to the ideal of 
liberty they shared as a people. Even in the early times when absolutist monarchies 
ruled the Greek states, they were unlike their Persian neighbour, never governed by 
“an oriental system of oppression.”13 Having been uniquely gifted with the spirit of 
liberty, the ancient Greeks gloriously stood up against any attempts, both internal and 
external, of despots, particularly against those of Darius and Xerxes. One of the 
attributes of ancient Greece commended wholeheartedly by the British historians was 
therefore its non-despotic character which drew ancient Greek and eighteenth-
century western civilisations closer.   
As a natural consequence of the liberal spirit prevailing in ancient Greece, the 
ancient Greek governments remained immune to “the inflexible rigour of 
despotism.”14 The historians echoed the ancient dislike of Persian despotism and the 
contemporary views of oriental despotism articulated by the Scottish Enlightenment 
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thinkers in their theories of civilisation and progress. The first and foremost reason 
why the ancient Greeks had never known despotic government was, it was claimed, 
the existence of the Amphictyonic council. As Gast put it, the council was “the first 
institution that seems to have given check to barbarous manners.”15 In this way, the 
ancient Greeks made themselves heard, even under the oppressive rule of the kings. 
Then, following the foundation of “larger and well-modelled states,”16 they rejoiced 
in having free government and equal laws in the proper sense. In the eyes of the 
historians, the Greeks thus distinguished themselves from the eastern nations until 
their surrender to the Ottomans. Before that, Greek history suggested, despotism had 
prevailed only on the other side of the eastern border of ancient Greece.  
With the exception of Mitford’s association of Athens with Ottoman 
despotism in the volumes of his history published subsequent to the French 
Revolution, ancient Greek histories of eighteenth-century Britain highlighted the 
non-despotic character of the Greek states as one of the pillars on which the Greek 
civilization rose to refinement. The political and property rights of the Greek citizens 
were enshrined in justly designed legal codes. Despite their rivalry for supremacy, 
the petty states of ancient Greece had similar understandings of civic rights, as the 
cultivators of the same civilisation. The language employed by the historians in this 
general assessment and appreciation of ancient Greece, discussed below, has a 
marked resemblance to the depiction of Europe in the contemporary theories of 
civilisation and progress. Thus ancient Greece was made to reflect the way Europe 
was contemporarily perceived in terms of civilisation. To the historians, ancient 
Greece also paralleled Britain in terms of size and rise to greatness. Before 
                                                 
15 Gast, History of Greece, I, 45.  
16 Ibid., 129. 
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proceeding with this point, the affiliation of ancient Greek civilisation with that of 
Europe, however, requires further elaboration.                               
The historians commonly perceived ancient Greece as a whole as the 
possessor of one polished civilisation. In this they resembled the Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers, speaking of Europe as a coherent solid force advancing 
towards the most far-reaching extension of commerce, respecting the law and 
standing in contrast to the despotic governments of the East. As Pocok contends, the 
image of Europe which emerged subsequent to the War of the Spanish Succession 
was of “a ‘confederation’ of independent sovereign states held together in a 
permanent association by a jus gentium,” “by the ties of a common commerce” and 
“by the shared civilisation of ‘manners,’ which flourished in a commercial culture.”17 
This image of Europe completely overlaps with how ancient Greece was 
contemporarily perceived. Ancient Greece represented the precedent, which had first 
attained the superior level of civilisation that Europe finally acquired in the 
eighteenth century. And ‘the empire of ancient Greece,’ in contrast to the empires of 
Sparta and Athens, was employed as a term signifying an abstract confederation of 
commerce and civilisation rather than a political entity with defined borders.      
Ancient Greece rose on the refining and non-aggressive power of commerce, 
promoted political liberty and resisted the despotic government of Persia. One might 
assume that ancient Greek history texts published from the 1740s on were written 
under the influence of the theories of civilisation and progress, which were skilfully 
articulated within the Scottish Enlightenment later in the century. The renowned 
thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, namely Adam Ferguson, David Hume, 
William Robertson and Adam Smith, invested significant labour in the study of 
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civilisations by monitoring a wide range of them, both ancient and contemporary, 
and figuring the patterns of progress. To them, Europe consisted of similarly 
sovereign states in which individuality and liberty could flourish. Despite certain 
differences, the states of Europe, as William Robertson stated in his History of the 
Reign of Charles the Fifth, were all “formed” through the same “system” based on “a 
proper distribution of power”18 which evidently distinguished them from the despotic 
powers. Similarly, Adam Ferguson in his An Essay on the History of Civil Society 
contended that the nations of Europe shared “the happy system of policy” which 
“does honour to mankind.”19                       
How the British historians treated ancient Greece as a general category bears 
significant resemblance to the way the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers understood 
and appreciated contemporary Europe. Thomas Leland’s approach to ancient Greece 
was noteworthy in that sense. While pointing out the varying characters of the Greek 
states, he at the same time underlined their essential common character, which 
separated them from the barbarians dwelling on the other side of the border.  
Ancient Greece was inhabited by people whose origin and language were the 
same, but their manners, customs, institutions and forms of government, in 
many respects, totally different. Yet, amidst this diversity, their general 
principles were also the same, an ardour for liberty, and a strict regard to the 
public good.20
 
The neighbouring Greek states developed the sense of belonging to a wider 
community, as they stood “all united and connected together by interest and 
affection.” What came out of this affiliation was, as Leland went on, “a similar 
species of civility” solidly committed to the Greek laws and commonwealth.21 Such 
admiration of ancient Greece was common to all historians. From smallness to 
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20 Leland, Philip, I, xxxv.  
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grandeur, the Greeks established a non-despotic, “just and wise government” and 
ruled to promote “security and felicity.”22 According to Gillies, prior to its decline, 
ancient Greece had promised its inhabitants “the equality of private fortune” and “the 
absence of habitual luxury” and was ideal in that sense also.23 To Gast, the principles 
of ancient Greece acted as “a moral governor over human things,” governing “a 
people, in their beginnings mean and inconsiderable, advanced by virtue and wisdom 
to the greatest height of empire.”24 Underpinned by this morality and martial skills, 
which was an equally important element, the states of ancient Greece built a system 
of alliance to eliminate not only foreign threats but the oppressive plottings of an 
internal ruler. Despotism could not have endured in ancient Greece.                
Of course, sharing the same civilisation did not mean that the states coexisted 
peacefully without any major clash, as Greek history taught quite the contrary. 
Having elaborated on this point, Gast underlined that ancient Greece, alongside the 
normative rules of civilisation, harboured “endless jealousies and contests,” for the 
stronger state unceasingly sought to dominate the weaker.25 As Leland stated, the 
possibility that one state could “extend its power beyond the just and equitable 
bonds” had never been ruled out in ancient Greece. 26  Again, the historians’ 
presentation of ancient Greece are analogous to the views of Europe in eighteenth-
century Britain. The rivalry between the ancient Greek states seemed to be an 
especially informative topic for the reader of Greek history, as it shed light on the 
problematic issue of the balance of power, the Whig priority in foreign policy. 
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25 Gast, History of Greece, II, 568. 
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Therefore, the imperial issues of ancient Greece were also treated in the context of 
attempts at domination over each other by states with a common geography and 
culture.   
This matter of the balance of power was central. The idealised version of 
Greece depicted a “really united body, happy in itself and formidable to its 
enemies.”27 And the secret of this Greek solidarity was seemingly embedded in the 
balance of power preserved among the major Greek states –and thus, this concept 
became one of the recurrent themes that imbued the Greek history texts. In his 
preface to Pons Augustin Alloetz’s History of Ancient Greece, William Robertson 
maintained that 
[t]he country of Greece, though of less extent than that of England was 
inhabited by a great variety of different states, perfectly independent of one 
another, remarkably opposite in their manners and dispositions but all 
actuated by the most ardent spirit of valour and liberty. As all these states 
were pretty nearly of equal force, it became absolutely necessary for them to 
be extremely attentive to keep the balance of power properly poised and to 
prevent any one state from acquiring such an increase of strength as might 
enable it to enslave the rest.28   
 
The eighteenth-century fascination with ancient histories was undoubtedly partly 
inspired by the fact that these texts showed ways of preserving the balance among 
states. Walter Moyle’s words, “from modern politics we have been taught the name 
of the balance of power, but it was ancient prudence taught us the thing”29 are 
noteworthy in that sense. Subsequent to the increased interest in Greek studies, 
ancient Greek history appeared to be the most suitable source to teach the matter. 
Hume, for instance, underlined how beneficial the history of ancient Greece should 
be in establishing the rules of a balance of power, for “[i]n all the politics of Greece, 
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the anxiety, with regard to the balance of power, is apparent and is expressly pointed 
out to us, even by the ancient historians.” In this sense, the Greeks experienced a 
harsher struggle for the balance, because “the Romans never met with any such 
general combination or confederacy against them, as might naturally have been 
expected from the rapid conquests and declared ambition.” 30
In the eyes of the historians, the rivalry between Sparta and Athens, and later 
Macedonia, set the normative rules of hindering one state’s design of expanding its 
borders at the expense of its neighbours. Nevertheless, the most valuable lesson 
learned on this topic, according to Leland, ought to be that “the balance of power” 
was “a romantic consideration.” No matter how much one state strove only “to attend 
to her domestic affairs and to secure and improve the advantage of commerce,” there 
had always been and would ever be another one to pose threat to security, wealth and 
happiness of that state. Then although “a war was burthensome and expensive,” as 
long as the state possessed courage and a sense of liberty there would be no doubt 
that “armies were to be raised and navies sent abroad.”31 Ancient Greek history thus 
vindicated the Whig concern with the European balance of power, but refuted the 
prospect of establishing “the peace of all Europe.”32  
Ancient Greece as a general category therefore bore a resemblance to what 
eighteenth-century Europe meant for the British political nation. Ancient Greek 
history therefore served the purpose of stimulating a guide through contemporary 
political crises. Nevertheless, as a scrutiny of ancient Greek history texts of 
eighteenth-century Britain makes clear, ancient Greece also paralleled Britain itself 
in the eyes of the historians and hence appeared fit, from this aspect too, to teach the 
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British. First and foremost, ancient Greece had surmounted the problems posed by its 
smallness in terms of both territory and population. As Linda Colley states, smallness 
was a predominant theme in the British discourse of empire as it was one of the 
enduring apprehensions. To understand the British empire perceptively, she claims, 
“the proper place to begin is with the smallness of Britain itself.” Although through 
their imperial experience the British acted as “ubiquitous intruders,” the smallness of 
the motherland at the same time rendered them “inherently and sometimes 
desperately vulnerable.” 33  A country of small extent, once it aimed at imperial 
ventures, would be exposed to foreign invasions and unlikely to sustain the armed 
force required to eradicate such a threat. Demographic considerations also 
perpetuated this fear of smallness. The previous Spanish experience of empire had 
proven to the British that empires, when over-extended, resulted in the depopulation 
of the motherland. The demographic deficit was already an issue in Britain and 
empire could worsen it. As Langford underlines, the mortality rate was significantly 
high in the first half of the eighteenth century and the reign of George II witnessed a 
major demographic crisis.34  Under such circumstances, the degree to which the 
political nation was concerned with the influence of the imperial ventures on the 
metropolitan population was only natural.    
Britain was “self-consciously small.”35 For that reason, similarly small states 
in history drew particular attention. The greatest source of admiration in this respect 
was ancient Greece’s outstanding growth into grandeur from its exceptional 
smallness in the very beginning, “being scarcely half so large as England.”36 In the 
early phases of their history, the Greeks were a people “inconsiderable in numbers, in 
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riches, and in the extent or fertility of territory.”37 Nevertheless, in Mitford’s words, 
ancient Greece possessed “natural peculiarities” that shaped the national character 
and the political institutions of all states within it. 38  These peculiarities were 
pinpointed by Gast in his Rudiments as “wisdom of government, upright manners, 
arts, eloquence, fortitude of soul” and “martial achievements.”39 Thus gifted, ancient 
Greece overcame the disadvantages of its smallness and, as Gast conveyed again in 
his History of Ancient Greece, “disputed the prize of empire with the great powers of 
Asia and bore away the palm of arts as well as arms from the nations of the East, 
who for ages had possessed it unrivalled and uncontrolled.”40 Ancient Greece was 
then the ample proof that the problem of smallness could be solved and smallness in 
terms of territory and population did not necessarily impede the state’s imperial 
enterprise.  
 
4.3 Ancient Greece as a Source for Understanding the Ideal Empire 
 
One indication of the particular attention paid by the British political nation to 
ancient Greece in their quest for the ideal pattern of empire-building was the 
existence of non-history texts which treated the topic in a manner similar to the 
contemporary history texts but with no claim to completeness, historical accuracy 
and mastery of scholarship. What makes these texts significant to this study is the 
authors’ explicit attempt at understanding eighteenth-century political issues with 
reference to ancient Greek experiences, including the problem of empire. This 
attitude prevalent in non-history texts about ancient Greece in effect encourages the 
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scrutiny of rather indirect expressions of imperial lessons embedded in ancient Greek 
histories. Baron’s History of the Colonisation, which appraised the Greek venture of 
empire as the pursuit of one single nation, is the quintessential example of this sort of 
literature. It openly pointed to the question of population and the connection between 
the motherland and colonies as the matters of particular importance in Greek 
imperial history. To Baron, the Greek method of colonisation was inspired by 
concerns over population in the first place. Relating these imperial designs to the 
smallness of the motherland and demographic necessity, but this time viewing 
smallness as desirable, he contended that the main purpose of the Greek colonisation 
was “to discharge supernumerary members or to preserve the constitution of the 
present state.”41 In doing this, Baron sought to understand the British experience of 
colonisation through ancient Greek history and highlighted the British colonies of 
North America as the indispensable means that could preserve the size of the 
motherland and its population. Thus, he explicitly argued against the conviction that 
colonisation drained the human resources of the state. Overseas colonisation was 
exactly what ought to happen before a small state like Britain became utterly 
ungovernable as a result of overpopulation.  
On the same subject, the historians of ancient Greece provided similar, but 
hinted, explanations. Gillies asserted that the Greeks, “when any of their 
communities seemed inconveniently numerous,” sent away the excess people and 
“occupied and peopled the surrounding territories.” He also stressed, together with 
Baron, the point that in order to establish “the gentle but powerful operation of 
regular government,” the extent of the state should be preserved in its original 
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smallness.42 Both the history and non-history texts on ancient Greece offered similar 
sorts of imperial lessons to the eighteenth-century British reader. Nevertheless, these 
lessons are unveiled and clearly highlighted in non-history texts, whereas the ancient 
Greek histories, in the name of cohesiveness, remained in the context of antiquity 
and did not comment on contemporary events. In studying the pattern of Greek 
colonisation, Baron very explicitly stated that this would cast light over his inquiry 
into how the relationship between Britain and its North American colonies ought to 
be.43 The historians, on the other hand, transmitted their message on the same issue 
through a more subtle approach. They depicted the Greek policies of empire in such 
a way as to unmistakably remind the reader of eighteenth-century Britain and its 
imperial questions. It should here be underlined that whereas the political thinkers 
and historians were growingly preoccupied with what the ideal governance might be 
for the empire, the executive branch of ministers adopted first the policy of “salutary 
neglect” towards empire and then a “self-defeating interventionism,” which resulted 
in the loss of the first British empire.44
        
4.4 Empire as Embedded in the Individual Treatments of the Greek States 
 
When it came to the treatments of the individual Greek states, the object of 
the appreciative remarks of the historians varied according to the topic assessed. As 
to democracy, Athens was commonly despised for having espoused this corruptive 
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regime, whereas Sparta was glorified for clinging to monarchy and resisting the 
malevolence of democracy. This viewpoint was responsible alone for the labelling of 
eighteenth-century ancient Greek historiography as pro-Spartan by the coming 
generations. The issue of empire, on the other hand, was discussed in an entirely 
different light. Within this context, because the Spartan enterprise of empire 
represented the undesirable empire, the admiration shifted from Sparta to Athens. 
Given its small scale, legal structure, non-military means of empire-building, such as 
widespread commerce, and finally its naval strength, the Athenian empire seemed to 
bear undeniable similarities to the British view of an ideal empire. In contrast to the 
commended notion of the British empire, the imperial practice of Sparta was 
grounded in belligerent policies aiming at unwise expansion. Sparta appeared in the 
ancient Greek history texts of eighteenth-century Britain as the empire of the 
undesired sort –the ancient model of the contemporary Spanish and French empires.  
Along with their aggressive policies, pursued at the expense of “the general 
tranquillity of Europe,”45 Spain and France also carried out unwise imperial designs 
outside of Europe, which rendered them the undesirable models. The unpleasant 
consequences of the Spanish imperial venture were widely assessed in eighteenth-
century Britain. The general conviction was that the Spanish overseas enterprise, 
initiated supposedly to enrich the motherland, had in fact exhausted the financial and 
human sources of Spain. The unprecedented flow of wealth from the colonies 
subsequent to the discovery of America, as one anonymous pamphlet on the Spanish 
settlements in America argued, was spent on the “vain pursuit after universal 
monarchy.” Spain failed to transform its imperial assets into a profitable investment, 
as its governors “[i]nstead of considering the West Indies as an estate they were to 
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improve and receive an annual profit always from” hastily “squandered” this vast 
territory. In the rise and fall of the Spanish empire, the British found once again the 
lesson taught by empires of old. In order to reduce the cost and sustain the 
profitability of the imperial designs, the motherland should delicately attach the 
colonies to itself through the civilising and mutually enriching bond of commerce. 
As the pamphlet maintained, “[i]f the Spaniards, as soon as they had acquired such 
extensive dominion in the new world, had diligently applied to the cultivation of 
trade and manufacture, it would necessarily have given them the supreme direction 
of the affairs of Europe.”46 The Spanish empire was “extraction-oriented”47 and thus, 
became the quintessential example of the undesirable empire for the British. The 
reasons why Sparta was understood by the historians of eighteenth-century Britain in 
the same way will be discussed below.  
France, on the other hand, which seemed to share the same “spirit of industry 
and enterprise”48 possessed by Britain was not completely ignorant of this crucial 
role to be played by commerce in the growth of empires. The French empire was in 
character “commercial.”49 Nevertheless, the rise of the French overseas followed an 
aggressive pattern of expansion and menaced Britain both in North America and 
Europe. Due to its authoritarian and warlike policies, the Bourbon scheme of empire 
instructed the British that they “ought to use every method to repress them to prevent 
them from extending their territories, their trade or their influence.” 50  As the 
potentially aggressive interest of France in the imperial endeavour of Britain kept 
growing, the British acquired the impression that “[a]n empire desired by France 
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must be an empire worth keeping British.”51 For that reason they closely monitored 
the French model of colonisation and remained guarded while the French transferred 
the revenue generated from the trade with colonies to their military designs and built 
an aggressive empire. Although the clash of the two empires in the Seven Years War 
rendered Britain a more powerful maritime power both in Europe and America, the 
military threat of France persisted. 
Having emphasised the same points that the contemporary political pamphlets 
stressed as the features of an undesirable empire with reference to Spain and France, 
the British historians conveyed to their reader that the Spartan imperial enterprise 
had indeed brought territorial gain, but failed to endure. The Spartan example did not 
represent a viable option in the empire-building process. Antiquity suggested that the 
empire overstretching its territory and chasing incessantly after the prospects of war 
would not last. Spain and France were the illustrations of this political lesson in the 
eighteenth century. The Athenians, on the other hand, made all the right moves in 
heading to imperial grandeur, to the degree that the historians presented it as the 
template to be applied in all times. Choosing non-military methods, encouraging 
particularly widespread commerce, the ever-growing British empire seemed to 
proceed on the right track, which had been once taken by Athens and thus proved a 
success. In the coming pages it will be further elucidated how, in terms of empire, 
Sparta was associated with France and Spain, and Britain with Athens. Following a 
chronological order, treatment of Sparta will be assessed first. 
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4.5 Sparta vs. Athens, Military vs. Commerce 
4.5.1 Sparta 
 
In his Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor points to the existence of a “battle 
between two ethical outlooks” in eighteenth-century Britain. The outcome of this 
battle resulted in “the rise of new valuation of commercial life” and “the recession of 
the aristocratic honour ethic, which stressed glory won in military pursuits.”52 One of 
the fields in which this battle between the militaristic and commercial attitudes to 
civilisation was fought was in the ancient Greek history texts. The former approach 
was represented by Sparta, the latter by Athens. The nature of legislation and the 
choice of governments between those applying authoritarian policies and those 
safeguarding of public good, as will be seen below, also determined the contesting 
characters of these two approaches.  
In Reflections on Ancient and Modern History, which was a contribution to 
the Battle of the Books mentioned in Chapter I, “the kingdom of Lacedemon” was 
highlighted as “the best established” among all Greek states on the grounds of it 
“being able to support itself with very little interruption,” unlike Athens, “for more 
than eight hundred years.”53 Sparta enjoyed mixed government, which entailed the 
political principle of checks and balances and on that account was presented as 
vindicating the British constitution. As Demetriou maintains, Sparta was thus seen by 
political pamphlets and history texts designed to exercise “a formative effect” on the 
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contemporary constitutional debate.54 However, the constitution was not the only 
item on the political agenda and Greek history-writing was thus not dominated by 
pro-Spartan sentiments. When it came to the remarks on empire, the tone of the 
historians became pro-Athenian. Even in the Reflections, which is not one of the 
texts of particular interest to this study, the question of empire altered the previously 
positive approach to Sparta. The Spartan constitution, which dovetailed with the 
requisites of perfect civil government, was unfortunately “inconsistent with any 
increase of power” and “when the Spartans began to look for conquests abroad, the 
attempt soon turned to their destruction.”55 In terms of empire, Sparta was not fit to 
be emulated.  
Assessment of the Spartan government, either by itself or in comparison with 
Athens, was pervasive in the political literature and ancient history-writing of 
eighteenth-century Britain.56  In most of these texts, Sparta was depicted as the 
archetype of the ideal state. Nonetheless, in others with a specific interest in the idea 
of empire, such as Thomas Pownall’s Principles of Polity, despite the generous 
praises for Lycurgos’s legal code, Sparta was despised for being essentially 
authoritarian, a character of government “discongrous to human nature.”57 Such was 
also the general conviction of the historians of ancient Greece. Though being more 
preoccupied with Athens, they devoted considerable space to the history of Sparta. 
As Gast stated, the history of these two states “is the history of Greece in general, 
and whether in the achievements of war, or the arts of peace, it was usually either the 
one or the other of these that led the way to glory.”58 The glory of Sparta, however, 
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was much tainted by its oppressive politics grounded on the armed force, which 
became more visible when consideration was given to the imperial issues. 
This supposedly defective character of the Spartan empire owed a great deal 
to the legal code of Lycurgos. As their histories are unfolded, one inclination 
common to all of these historians was to stress that the inherent characteristics of a 
state’s legal code determined the features of its imperial policy. As J. C. D. Clark 
points, “law, not party politics, was the synthesizing intellectual genre of the late-
eighteenth century constitution.”59 The publication of the majority of the ancient 
Greek histories coincides with the shift to the appeal to law as the science of 
government. The concern with legal history among the philosophers of the Scottish 
Enlightenment resulted in the conviction that the history and character of a state 
could be understood through its legislation, though Montesquieu had declared it 
before them. Conversely, the flaws in the character of a state could “account for the 
disparate and contradictory elements in its legal system.”60 This understanding of law 
in the late eighteenth century inevitably made its way into the Greek history texts. In 
the contemporary theories of civilisation and progress, a well-established and just 
legal system was viewed as essential for refinement, civilisation and commerce. 
Without this, there would emerge authoritarian, aggressive and, as the worst possible 
outcome, despotic states, with oppressive imperial policies.    
Hume, for instance, devoted one of his essays, ‘That Politics may be reduced 
to a Science,’ to the discussion of the most suitable legal system, its importance and 
the difference it could make in the progress of societies. Obviously, the ideal 
legislation was the non-authoritarian, non-absolutist and non-aggressive one: 
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So that, in every respect, a gentle government is preferable and gives the 
greatest security to the sovereign as well as the subject. Legislators, therefore, 
ought not to trust the future government of a state entirely to chance, but 
ought to provide a system of laws to regulate the administration of public 
affairs to the latest posterity.61   
 
Inevitably, the laws of Britain appeared, in the eyes of Hume and many others, as 
ideal, the sort which the British should “cherish and improve.”62 Of course, such a 
just and supremely well designed legal system, meant to be the protector of liberties 
could not possibly have had a negative effect on the imperial affairs of Britain. In his 
comparison of the British laws with the pais conquis of France, he praised the former 
for granting “so many rights and privileges.”63  
The fine regulation of commerce required a sophisticated legal system. As the 
British engagement in the global commercial network became more complicated and 
extensive so did law-making in Britain. In accordance with the maxim that “the 
empire of goods was also an empire of laws,”64 the British empire depended a great 
deal on its imperial legislation to ensure the continuity of commercial activities 
between the metropolis and colonies. Although for the first British empire, imperial 
legislation remained rather “informal, unsystematic and contested,”65  the British 
were convinced that their empire was governed, secured and justified through laws. 
These laws of the metropolis brought commerce, welfare and liberty to the colonies 
and thus distinguished itself from the contemporary rival empires.    
By the same token, it appeared imperative to the historians of ancient Greece 
to explain to their readers, as they practiced philosophical history, the effect of the 
legislative tradition at home on the empire in the making. They examined the laws of 
Solon and Lycurgos from this viewpoint too, along with their concern with property 
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and agricultural policies, for example. How the differing characters of these legal 
codes generated empires with differing, or rather incompatible, features considerably 
preoccupied them. In comparison with Athens, Sparta’s authoritarian laws hardened 
its citizens as well as their attitude towards the colonies and neighbouring states. The 
laws of Lycurgos which underpinned the limited monarchy and prevented democracy 
in the Spartan realm, indeed aimed at the public good and promoted “love of virtue 
and moderation.”66 To that extent, the historiography of eighteenth-century Britain 
was pro-Spartan. From the perspective of empire, however, the legal code of 
Lycurgos was less than a source of inspiration. 
Certainly, Lycurgos himself received approval from the historians. Among 
them, Goldsmith, who considered Lycurgos as “one of the first and most 
extraordinary legislators that ever appeared among mankind,”67 gave him the most 
credit. Also, Stanyan called him a pagan who could occasionally “approach … near 
to Christian morality.”68 Nevertheless, because of what afterwards happened to the 
Spartan government built by this remarkable man, the historians, in truth, treated the 
era of Lycurgos with reserve. The negatively viewed empire which the Spartan state 
later grew into was in fact the product of Lycurgos’s laws, although in his lifetime he 
attempted to “provide for the security of Sparta by excluding the pursuit of wealth 
and of extensive empire.” 69  Thus, Lycurgos cautioned his people against the 
instability inherent in extensive territorial empires, but the Spartans, hardened by the 
laws of Lycurgos himself, acted otherwise. It is true that the kind of state envisaged 
in these laws was based on desirable features, such as complete equality and balance 
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in the administration. Yet, these were not easy goals to attain and sustain. In this 
respect, Lycurgos first encountered the problem of securing his establishment and 
then resolved to enhance the Spartan government through institutions whose 
“severity,” according to Leland, transformed the Spartan people “into a robust, hardy 
valiant nation, made for war.”70 Therefore, not the laws themselves but the strict 
means to secure them, inescapably rendered the Spartan government authoritarian, 
oppressive and aggressive. Gillies, too stressed the same point, by arguing that 
Lycurgos’s code of laws did not bring peace to Sparta at the outset. On the contrary, 
like “almost every city [it] was torn by a double conflict, dangers threatened on all 
sides.”71 For that reason, the task of priority for Lycurgos appeared to secure his 
commonwealth at any expense and so he did. The outcome was the transformation of 
Sparta into “the most warlike” among all Greek states.72 Elaborating further on this 
issue, Leland asserted that it was this warlike spirit of the Spartans, which inspired 
“vast designs of power” and fuelled “an inordinate and violent ambition”73 –the 
hallmarks of the Spartan imperial understanding. 
Throughout the eighteenth century, the threat of ever-growing Bourbon 
strength disturbed “both ministers and the political nation in general” concerned 
“about the strength and intentions of other powers” and “about British vulnerability 
in face of them.”74 The British historians’ understanding of the imperial growth of 
Sparta was made to resemble their perception of the French desire to challenge 
Britain both at home and in North America. In Goldsmith’s words, through 
Lycurgos’s “celebrated body of laws,” Sparta emerged to be “at once the terror and 
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the umpire of the neighbouring kingdoms.” 75  Though being the author most 
sympathetic to Lycurgos, he laid emphasis on the word “terror,” recalling France and 
“the weakness of Britain as a military power and her vulnerability to invasion.”76  
A military character, which was a feature never attributed to Athens 
specifically within the context of the imperial affairs, came to the fore as a common 
attitude of the historians in their assessments of Sparta. Needless to say, a constant 
quest for military solutions was not a policy held in high esteem in eighteenth-
century Britain, for this was the French way of conducting foreign affairs. Britain 
gave priority to “naval power and colonial and commercial considerations.”77 The 
“interventionist foreign policy,”78 similar to that of France, pursued during the Whig 
supremacy had very much annoyed the Tories and such discontent echoed in the later 
ancient history texts. 
 During the Spartan supremacy in the Amphictyonic council, the official 
discourse of Sparta was about being “the supreme umpire and general protector of 
the injured,”79 but British historians did not pay much need to this. Their actual 
impression of Sparta was conveyed by Stanyan’s words. The Spartans were “the only 
people in the world, to whom war gave repose,” for their “the glory…was to be 
gained by dint of fighting and in the open field.”80 There was no doubt that their 
aggressive, hence ‘interventionist,’ imperial policies were the reflection of this 
warlike character. Their “strict discipline” acquired through Lycurgos’s code of laws 
bestowed the Spartans with “moroseness of temper” and what they extended to their 
                                                 
75 Goldsmith, History of Greece Abridged, 6.  
76 Black, System of Ambition, 74.  
77Ibid., 85.  
78 Jeremy Black, British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole (Hampshire: Gregg Revivals, 1985), 
179.  
79 Leland, Philip, I, 24 and “protectress of liberty and guardian of the public peace” in Gast, History of 
Greece, I, 494.    
80 Stanyan, Grecian History, I, 87-8.  
 192
colonies as well as the neighbouring states was “the same harsh severity.”81 In the 
same way, Gast considered the Spartans with regard to empire, “the spoilers and 
ravagers of every neighbouring state.” As Spain, and, above all, France harassed the 
states of modern Europe in the name of building a universal monarchy, Sparta sought 
expansion at the expense of its neighbours. Gast who wrote most straightforwardly 
on the issue of empire, maintained that the Spartans’ “very virtues were the ruin of 
their unhappy neighbours.” 82  
Also, unlike the Athenian empire which was firmly believed by the British 
historians to be founded on the ideal of mutual benefit between the motherland and 
the colonies, the Spartan empire gained the loyalty of the subordinate states and 
colonies through a scheme of suppression, which was “far from intending any 
benefit”83 to them. Sparta, therefore, remained out of the empirical data collected by 
both the British historians and political writers to enhance their arguments on the 
necessity of a more refined policy of empire grounded in the principle of mutuality. 
It was not viewed as suited to teach lessons about widespread commerce, naval 
power or polite manners. Having thus been depicted as the antithesis of the ideal 
empire, prescribed by those such as Baron, which endowed the colonies with ‘civil 
rights and privileges’ and expected cooperation in return, Sparta seemed to offer no 
positive imperial lesson to British statesmen. The Spartans, no different than the 
Spanish and the French apparently, were simply the most despicable sort of 
conquerors “who wield the sword, not of justice but of violence and oppression.”84 It 
                                                 
81 Stanyan, Grecian History, I, 89. 
82 Gast, Rudiments, 266.  
83 Gast, History of Greece, I, 494.  
84 Gast, Rudiments, 266. Italics by the author.   
 193
was true that they too rejoiced in “a high degree of glory and empire,”85 but not the 
sort eighteenth-century Britain was required to seek.  
 Given the contemporary dislike of engagement in constant land war, the 
Spartan empire appeared to be at odds with the British understanding of empire 
which was mercantile and sea-borne, rather than military and land-borne. As 
reflected by Goldsmith whose account of the Spartan empire was the most 
favourable one, the contemptible feature of this entity was that its “sovereignty was 
not to be maintained but by a constant course of action.” In order to sustain the 
durability of their empire, the Spartans had always to chase after “fresh occasions of 
war,”86 which stood as the ultimate source of their imperial power. All in all, they 
maintained an atmosphere of terror throughout the empire. The terror of war may 
have glued the Spartan empire together, but this insubstantial foundation of solidarity 
ended as soon as the motherland ceased to be formidable. According to Gast, it was 
their “pride and arrogance” which prevented the Spartans from coming to terms with 
this fact.87 Although the support of arms was indispensable in the early phase of the 
empire-building, no state in history had successfully carried out an imperial scheme 
designed purely from a military perspective. Sparta failed to reform its imperial 
policies and consequently had to hand over the title of “the umpire of Greece” to 
Athens. To the British historians, this was the most obvious lesson from the history 
of Sparta. 
Before concluding however, it should be noted here that there was one 
historian early in the century who found something to admire in the Spartan empire-
building process. Potter made use of Lycurgos’s ban on the free movement of the 
Spartans in raising his own argument about the degenerative effect of the interaction 
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with foreigners in imperial activity. In this context, he presented Lycurgos’s 
determination to prevent his people from increasing acquaintance with other nations 
as the product of “a well-grounded fear.” It was well-grounded because “the 
conversation of strangers” jeopardised the stability of “that excellent platform of 
government” of the Spartans.88 In this fashion, Potter indeed prematurely voiced the 
concern rather pertinent to the Second British Empire phase of the country’s imperial 
experience, the possible corrupting impact of civilisations essentially different from 
one’s own. As Kathleen Wilson argues in her attempt at defining the empire in terms 
of race and gender in eighteenth-century Britain,  
[e]mpire was, in a very real sense, the frontier of the nation, the place where, 
under the pressure of contact and exchange, boundaries deemed crucial to 
national identity –white and black, civilised and savage, law and vengeance– 
blurred, dissolved or were rendered impossible to uphold.89    
 
It was this problematic of frontier which Potter pointed to. Against the ‘contact and 
exchange’ which came with the expansion of the borders, he maintained that 
Lycurgos’s ban on free movement was correct.     
Of course, the apprehension of the ‘other’ emphasised within the context of 
the Greek encounter with Persians would not appear unusual to the reader of Greek 
history. In their accounts of the Persian empire, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
the historians were preoccupied with the issue why, in Goldsmith’s words, “an 
admission of foreigners into Greece, was a measure that was always formidable to 
those who called themselves Grecians.”90 Nevertheless, the elaboration of the topic 
in discussion of the Spartan empire was not a common practice. Potter’s approach, in 
that sense, was atypical.   
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Potter’s whiggish stance on politics may explain the reason why he brought 
up the matter of foreigners in his analysis of the Spartan empire-building, for he 
linked his argument to the possible negative effect of naval power. Because maritime 
success naturally brought about an encounter with hostile, incompatible or simply 
different civilisations, he held that the motherland should adjust its policies by taking 
the role of naval superiority as the accelerator of degeneration and decline into 
account.91 In the histories of ancient Greece published later in the eighteenth century, 
as mentioned above, the old Tory opposition to land war was generally projected on 
the Spartan empire. Leaving aside Potter’s unusual appreciation of its territorial 
strategies, it could safely be argued that the Spartan empire was depicted in a 
negative light in the texts considered here, as aggressive and warlike, hardened by 
adherence to the legal code of Lycurgos. 
  
4.5.2 Athens 
 
On the other side of what Taylor calls the ‘battle’ of two ethical viewpoints in 
eighteenth-century Britain, there was the commercial attitude which was, in 
considering historians of Greece, represented by the Athenian empire. Though 
having despised its commitment to democracy, the historians alternatively presented 
Athens, in contrast to Sparta, as the desirable empire. With the liberty enshrined in its 
legal code, its naval superiority, its excellence in commerce and its unwarlike 
character, the imperial experience of Athens offered them sufficient ground to build 
such an argument. Athens, on this account, received positive remarks of the sort that 
Sparta never did. The most explicit definition of ideal empire provided by the 
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eighteenth-century ancient Greek histories came up in the section on the Athenian 
empire and belonged to Gast. 
Of all the Greeks states, British interest focused on Athens. Ancient Athens 
was put on a pedestal as “the seat of learning and eloquence, the school of arts and 
the centre of wit, gaiety and politeness.”92 On account of being the most refined 
people who rose most quickly “to the summit of glory,”93 it was widely believed that 
the ancient Athenians had valuable knowledge to offer to the British nation about the 
arts, literature and of course politics. In the political sphere, the main attraction of 
Athenian history seemed to be party politics, elections, the functioning of the 
councils, the role of the army and the differing effects of monarchy, tyranny, 
aristocracy and democracy on the people of Athens. Nevertheless, as our topic is the 
conduct of Athens’s imperial affairs, debates over other topics which have always 
been fashionable in the history of political thought, will be left out. It will be argued 
that how the historians understood the Athenian empire bears undeniable similarities 
with how the British political nation viewed their empire, being built in the 
eighteenth century.   
If it was the belligerent character of the Spartans which determined their 
aggressive imperial policies, according to the historians, the Athenian spirit of liberty 
shaped the Athenian way of empire. Athens, it was believed, had many things in 
common with Britain, excluding its practice of democracy, and commitment to the 
cause of liberty was one of them. The notion of liberty in Athens was highly 
romanticised by the British historians. Gast’s words that the Athenian “chose rather 
to fall with the commonwealth than to purchase life at the expense of liberty”94 stood 
as the typical articulation of this. Athens was considered as unique among other 
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Greek states in this respect. To Montagu, for instance, the Athenian allegiance to 
liberty had refined and polished the manners of the Athenians in such a distinctive 
way that Athens emerged as “a strong contrast to … Sparta.”95 Its promotion of 
freedom within that state gave the British one reason why Athens became a model of 
good manners and ideal governance. 
Liberty was granted to the Athenians through their legal system. And, as 
already said, the ancient Greek histories conveyed to the reader that the domestic 
legal code set the imperial rules and the nature of the relationship between 
motherland and colonies. The Spartan empire which emerged under the influence of 
Lycurgos’s legal code grew into a military and territorial empire at once expanding 
and suppressing. The Athenian empire on the other hand evolved into a 
commendable one due to its legal system introduced by Solon.96 The first Athenian 
attempts of colonisation could be traced back to 600 BC and after, which in fact 
coincided with the age of Solon. This phase of Athenian history was regarded as the 
beginning of the historical era of the city and Solon’s age was commonly stressed by 
all ancient Greek history texts of the eighteenth century as that of the rise of Athens. 
Once he acquired “the power of new-modelling the commonwealth of Athens,”97 
Solon reinforced reforms of an unprecedentedly broad scope, covering almost all 
areas. In this way, in Goldsmith’s words, he put an end to “the inactive government” 
of the times of the kings, which lacked “the spirit of extensive dominion.” Before 
Solon, “the citizens were too much employed in their private intrigues to attend to 
foreign concerns” and Athens therefore remained for “a long time incapable of 
enlarging her power.”98 It should be emphasised here that although the eighteenth-
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century Greek historiography has been labelled in recent scholarship as pro-Spartan 
and monarchical, traces of anti-monarchical discourse sporadically made its way into 
these texts. Overemphasising the works of Mitford and Gillies leads to a distortion of 
them. An author such as Goldsmith could thus praise the laws of Solon on the 
grounds that they brought about the reinvigoration which Athens had been lacking in 
the times of kings.  
The historians agreed that under Solon’s rule Athenian government 
underwent a remarkable transformation and Athens was blessed with improvement 
and progress that introduced a new understanding of empire –and Solon’s greatness 
lay in his law code, chiefly.   With the purpose of emphasising the role of complete 
and perfect legislation played in the emergence of a mighty and glorious state, the 
laws of Solon were extensively treated. The enlargement of the national assembly to 
include all citizens of Athens, the division of the Athenians into different classes 
according to the extent of their estates, the prescription of commercial regulations 
and the standardization of the agricultural activities, were among his foremost 
achievements. Having looked at this picture, what struck the historians most, it seems, 
was the wide range of topics sorted out by Solon’s codification. They called the 
reader’s attention to that point and argued that comprehensive legislation brought 
wealth, greatness and eventually, imperial success. Through perfect government and 
complete legislation, similar to that of Solon, a state could attain polished manners, 
profitable commerce, self-sufficient agricultural production, security and wealth.99 
                                                 
99 Mitford agreed with the rest on this issue but specified that the enforcement of extensive legislation 
was appropriate solely in the barbarous age of a nation. Prior to the laws of Solon, Athens had not yet 
been sufficiently refined and could have afforded much renovation and improvement. The constitution 
of the polished states, however, would not allow amendments on a large scale. To do otherwise, 
according to Mitford, obviously referring here to the contemporary French unrest could have very 
likely caused “some violent convulsion threatening subversion confounding all establishments and 
reducing things to the chaos of barbarism.” Therefore, to improve, a state should implement 
progressive legislation of great extent only once at the outset. There was one polished state which 
state which was fortunate to experience constant but non-violent and gradual improvement of 
 199
Only Stanyan criticised the laws of Solon which were, be said, “more numerous and 
confused” than those of Lycurgos.100 The rest concurred with Tacitus who declared 
these laws “more excellent and more complete” than the previous examples of the 
kind.101
From the perspective of the influence of law on imperial policy, Athens was 
superior to Sparta. On the grounds that the authoritarian language of the laws of 
Lycurgos generated a “hardy” but “unpolished”102 people, one could easily surmise 
that so would have been their empire. If conquest, by definition, had always to cause 
pain to the conquered, the lands controlled by authoritarian Sparta, according to 
Gillies, “suffered still greater vexations under the Spartan, than they had done under 
the Athenian empire.”103 Additionally, in acquiring new territories Sparta, as Gast 
stated, did not give priority to “the welfare of Greece.” Instead, the ideal which the 
Spartans remained fully committed to was “the advancement of their empire,”104 -a 
purely military ambition likely to undermine the balance of power in Greece. On this 
point also, Sparta was utilised to enhance the old Tory argument against constant 
land war. Athens, on the other hand, moulded by the laws of Solon, grew into an 
“ambitious” but a “refined state.”105 Having been gifted with a complete legislative 
code similar to that of eighteenth-century Britain, it was in the power of the 
Athenians to offer substantial benefit to the colonies. Certainly, because no imperial 
design could have been accomplished without –though in varying degrees –  the 
assistance of military, the Athenian empire did make use of its arms. The historians 
acknowledged this fact and elaborated on it. While exploring the Athenian 
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acquisition of the title of “Protector of Greece” from Sparta in the Amphictyonic 
council, Goldsmith, for instance, described Athens as “determine[d] to avenge the 
slightest affront by the edge of sword.”106 Still, there was a considerable number of 
other more pleasant adjectives than warlike to identify Athens with. 
Concentrating on the remarks exclusively on Athens as an empire, they can 
be seen to dovetail with how the British political nation perceived their own empire. 
In addition to the histories, the non-history pamphlets spoke of the ideal features of 
the Athenian empire. The Athenian empire, as Pownall said in his analysis of ancient 
government, represented “domestic peace,” “public prosperity,” “security” and, of 
course, “liberty,” at the times it resisted the degenerating effects of party factions or 
luxury.107 Baron, similarly, expressed his high opinion of Athens, for it was an 
empire that had bettered the condition of its acquisitions in terms of politics, 
economy and civilisation with its “manners, customs and forms of government.” 
Unlike Sparta which “derided” the Athenian virtues and won the loyalty of its 
colonies through force of arms, Athens took an interest in the prosperity of the 
subordinate states which were “destitute, in a great measure, of all the useful arts, 
particularly of agriculture and commerce.”108 The historians’ view of the Athenian 
empire did not essentially differ from Pownall’s and Baron’s. Among many 
comments of the same sort, those by Gast emerge as most representative of the 
common point of view on why the Athenian empire was to be set as an example for 
the contemporary British reader. Instead of oppressive imperial policies, the 
Athenian rulers wisely pursued an imperial scheme to embrace “all confederates.” It 
was not the politics of Pericles, as Gast did not mention him, but “the justice of 
Aristides” and “the candour and affability of Cimon” which connected other Greek 
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states as well as the colonies to Athens.109 Additionally, its “naval strength,” “very 
manners and laws” and “love of liberty” ensured that this attachment was an 
enduring one.110 Pericles’ exclusion from this depiction of Athens as ideal will be 
spoken of below. 
In this way, as the British historians understood it, the Athenian empire both 
maintained the balance of power among the Greek states, including Sparta, and 
expanded its area of influence to non-Greek territories. While Athens rejoiced at the 
flow of wealth as a result of the sustained commerce with the colonies and 
neighbouring states and the sense of security brought by the dominance over Sparta 
and Persia, the colonies and subordinate Greek states, in return, benefited not only 
from the trade with the motherland but the superior techniques introduced by the 
Athenians to increase the efficiency of production, as well as the peace their alliance 
with Athens provided. In this imperial network, the Athenians avoided the explicit 
language of empire that Rome used and contended with an undefined but robustly 
hierarchical relationship, in which they had only taken upon themselves the title of 
“protector.” Evidently, such an understanding of empire could safely be associated 
with the eighteenth-century British notion as elucidated in Chapter II and the British 
historians of the age made implicit but frequent references to that.  
Among the features of Athens which more resembled those of Britain, naval 
superiority was of particular interest to the British reader. The ideal of a maritime 
commercial empire and, as Armitage contends, “the diagnosis of England’s fitness to 
capture it,”111 which had evolved in the course of time to encompass all Britain, 
preoccupied the political nation for centuries. According to the perennial belief, 
originating in ancient Rome, Britain, by the virtue of being an island was pictured as 
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isolated, by divine favour, from the continent and in the position to excel at maritime 
activities, in order to alternately maintain or overcome the isolation. One could detect 
the varying reflections of this belief on the imperial policies of different ages. In the 
sixteenth century, isolation was thought to be the reason why this kingdom did not 
possess any overseas territories.112 In the eighteenth century, the Tories made great 
use of it as a part of their propaganda against the Whig engagement in continental 
affairs at the expense of maritime advancement. Investment in naval policies and 
sometimes warfare thus appeared to be a natural outcome of the isolated situation of 
Britain. The idea of a maritime imperium which had once stood for the sovereignty 
“solely over home waters” grew into something larger, to include the “conception of 
mare liberum on the oceans” which brought about the blue-water strategy in the 
eighteenth century.113
Looking at this picture, the traditional British notion of maritime dominion 
was reflected in the Athenian superiority on the seas, which was in effect shared with 
no other ancient Greek state. This can be stressed as one of the themes that fascinated 
the British in the ancient Greek history, as the source of political wisdom. In terms of 
security, for instance, the histories established that the Athenian maritime superiority 
eliminated the possibility of invasion by sea altogether. 114 Still, the benefits brought 
by a powerful navy and exceptional skills in maritime activities were to be greatly 
appreciated in imperial affairs. As Stanyan put it, Athens’s “very fair title to 
command at sea” could not have been challenged by Sparta and this advantage of 
Athens, in fact, created one of the essential differences between the two empires.115 
On account of being a maritime empire, Athens secured “a closer connection” even 
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with the most distant colonies and had never been “averse” to expeditions far 
away.116 According to Gillies, Stanyan and Leland, naval strength was one of the 
requisites in connecting the motherland to its offspring and building a non-military, 
but robust empire, unlikely to dissolve easily.  
In the eighteenth century, as Wilson argues, the “empire mattered” even “to 
ordinary people.”117 It would be wrong to suggest that British statesman had not 
already begun to seek for an ideal of imperial governance prior to or concurrent with 
the publication of these history texts. There was concentration on the prospects for 
the naval empire and a mutually beneficial relationship with colonies, as Pownall’s 
pamphlets, for instance, demonstrate. Such interest coincided with the points 
emphasised by the historians of ancient Greece, who presented the Athenian empire 
as more united and successful than the Spartan empire by virtue of its sea-borne 
character. The emphasis implied that the same glory could eventually be Britain’s.    
In the complete association of Britain with Athens in terms of naval affairs, 
there was one small detail brought by Goldsmith to the attention of the reader as a 
point that deserved elaboration. What was striking, according to him, was that the 
Athenians did not originally possess the gift to become the masters of the seas and 
did not inherit such a merit from their ancestors. Therefore, they learned afterwards 
to be powerful on the seas as conditions demanded. Unlike the British they did not 
have this in their blood.118 This petty detail in the full affiliation of Britain with 
Athens, however, did not concern any other historian than Goldsmith. They had 
already made their points while elaborating on the Egyptian impact on the Greek 
civilisation demonstrating that, in Mitford’s words, the early Greeks “seem not yet to 
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have excelled their neighbours in any circumstance of science, art or civilisation.”119 
As a matter of fact, the reason why Goldsmith dwellt on this point was not to 
discourage the British interest in Athens.  He stressed that the naval knowledge of 
Athens was second-hand, because he believed that Britain was actually superior to 
Athens in naval affairs and could surpass it.  
It became a truism in eighteenth-century Britain that naval superiority served 
to foster commerce and commerce bound the colonies tighter than the force of arms. 
As Armitage maintains, “commerce was the greatest bond of community”120-a point 
extensively accentuated by the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment. Though 
perhaps “not specific to the period,”121 commerce was an important facet of the 
eighteenth-century imperial discourse. Also, the way the thinkers of the Scottish 
Enlightenment formulised it as the motor of civilisation added a new perspective to 
the British understanding of commerce. Adam Smith’s renowned theory of 
stadialism prescribed four stages through which societies were to progress and a 
commercial state was the final stage to be achieved. Commerce was “the parent of 
politeness.”122 Therefore both the quality and quantity of commerce determined the 
level of civilisation into which modern Europe was expected to grow collectively. In 
his essay entitled ‘Of the Jealousy of Trade’ Hume expressed his desire to see “the 
flourishing [of the] commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy and even France itself.”123 
To him, as to the other Scottish Enlightenment writers, commerce was the source of 
greatness, happiness, wealth and refinement. Despite their significant, sometimes 
unbridgeable differences, on this common ground the European states rose. As an 
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indicator of civilisation and stimulator of refined manners, the ancient Greek history 
texts put particular emphasis on the non-military and commercial characteristics of 
the Athenian empire.  
According to Gillies, for example, the Athenians were the only people in 
history who “by the virtue of the mind alone, acquired an extensive dominion over 
men equally improved with themselves in the arts of war and government…an 
absolute authority in the islands of the Aegean, as well as in the cities of the Asiatic 
coast.” Even the Romans, Gillies continued, who deserved much respect for their 
imperial enterprise, ruled their universal empire merely by means of arms and 
superior military discipline. 124  Undoubtedly, the Athenian policy of substituting 
military activity with commerce enabled this people to enjoy a secure and peaceful 
hegemony over the states incorporated in their empire. Instead of martial skill, the 
Athenians employed the “gentler arts of uprightness and clemency which,” in Gast’s 
words, “alone are the security of governors, and render empire amiable.”125 Of all the 
historians, Stanyan was the one who most explicitly stressed this non-military aspect 
of the Athenian empire as another common point between ancient Athens and 
contemporary Britain. He was convinced that commerce flourished remarkably in 
Athens due to a similar environment to that in Britain. Through its virtues, the 
Athenian government spread “the love of labour and husbandry,” which “made way 
for commerce” and rendered the Athenians “rich at home and powerful abroad.” In 
combination with Solon’s laws of liberty, commerce at home helped “to tame and 
polish a people bred up in liberty.” And in imperial affairs, based on the principle of 
profiting mutually, it stuck the motherland and its colonies together as a more 
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powerful glue than oppression, violence and force.126 For that reason, above all 
others, Athens built up an empire inherently different from Sparta’s which, in Gast’s 
words, pursued imperial goals through a “tyrannical government” that “made use of 
empire only to oppress and subdue the rest of Greece.”127                                                                    
Beside naval superiority, utilitarian commerce and a non-military attitude, the 
history of Athens also called attention to the wisdom of limiting the government’s 
area of interest at difficult times as another valuable lesson of imperial conduct. This 
will take us to the concept of hêgemoniê which was regarded as a major theme by 
historians, both ancient Greek and British. The accounts of the hegemonic rivalry 
between Sparta and Athens by Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon and Ephorus 
clearly set out at once the awards and burdens of being the hegemon and the British 
historians took particular interest in the latter. To them, discussion of the hegemony 
offered instruction: in order to sustain imperial strength the state should avoid any 
unnecessary engagements in the affairs of other states. According to the definition of 
John Wickersham, the hegemon is the state which “is nominally in control of 
strategy.”128 The term will be used in that sense below. Naturally, being in control of 
the strategy which will influence other states to operate in the way the hegemon 
desires, as a rule, requires remarkable financial and military effort. The cost of such 
effort is particularly high, as its investment in some other purpose, unconnected to 
the functioning of other states, could likely bring more success, welfare and 
prosperity to the hegemonic state.   
From the turn of the eighteenth century on, Britain’s quest to control 
continental strategy distressed the Tories, who were extremely concerned about this 
cost of being the strategy-setter. The concentration of resources on imperial interests 
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and on naval power instead would have lead, it was believed, to more profitable 
outcomes. The hegemonic experience of Athens, for that reason, appeared to be a 
very informative episode in history. The heavy toll of entanglement in other states’ 
affairs, a substantial issue in the politics of eighteenth-century Britain, could best be 
learned from ancient Greek histories. The topic was elaborated extensively by two 
historians particularly, Stanyan and Gillies. How Athens gradually sunk under the 
burden of its hegemonic relations, despite its wise conduct of strategy in the 
beginning was to dissuade the British state from making the same mistake.  
During the Persian Wars, Sparta was the hegemon to which Athens was 
subordinate. Sparta’s name was carved at the top of the Serpent Column erected at 
Delphi to commemorate the victory of Platea. Nevertheless, “a state with strong 
leverage” such as Athens did not remain long under the shadow of Sparta; hence the 
end of the Persian Wars marked the end of the Spartan hegemony.129 However, from 
the moment it acquired the presidency of Amphictyonic council and surpassed Sparta, 
Athens, now the umpire of Greece, as Stanyan underlined, was encumbered with the 
problems of the “injured” states incorporated in the council. Sparta, on the other hand, 
was encouraging them to appeal to Athens for no good reason. This was, according 
to Stanyan, the Spartan method of exhausting and paralyzing the Athenian state, to 
the degree that it would fail to protect its own interests and imperial designs. The 
historian’s emphasis on the high cost of being involved in the affairs of other states is 
understandable, for Stanyan wrote and enlarged his history reflecting on the War of 
the Spanish Succession (1702-13), the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-20) and 
the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739). Regarding these endeavours of Britain to set the 
continental strategy, he was convinced that his history ought to stress the vital point 
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that aiming at leadership served Athens in enhancing its authority for a limited time, 
but that eventually its welfare suffered.130                
The Athenian experience in the Amphictyonic council, in which the Greek 
states were represented in proportion to their size, in effect acknowledged the price a 
superpower was to pay. Under Spartan supremacy, Athens was not sufficiently 
powerful to dominate the council, but, on the other hand, free from the heavy burden 
the hegemonic state had to carry. Gillies, another historian committed to emphasising 
the undesirable side of such political and military engagement, called attention to the 
early phases of Greek history, when the Athenians cleverly manoeuvred in council so 
as not to involve Athens further. In this way, “their arms had acquired great 
lustre.”131 Prior to the Persian Wars, Sparta was both gifted with all the benefits and 
glory brought by its hegemonic power and overwhelmed at the same time by the 
endless appeals of the petty states. In the course of time, the cost of maintaining 
hegemonic rule and dominance over Greece surpassed the profit of being the sole 
strategy-setter. Inevitably, the same fate would befall Athens when it acquired the 
leadership of the Greeks. The relationship of Athens with its allies in the 
Amphictyonic and Delian Leagues was also hegemonic and subsequent to the 
inclusion of non-Greek elements grew into the more costly imperial one. 
The turning of hêgemoniê to arkhê in the reign of Pericles required a closer 
union among the components of the Athenian empire. In this very visible arkhê, the 
mutual responsibilities and obligations were well-defined. It was now that the 
subdued language of empire became more explicit. The power of Athens grew 
further but so did its responsibilities. In this context, Stanyan stressed the poisonous 
effect of ultimate imperial power. On one hand, such power allowed a state to realise 
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any design, either political or economic. On the other, it trapped that state with 
precise responsibilities towards its subordinates, which would eventually suck the 
state dry of its real strength. Having possessed “the prerogative of rewards and 
punishments” and been “the sovereign umpire of Greece,” Athens sought to 
eliminate this dilemma, which had previously exhausted the Spartan hegemony. 
Nevertheless, the later phase of Athenian supremacy disappointed Stanyan as, 
according to him, the Athenians “roughly treated the Grecian cities of which they 
called themselves the protectors.”132 In other words, struggling with the dilemma, 
Athens in the end chose not to protect its subordinates, contrary to its promise. 
Therefore, over the long term it was impossible to avoid the negative outcomes of an 
empire in which the rights and obligations of the centre and periphery were officially 
and clearly declared. Such a lesson might well have been welomed by the British 
statesmen who had been the agents of a rather vague and unpronounced imperial 
policy.  
It was Pericles who redefined the imperial relations of Athens with the 
periphery. In his Funeral Oration, he brought the defence of arkhê in front of the 
Athenians and introduced it as the most honourable governance. Because the empire 
at that time stretched “from Euxine to the sea of Crete from the coasts of Asia to the 
Adriatic gulf,”133 the era of Pericles was commonly accepted as the golden age of 
Athens. Nevertheless, the reader would not come across any generous praises of 
Pericles in the ancient Greek history texts of eighteenth-century Britain. Although 
Pericles’s rule of forty years was the most flourishing time for Athens, it was at the 
same time, particularly according to Gast, the period in which the imperial principle 
of non-aggression was undermined. From then on, Athens lost its previously 
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amicable voice and became the “dread” of the colonies it possessed. What is more, 
while governing the empire, Pericles put into force new regulations in which public 
benefit was no longer a priority.134 Obviously, his role in the Peloponnesian War, as 
the one who declared war, was the main reason why Pericles’s imperial ventures did 
not receive much appreciation from the British historians. Through most of the 
eighteenth century, war was vindicated in Whig discourse as an efficient way of 
securing the British interest, whether against Spain or France. Apprehensive about 
the state of constant war, many pursued an opposition to such intense British 
engagement in the continental affairs. The historians discussed here clearly 
disapproved of overzealous military expeditions, which in fact meant the violation of 
the unofficial unwritten imperial code of Athens. 
According to Stanyan, frequently pronounced phrases such as “preserving the 
balance and protecting confederates” issued by the Athenian side were only pretexts 
in the Peloponnesian War, which was really fought with Sparta for “the empire of 
Greece.”135 To Hind, who too despised the insufficiently justified wars, it was true 
that the Spartans were prepared to challenge the increasing influence of Athens over 
the other Greek states; but Pericles did not urge his people “to hearken to any 
proposals of peace,” but instead “exhorted them to make all the necessary 
preparations of war, with the utmost expedition.” For that reason, the war seemed “in 
a great measure, to owe its beginning to Pericles.” Evidently, Hind, like Stanyan, was 
convinced that fighting a preventable war was a sign of mismanagement. Pericles 
dragged the Athenians into this “dangerous,” “long and bloody war”136 and this was 
the point emphasised.  
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Throughout his reign, Pericles breached not only the unofficial rule of non-
aggression but the rule of optimal expansion as well. It was he who acquired more 
territory than any other Athenian ruler, but it was his predecessor Cimon who was 
saluted for his efficiency, wisdom and imperial genius. The main reason for this was 
that Pericles overstretched Athenian borders beyond that ideal point, which did not 
permit the imperial governance to be free of oppressive policies, degeneration and 
mismanagement. The conviction that hasty and spontaneous, hence not well-planned, 
territorial expansion was to be dismissed as a vain pursuit in empire-building was 
commonly expressed in contemporary political literature. Davenant, for example, 
explained the decline of both the Spanish and Ottoman empires by the fact that they 
grew too fast, overstretched their boundaries and while doing that, they did not have 
“time to cement” the components of the empire “strongly together.”137 Therefore, 
expansion beyond the optimum point brought maladministration and the British, in 
learning from history, ought to resist the temptation of expansion. Ferguson too 
contended that “the plan of enlargement” and naturally of “pacification,” because 
territory of inordinately large extent could only be governed by suppression, did not 
serve the well-being of empire, on the grounds that its “members can no longer 
apprehend the common ties of society nor be engaged by affection in the cause of 
their country.” Such alienation would inevitably bring about “decay.”138 As Nancy F. 
Kohen contends, the fear of “abundance” also pervaded the imperial debate of the 
early 1760s.139
Overstretching the imperial borders was a concern collectively shared by the 
British historians. One should evaluate the treatments of Cimon and Pericles with 
similar condemnations of Roman overexpansion in mind. Although Pericles 
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gloriously ruled over the most extensive territory in the history of ancient Athens, his 
desire for expansion rendered it impossible to govern the empire according to the 
maxims set at the outset and enhanced by Cimon. As Gillies put it, what the times of 
Pericles should therefore teach was that consequent to his rule “[i]n the exercise of 
power the Athenians displayed principles totally different from those by which they 
had attained it.”140 This was what would happen when the imperial capacity of a state 
was exceeded or, in Gast’s words, when it launched “the mad project of attempting 
the empire of the world.” Unfortunately, the Greeks  
had rendered their yoke insupportable even to their Grecian neighbours: their 
confederates they treated as vassals, and the contributions which they 
received from them and which they were to have administered for the 
general good they wantonly lavished on the pride and magnificence of their 
own city, in the name of protectors of Greece, but in reality its oppressors. 
Amidst of all this insolence and bold show of enterprise, the Athenians 
nevertheless had nothing of their ancient vigour remaining.141                                    
 
The British who were the reluctant imperialists of the eighteenth century had 
always had reservations about an overextended empire. These concerns were 
expressed at the beginning of the century by political economists such as Davenant 
and Reynell and reached a peak in the aftermath of the Seven Years War. Subsequent 
to the acquisition of Canada, Dominica, Florida and India, the ministers and MPs as 
well as political writers were alarmed as they faced a financial and political burden 
of an unprecedented sort. The pamphlet debate of the 1760s on the issue has 
previously been discussed. These pamphlets reflect the anxiety about the new 
commitments and burdensome imperial obligations, which required change in 
overseas administration. Of course, in the discussions of empire there was also 
another camp, which “took an inordinate pride in the extent of Britain’s triumph, 
with victories in Europe, West Africa, India, Canada, the Caribbean and…the 
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Philippines.” Nevertheless, such an attitude was dominated by “a countervailing set 
of concerns over the martial fantasies spawned by Britain’s success.”142   Whether 
such a situation, as they found themselves in, was desirable or affordable greatly 
preoccupied British statesmen and evoked a substantial interest in the imperial 
experience of Athens and other ancient states. Thus they sought ways to surmount 
the problematic issues, through what Kohen calls the “collective knowledge of 
imperial history.”143
All in all, in a scrutiny of ancient Greek historiography in eighteenth-century 
Britain, empire comes to the fore as a theme of equal importance to that of 
democracy. Taking only democracy into account, these texts may appear as pro-
Spartan, written with the purpose of denouncing the evil forces of democracy and of 
course Athens. Nevertheless, ancient history-writing aimed to encompass as many 
topics which related to contemporary concerns as possible. Picking one theme and 
categorizing the entire historiography with regard to the study of that particular 
theme is to be regretted. Instead, it should be pointed out that the nature of the 
narratives differs according to the themes chosen. This chapter has argued that 
empire was one of the topics that much preoccupied the historians. And with 
reference to that notion, Athens appeared to be the commendable example, whereas 
Sparta decidedly was not. This does not imply that ancient Greek history-writing in 
eighteenth-century Britain was altogether pro-Athenian. Still, it was so on the matter 
of empire.  
Although the historians attempted to produce a more accurate account of the 
imperial practices of Athens and Sparta, learning how contemporary Britain and its 
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imperial affairs should be conducted through ancient examples had always been their 
greater concern. In a comparison of legal systems, expansionist policies, methods of 
colonisation and imperial characters, Athens was associated with Britain. Despite 
disapproval of the reign of Pericles, Athens’ smallness, its spirit of liberty, its non-
aggressive imperial policies, its commercial bond with the colonies, its refined 
manners and its wise hegemonic practices rendered the Athenian experience of 
empire in the eyes of the British historians very impressive. Athens was the example 
of what the British Empire ought to evolve into in the future. Sparta, on the other 
hand, was viewed as the antithesis of both Athens and Britain and hence of the ideal 
sort of empire. On this account, the attempts at understanding the Spartan way of 
empire replicated not only the ancient historians’ remarks, but also contemporary 
views of the Spanish and French empires. One might say that the accounts of Sparta 
and Athens by the eighteenth-century British historians were chiefly about 
vindicating the established or (being established) contemporary notions of empire, 
both the ideal and the disapproved. The historians consequently sought to provide 
grounds for commending the sea-borne commercial empire. In doing that, they made 
use of some of the topics extensively treated by the thinkers of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, such as the impact of its legal system on the nature of a given state 
and the mutually binding and beneficial effects of commerce.      
Just as much as the concern with the features of the ideal empire and the ways 
of attaining it, the interest of eighteenth-century British historians of Greece in the 
decline of empires is notable. No earthly empires, including the most perfect, could 
resist the inevitable end, which was decline and fall; nor could Sparta and Athens. 
Ferguson voiced this well-established conviction of the eighteenth century. 
Mankind, in aspiring to national felicity, have substituted arts which increase 
their riches, instead of those which improve their nature. They have 
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entertained admiration of themselves, under the titles of civilised and of 
polished, where they should have been affected with shame, and even where 
they have for a while acted on maxims tending to raise, to invigorate, and to 
preserve the national character, they have, sooner or later, been diverted 
from their object and fallen a prey to misfortune, or to the neglects which 
prosperity itself had encouraged.144                          
                         
Such was the inevitable fate of all states on earth, both polished and barbarous. To 
Gillies, because “the spirit of improvement is transient and demands perpetual efforts 
and the sources of degeneracy are permanent and innumerable,”145 the decline was 
inevitable. Not even the ablest sovereigns could have defied the eventual 
degeneration. In their attempts at reaching the ideal of flawless imperial governance, 
the British historians in truth aspired to knowledge of delaying decline and fall to the 
latest possible moment. For that reason, they put particular emphasis on specific 
issues such as maritime superiority, clever and limited expansion, a capable monarch 
and non-military imperial policies, with the conviction that genuine commitment to 
these principles and the others mentioned above would create the empire of the 
longest duration on earth.  
                                                 
144 Ferguson, Civil Society, 300. 
145 Gillies, History of Ancient Greece, II, 678.  
 216
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
  
EMPIRES BEYOND GREECE 
 
 
 
As Philip Lawson states, “comparison of the nascent British empire to those 
of history, usually coupled with sombre analyses of the rise and fall of some earlier 
imperium”1 was a common practice in the political literature and history texts of 
eighteenth-century Britain. As to Greek history-writing, the empires employed for 
such comparison were those of Athens, Sparta, Macedonia and Persia. Nevertheless, 
in recent works, the entire attention of the scholars concerned with the use of Greek 
antiquity has been attracted only by the way Sparta and Athens were depicted –and 
their concern has never been empire. The concern has been with democracy and the 
historians’ approach to Macedonia and Persia has remained out of the scope of the 
existing works on the eighteenth-century British histories of ancient Greece. Clearly 
here Macedonia and Persia, with reference to their imperial practices, must be 
included. Through their reflections on Macedonia and Persia, as through their 
assessments of Athens and Sparta, the historians sought to transmit imperial lessons 
that would teach the political nation what to do and what not to do. This chapter aims 
at the same time to reveal these lessons and to elaborate on the point that British neo-
classicism of the eighteenth century was not solely about Rome, Athens and Sparta.    
Macedonia and Persia are treated together since these two ancient states were 
clearly not considered by the historians as equals of Sparta and Athens in guiding 
contemporary Britain. Although Sparta was employed as a means of negative 
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exemplification in the quest for ideal empire, it was as Greek as Athens and hence 
both part and begetter of Greek civilisation. Nevertheless, the Macedonian and 
Persian empires, though always a part of the ancient Greek history, were outsiders to 
the Greek family and they, with the exception of the heyday of Alexander’s empire, 
were approached by British historians in this light. For that reason, in our attempt at 
pinning down the eighteenth-century views of empire embedded in ancient history 
texts, Macedonia and Persia are categorised as the other empires of ancient Greece in 
a separate chapter, serving as a sequel to the previous one. 
In the ancient Greek history-writing of eighteenth-century Britain, Macedonia 
and Persia, empires that did not point to the ideal, were definitely not associated with 
Britain. Still, in terms of building, managing and preserving an empire, they were 
believed to offer crucial lessons, lessons of avoidance mostly, to the British political 
nation. Before proceeding to examine these lessons, it should be stated at the outset 
that despite the low opinion of eighteenth-century British historians of early 
Macedonia and of the later years of the Alexandrian period, as will be seen below, 
Macedonia was not treated with as much hostiliy as Persia. First and foremost, 
Macedonia was not despotic. It might have been frequently called unpolished, 
warlike and authoritarian, but the historians particularly avoided drawing parallels 
between Macedonia and Persia. Any association with “the despotism of the east,” in 
Gillies’s words would “form a very erroneous notion of the Macedonian 
government.”2 The Macedonians were never been perceived as alien as the Persians 
customarily were.  
Interestingly enough, after the Macedonian triumph over Persia, the tone of 
the assessments of the former shifted from critical to approving.3 Having eliminated 
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the Persian threat, the Macedonians under Alexander were now commonly hailed as 
“a prosperous mighty people”4 alongside the Athenians and Spartans. All allegations 
of authoritarianism and lack of refinement seemed to be put aside. The British reader 
was invited by Gast to appreciate how “by degrees they rose superior to all the 
difficulties that environed them, they repelled their enemies [and] enlarged their 
borders.”5 Thus, unlike Persia, Macedonia was occasionally included in the Greek 
family, though always as an odd member. Persia, on the other hand, remained 
consistently an alien entity.  
 
5.1 Macedonia 
 
 
As Eliga Gould maintains, the Seven Years’ War brought along a period of 
“political retrenchment and moral self-scrutiny”6 in Britain with regard to the affairs 
of the empire. On one hand, the common people and popular press seemed to be 
extremely content with the new extensive territorial acquisitions of Britain. On the 
other, in the intellectual milieu, apprehensions about the economic burden, the 
manageability, the morality and hence the overall desirability of expansion, as well 
as the territorialization of the British empire began to be voiced loudly. Some of the 
political pamphlets which appeared in the 1760s were preoccupied with the questions 
of finance and military and political strategy, disapproving of existing imperial 
policies. Further, the question of morality, the feasibility of commerce as an 
alternative to war and the prospects of spreading civilisation, politeness and 
prosperity to the periphery were topics elaborated within the Scottish Enlightenment. 
Such arguments suggested cautious steps towards the empire and they found 
considerable support among the British statesmen. Thus, in his address to the House 
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of Commons during the discussions over the taxation of the North American colonies 
in 1775, Lord North laid particular emphasis on the point that the imperial policy of 
Britain on the issue had been a “moderate” one. Having avoided excess, Britain 
prudently sought to adopt “the best means for ensuring peace, prosperity and repose” 
which would not lead to “future hostilities.”7 Of course, the loss of the thirteen 
colonies proved this policy wrong.  
Still, this approach to empire was the one dominant in eighteenth-century 
Britain and it resonated in the contemporary texts on Greek history. The historians 
offered imperial lessons that taught the reader to refrain from desiring extensive 
territory and fighting any avoidable battle, even if it might bring wealth, glory and 
land in return. Commendations of moderate strategies of empire were contemporary 
commonplaces, as Anthony Pagden emphasises. “Expansion, ungovernable once it 
had begun” was believed to be “an obvious threat to the stability and continued 
prosperity of the metropolis.”8 From the 1780s on, when the British imperial design 
was more about India and the British conception of empire was irreversibly 
territorialized, attaining the optimum size of expansion gained an even greater 
importance.9     
The motherland, it was argued, should not pursue aggressive and 
authoritarian policies that would nurture hostile feelings in the colonies and 
expansion could not be secured without strict policies of this sort.  As a viable 
alternative to arms, the bond connecting the motherland to its colonies was presented 
as the bond of mutual benefit and well-being. The relationship between the centre 
and the periphery ought to be profitable for both sides. The decision whether the 
outcome was successful and desirable was to be based on the degree of politeness, 
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refinement and hence civilisation transferred to the colonies. In achieving this goal, 
the extent of territory was believed to be significant. The historians assessed the 
imperial design of Macedonia from this perspective and this understanding 
determined the features of the Macedonian empire that were presented to the reader 
of ancient Greek history as worthy of appreciation or the reverse.        
The eighteenth-century literature on Macedonia has not yet been exhausted 
by scholars. Various books are left out of the analyses on the grounds that they do 
not bear the name ‘Macedonia’ in their titles. In his ‘Alexander the Great and the 
Enlightenment,’ Pierre Briant, for example, stresses that William Roberts’ Historical 
Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge Which the Ancient Had of India (1788) has 
not been included in the works on Alexander, “not even by allusion in a 
historiographic survey.”10 Yet, Historical Disquisition is by no means alone in the 
list of neglected sources in completing the knowledge of contemporary views of 
Macedonia. Our texts of Greek history too have not received the attention that they 
deserve within the same context. Furthermore, in eighteenth-century studies the way 
that Macedonia was treated by the period has always been considered of secondary 
importance, as the focus has remained on Sparta and Athens. This chapter aims to 
contribute to the completion of the history of the historiography of Macedonia and to 
incorporate the understandings of the Macedonian empire into the eighteenth-century 
studies of empire.   
When compared to the Spartan and Athenian empires, the Macedonian 
empire, since it was the most extensive, was more specifically treated from an 
imperial perspective. With this territorial extent, in the ancient Greek histories, 
Macedonia appeared as a Greek equivalent of Rome. Gast even acknowledged the 
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grandeur of the later Macedonians by using words associated with the Romans, for 
example, the “Lords of the World” alongside with their usual title “masters of 
Greece.”11 The Macedonian empire encompassed “Asia up to the Indus river in the 
east and the borders of Arabia in the south, in Africa also Egypt and part of Libya 
(the Cyrenaica) and most of mainland Greece and the Aegean islands.” 12  The 
impressive size of this empire of course did not go unnoticed by our historians. 
Leland observed that it was comprised of more than a hundred different peoples who 
were initially granted the liberty to keep the legislation and administration of their 
own.13 Relying on that, Leland also argued that Macedonia was so founded on “the 
principles of equity, justice and moderation, in the prince and valour, and national 
loyalty in the people, as to promise happiness and stability.”14 This view, however, 
was not typical of how the Macedonian empire was perceived by the British 
historians. As a matter of fact, Leland stood alone in assessing the Macedonians as a 
people “who have ever appeared highly worthy of the attention of all ages.”15 After 
all, his main motive was to write a history of Macedonia, which was to oppose the 
unfavorable treatment it and its king, Philip, had received in the histories of ancient 
Greece.16          
The perceptions of Macedonian empire displayed in the texts which are the 
concern of this study do not demonstrate a single uniform approach, sympathetic or 
not. Instead, there were certain periods in Macedonian history which commonly 
received either the approval or the criticism of the British historians. The early 
phases and the reign of Philip, for reasons explained below, were regarded as 
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belonging to the history of a state disapproved of, and likely to grow into an empire 
disapproved of. The reign of Alexander, on the other hand, was believed to set the 
ideal imperial pattern. Under the influence of the Enlightenment, as Briant argues, 
“[a] conqueror” could then “only be ranked among the heroes of history if the war 
that he conducts spreads civilization.”17 Alexander was seen as that sort of conqueror. 
Of course, he was not exempt from negative comments either. The final state of his 
empire, overstretched and depopulated, according to the historians, ceased to 
facilitate “the prosperity of Greece.” 18  In this respect, the early Macedonian 
government, Philip’s empire and the late Alexandrian empire were understood in a 
similar light.  
The historians, employing the same criteria by which they assessed the 
Spartan and the Athenian empires, presented the early Macedonian government as 
rude, pointing its lack of a navy; Philip’s empire as authoritarian, deprived of the 
civilising touch of a proper and complete system of legislation; and finally the late 
Alexandrian empire as overwhelming and unmanageable because of its broad extent. 
As to the characteristics of the desirable kind of empire, that of Alexander at its 
zenith represented the success attained by a superior naval power. Also, in terms of 
relations with the colonies, this empire wisely established the bond of mutual benefit 
and well-being. Thus, the concerns of the historians voiced in their scrutiny of 
Macedonia as unwise imperial practices overlap with those that they highlighted in 
their analyses of Sparta and Athens. The same was true for their remarks about the 
desirable features of an empire. What they found commendable in the Athenian and 
Spartan experience of empire they looked for in the Macedonian empire. Again, 
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these apprehensions and recommendations about empire are represented, in the 
contemporary political pamphlets. 
5.2 The Imperial Activities of Early Macedonia  
 
In the eyes of the British historians, early Macedonia was not a focus of 
interest, as it had not expressly incorporated itself into the Greek confederacy of 
states. To Goldsmith, whose scorn was clearly reflected in his works, the 
Macedonians, prior to the reign of Philip, were a “semi-barbarous” people, who were 
deprived of the liberty of contemporary Greeks. Also, since it was not one of the 
sovereign states of Greece and did not possess “politeness,” a significant phrase in 
eighteenth-century discussions of civilization representing “a logical consequence of 
commerce,”19 this Macedonia could not be treated as Sparta and Athens were and 
hence identified with Britain. What is more, early Macedonia lacked a powerful navy 
and the refining effects of a naval culture. Regarding this lack of naval competency 
in its early phases –Macedonia clearly fell short of the Athenian standards- Gast 
observed that the Macedonian state had not shown the promise that “the greatest 
empire of Asia” was “to receive its overthrow” at its hands.20 The reason why 
Macedonia failed to develop crucial maritime skills was its obstinacy and pride, 
which also prevented its integration into the Greek league of states. It was for long 
established in the eighteenth century that maritime skills brought not only military 
superiority on the seas but also advantages in political economy in terms of free 
circulation of goods.21  
Cooperation in areas such as naval and military activities and commerce, if it 
had existed, would have bestowed on both Greeks and Macedonians considerable 
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benefits. Accepting eighteenth-century theories of civilisation and progress that laid 
particular emphasis on the extension of commercial cooperation as the motor of 
progress, the historians of ancient Greece linked the backwardness of Macedonia to 
its ignorance of the merits of such cooperation. Isolation inevitably resulted in 
making the Macedonians a “low and indigent”22 people, who did not possess the 
necessary means to save them from “penury at home.”23 Still, their poverty and 
simplicity was counted by the British historians as a virtue. The Macedonians so 
excelled at the use of arms that their virtuous manners were overshadowed by their 
hardy warlike character. For all these reasons, until its virtues guided it to greatness, 
Macedonia remained among the Greek states an inconsiderable force which, 
furthermore, was not always regarded as being as Greek as the rest. All in all, in 
Potter’s words, until the emergence of “this design,” which “was projected and 
begun by Philip but achieved and perfected by his son, Alexander the Great”24 
Macedonia did not attract much attention from the historians and when it did, it 
usually received negative comment.  
Last but not least, this non-naval, non-cooperative and non-Greek state had a 
very harmful practice with reference to empire, pointed out by Goldsmith. What 
rendered the early Macedonians unsuitable for imitation was their attitude towards 
conquered native populations. They acquired “the habits of the natives,” but failed to 
earn their respect in return.25 Once again the degree of the interaction with the 
conquered people appeared to be a problem for the conquerors. In the course of the 
eighteenth century, as especially the second British empire was “becoming more 
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self-consciously multiethnic multidenominational and cosmopolitan,”26 the British 
were preoccupied with the prospects of handling interracial and interreligious 
relations.  On this account, it was natural that the historians dig into the Greek history 
to search for answers to this question as well. The outcome of this probe was that in 
the early phases of its territorial growth, although they should have distanced 
themselves, Macedonians intermingled with the natives of the lands that they 
acquired. The colonies, particularly those of the second empire, came to be in 
eighteenth-century Britain, as Wilson contends, “an important test case for the 
examination and verification of national character,”27 through the comparison of the 
level of civilization in the motherland and in the colonies. This was the means of 
underlining the differences and confirming the superiority of Britishness. Also, the 
colonies were supposed to be the places in which the virtue acquired at home should 
be spread, not foreign vices acquired.28 The Macedonian example which reversed 
this practice of colonization and imported the traditions of the natives to the 
motherland, was not to be imitated.     
In the first phase of the Macedonian history, Caranus, the first known king of 
Macedonia, attracted considerable attention, particularly from Goldsmith and Leland. 
The first and foremost motive of this focus was to assess more exactly the degree of 
‘Greekness’ of the Macedonians. Both Goldsmith and Leland, repeating the words of 
Vellius, underlined that Caranus was an Argive by birth and said to be “the sixteenth 
in descent from Hercules.” 29  Nonetheless they remained unable to conclude 
definitely on that point. Whether Macedonians were Greeks seems always to have 
been a flammable topic. As Robin L. Fox argues, the Macedonian kings “claimed to 
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be of Greek descent” but Greeks seemed not to be “convinced by these northerners’ 
insistence.” When Philip conquered the Greek states, the claim to Greekness gained 
particular importance. Nevertheless, in European Greece “only to flatterers was 
Philip anything better than a foreign outsider”30 and Macedonia another Greek state.   
The matter of Greekness of Macedonians remained less than settled 
throughout the eighteenth century. Still for our historians, because it was believed to 
cast light on another equally important issue, the reign of Caranus did not cease to be 
a topic worthy of attention, as it offered one minor imperial lesson to the reader. 
According to Leland, a close look at the rule of Caranus would demonstrate what the 
real virtue was in a monarch who nourished imperial hopes. The maxim to be 
deduced here concerned the fair treatment of the vanquished. Very wisely, Caranus 
aimed to obtain the respect and admiration of the neighbouring states rather than 
suppress or humiliate them at the time of their defeat. Unfortunately, as Leland went 
on, this honourable principle was practised by neither Philip nor Alexander.31 How, 
then, were the imperial policies of Philip and Alexander really seen in the eyes of the 
British historians? 
                                                                
5.3 The Imperial Design of Philip 
 
 
Although the extraordinary might and greatness of Philip was acknowledged 
by all historians, Leland was the most generous to him. Having admitted that Philip 
should be viewed as “one of the greatest masters of intrigue in his or any other 
age;”32 that “his ambition was vast;” and he was adept in making “the passions, 
interests and inclinations of every particular the instruments of his designs,”33 Leland 
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saluted Philip as “an artful, penetrating and sagacious prince,”34  who was “the 
founder of the Macedonian greatness.”35 Nevertheless, Leland was an exception 
among the historians in this.36 For the rest, Philip was a figure approached with much 
reserve. The undeniable “centrality of the army”37 in Philip’s government must be 
regarded as the reason behind the historians’ dislike.    
According to Goldsmith, Philip was “the most dangerous enemy of 
Greece,”38 and that was exactly how the British reader should see him – the destroyer 
of the peace among the Greek states, which was grounded in the balance of power. 
Gillies argued that Philip was a monarch determined to acquire an absolutist power 
over his subjects throughout his empire by personally administering everything from 
religious to military affairs. Gillies conceded that Philip’s imperial scheme did not 
parallel “the absolute dominion of many European monarchs” of the eighteenth 
century. However, what the historian here gave credit to was not the Macedonian 
empire founded and governed by Philip but the Macedonian state into which Philip 
was born. Macedonia in Philip’s childhood, despite its backwardness in comparison 
with the Greek states, could not be compared with the absolutist and universalistic 
empires of modern Europe.39 Philip’s empire on the other hand clearly did tend in 
this direction.  
The Wars of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) and the Austrian 
Succession (1740-1748), and of course the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), were the 
times in the eighteenth century when the perennial British fear of absolutist and 
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universal monarchies was replaced on the top of their concerns. 40  Against this 
background, the contemporary historians examined ancient Greece with the hope of 
reaching a code of behavior for the absolutist and authoritarian governments too and 
in this context focused on Philip’s Macedonia, though without being able to decide 
whether it was absolutist. Still, absolutist or not, Philip’s ambition of imposing his 
will alone on Macedonia made him too authoritarian in the eyes of the British 
historians. Also, due to his authoritarian character, he concentrated only on how he 
ought to rule in his lifetime and thus failed to establish a regime to be adapted and 
developed by future rulers of Macedonia.  
As we have seen in the examples of Lycurgos and Solon, a complete code of 
legislation was the indicator of proper governance and much appreciated by the 
minds preoccupied with the ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment, which presented the 
business of governing as a science. Despotism then, under the influence of 
Montesquieu’s ideas, was believed to be a regime of few “but strictly administered” 
laws. A voluminous legal code, on the other hand, suggested the ideal.   The essence 
of the legislation varied from one lawmaker to another; but what mattered was 
existence of such extensive code, which legitimized government. In Britain, 
particularly from the mid-eighteenth century on, the practice of law-making 
accelerated and this was welcomed by the intellectual milieu as the sign of the 
country’s advanced politics.41  
Further, the large quantity of laws signified a non-despotic rule not only at 
home but throughout the empire also. The law of the metropolis was at the same time 
the legislation to be implemented in the colonies. Therefore, its completeness and 
character determined the nature and the scope of the imperial policy. Hence, as 
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Thomas Pownall emphasized, the nucleus of the colonial administration was “the 
administration at home.” 42  And in the case of Britain, as Armitage points out, 
“English law was the Law of the Empire.”43 Hardly surprisingly, the extension of 
these discussions on the desired sort of legislation which would serve the cause of 
empire best, made its way into the Greek histories. Macedonia, in this sense, was not 
presented as a role model. Philip, unlike Lycurgos and Solon, did not fix the rules of 
his administration in a code of law, through which the colonies were to be governed. 
On this account, Philip’s imperial activity was not presented as a case study worthy 
of much close scrutiny.                  
It was not Philip, but those he conquered, who merited attention, particularly 
the Athenians. The historians of Greece held that the success of Philip and the 
imperial rise of Macedonia owed much to the political factions, military relaxation 
and degeneration that prevailed in the rest of Greece. How Philip attained the 
leadership of the Greek league of states and what sort of expansionist policies he 
pursued all remained secondary when compared to the emphasis on the claim that 
Philip could have never succeeded, if only the Greek states had preserved their 
integrity and coherence in the name of maintaining the balance of power. As Gast 
asserted, Greece “was weak only from disunion.”44 Therefore, the more instructive 
aspect of Philip’s reign was the degraded condition of the Greek states, and the 
maxim to be highlighted here was that whenever states were too much entangled 
with domestic disputes, meaningless jealousies and groundless hostilities, another 
state would always rise to dominate them and more importantly overturn the existing 
delicate peace. 
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Particularly in the first half of the eighteenth century, the Jacobite threat cast 
shadow over British political life. The period from the Revolution to the Seven Years 
War saw three domestic wars, and innumerable plots and disturbances. The political 
nation was always deeply and profoundly divided and most of the population was 
probably more inclined to the old dynasty than the ruling one. These riots kept the 
“question of succession”45 always warm and reminded the British that the disunion 
of that country was not a weak possibility. For that reason, the historians laid 
particular emphasis on what happened to Greece once it sunk into the games of 
treason and petty conspiracy. The disintegration of Greece resulted in Greece falling 
into the hands of Philip. Such lesson was hoped to teach the British to be prudent and 
avoid falling, through Jacobitism, into the hands of Louis of France. The fear of 
disunion coexisted with the fear of decline.           
The fear of decline was a recurrent theme in eighteenth-century texts about 
religion, morality, economics, commerce and politics. The assessment of the rise of 
Macedonia in ancient Greek history texts should be evaluated with this mind. Once 
the state in question declined, another, generally a rival state, rose. Within this 
framework, Macedonia was depicted as an outsider to the Greek world which 
benefited from the unfortunate but preventable fall of Sparta and Athens and took up 
arms “to decide the cause of liberty and the empire of Greece.”46 No parallels were 
drawn between Philip’s Macedonia and eighteenth-century Britain. On the contrary, 
the aggressive and expanding Macedonian empire ruled by Philip, and its impact on 
ancient Greece, were pinpointed as a danger very likely to recur in modern Europe, 
given the Spanish and above all French attempts at dominating the continent. 
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In unfolding the rise of Macedonia, the British historians adopted an Athenian 
perspective, as they concentrated on the factors that led to “the loss of dominion.”47 
Almost invariably they accused the Athenians of neglect, effeminacy and 
degeneration, as they failed to stop the march of the Macedonians when they could 
have. Gast, for example, asserted that  
[i]n the midst of a progress to empire which ought to have alarmed the 
Athenians, this inconsiderate people continued blind to the dangers that 
threatened them, nor could persuade themselves, that a king of Macedonia 
was capable of aspiring to the conquest of Greece.48                              
 
Without trying to conceal the angry tone in his assessment, Gast added that the 
Athenians, “instead of being animated with a generous zeal for the public 
happiness” 49  after all these glorious victories, indulged themselves in “ruinous 
dissipations,” and only watched the growth of the Macedonian empire as one of “the 
natural calamities which a people might expect” under such degrading 
circumstances.50 Philip crouched down “with pleasure” to see “Grecians doing his 
work.”51 Goldsmith shared this attitude and emphasized that Macedonia established 
its dominance in ancient Greece easily in the absence of the “natural balance” which 
alone could have challenged it. Such a balance should be understood as “a union 
between Athens and Sparta.”52 Ferguson, in his analysis of the decline of states 
asserted that the rise of a rival power “from abroad” could happen anytime “before 
[the state] gave any signs of internal decay, even in the midst of prosperity, and in 
the period of their greatest ardour for national objects” and Athens, “in the height of 
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her ambition and of her glory” and “in striving to extend her maritime power beyond 
the Grecian seas,” 53 did not fully grasp the Macedonian threat.    
Thus, Philip’s Macedonia was a hostile power threatening not only the union 
among the Greek states but also the Athenian supremacy. In this episode of the 
Greek history too, Athens was identified with Britain. The British reader was to be 
instructed about what happened, when a state very similar to Britain let another in the 
same region acquire the power to dominate. The fate of the Athenians under 
Demosthenes taught this important lesson. Even Leland joined his colleagues in 
accentuating the Greek inadequacy as the key factor in Philip’s success: “their own 
unreasonable ambition encouraged, enabled and taught their common enemy the 
means to gain an influence in Greece.”54 Although he offered a comprehensive 
analysis of Philip’s imperial policies and the elements of his imperial power, in the 
end, his conclusion too was that it was the Greek “spirit of discord and contention for 
pre-eminence which were the great basis on which Philip founded his designs.”55  
There is no doubt that besides the Greek disintegration and negligence there 
were other points, though cited secondarily by the British historians, which brought 
Philip imperial success. On these issues too, Leland’s account of Philip included 
more complete comments and for that reason will be referred to here more frequently 
than other historians’ accounts. According to Leland, Philip owed his imperial 
greatness chiefly to “his own abilities alone.” Unlike Pericles or his own son 
Alexander, he was not an emperor born into an empire but a monarch deprived of 
“the advantages of an illustrious country,” “the opulence and force of splendid and 
extensive dominions” and “the achievements of a long train of renowned ancestry.”56 
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Thus, Philip’s gradual accession to greatness could only be understood by means of 
tracking down numerous inconsiderable events, which eventually turned out to be 
causes of “one of the greatest revolutions of power which the annals of the heathen 
world afford.” Therefore, despite the attempts, through a scrutiny of Philip’s reign 
one could not arrive at clear guide to direct empire building. What happened then in 
terms of imperial venture was peculiar to Macedonia and the replication of similar 
circumstances at the times of another monarch seemed not to be likely. A ruler might 
possess identical “patient resolution” to Philip, who unceasingly sought “to 
strengthen and to aggrandise his kingdom to incorporate with the illustrious nation of 
Greece to subdue that nation and to place himself at the head of its united powers.”57 
Nevertheless, most probably the miraculous interplay of external factors would not 
recur.  
Yet Leland put forward one maxim to be universally adopted, which was the 
importance of meticulously and cleverly uniting the new acquisitions to the 
motherland.58 Implementing the best method of connecting the motherland to the 
colonies and confederate states was too delicate an issue to be left to take its own 
course. Philip had first appointed himself as leader and gained, not wholehearted, but 
nonetheless, the legal consent of the Greeks. Then he, as the head of the Greeks, 
levied taxes to build concrete bonds between his kingdom and new territorial 
acquisitions. Hence, taxation was offered as the explicit articulation of the 
motherland-colony relationship and recommended. Despite such arguments in favor 
of fully taxing the colonies, undoubtedly referring to America, the British 
government, particularly during the early Hanoverian period, “showed little interest” 
in this topic. With the exception of occasional attempts at imposing new taxes, 
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British statesmen who failed to see taxation as a crucial instrument to glue the 
colonies to motherland and secure their subordination, let the thirteen colonies grow 
apart from the metropolis. When Parliament finally decided to “make threatening 
noises” as an imperial legislature keen to levy taxes on the colonies, it was too late. 59  
Although Leland’s history included the most thorough account of Philip’s 
imperial policies published in eighteenth-century Britain, other British historians 
made their own remarks on the same topic. According to Stanyan, the British reader 
needed to pay much attention to the basis on which the Macedonian empire was 
founded. Philip successfully acquired an empire as a result of his attempts at 
destroying the spirit of liberty among the Athenians, Spartans, Thebans and other 
non-Eastern peoples of his empire. He let them enjoy a merely slight taste of freedom, 
enough to convince them that they were virtually free, and hence they remained 
pliant. Maintaining this fragile balance throughout the Macedonian empire, Philip 
was able to exult in the rusting of the renowned Greek spirit of freedom.60 On the 
whole, to Stanyan, a multinational empire could have lasted only if the components 
of the empire had been governed by a strict regime disguised as a liberal one. 
Obviously, although it was the ideal situation, such a delicate balance was not easy to 
establish. The governance of a territorially large and heterogeneously populated 
empire would have more likely ended up simply authoritarian. The ideal in real terms, 
therefore, seemed to be to avoid seeking what Philip had desired.  
Gast also elaborated on the authoritarian character of Philip’s imperial 
policies. The continuous military achievements of the Macedon, as his argument 
went, while supporting “the courage and discipline” of his soldiers on one hand, cast 
a shadow over the subjects of his empire on the other and deterred them from 
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revolting. 61  It should be noted here that Gast, having adopted an Athenian 
perspective, did not praise this military power of Macedonia under Philip. As 
mentioned above, he held that the best means of both acquiring and preserving an 
empire were the “gentler arts of uprightness and clemency.” Too ambitious an 
imperial design, as Macedonia’s was, could only be held together by arms. Such was 
the rule with which the British intended to comply in their first empire. However, 
given their homogeneous and administratively manageable nature, it was easy to be 
non-authoritarian while governing the thirteen colonies. Following their loss, all 
imperial interest was concentrated on the second empire and hence the British crown 
was challenged by the necessity of ruling a vast heterogeneous entity, such Philip 
had acquired. Thus after 1783, as David Armitage holds, one witnesses “the 
increasing prominence of the army as the instrument of empire.” Therefore, the 
second empire emerged as an empire redefined and, being “more self-consciously 
multiethnic, multidenominational and cosmopolitan,” it could not escape from 
becoming “more paternalist and authoritarian.”62 In this aspect, the historians were 
apt to suggest that extensive and racially mixed empires required authoritarian rule; 
but the politicians would be wrong to desire an empire of this sort.             
On the whole, being found too authoritarian and the enemy of the Greek spirit 
of liberty, Philip’s imperial policies were not presented by the historians as 
commendable. The rare appreciative remarks about Philip mainly came from Leland. 
His willingness to find straightforward positive guidance in Philip’s conduct, 
mentioned above, was not often found. It was in Goldsmith, the author of the most 
hostile account of Philip. In Goldsmith’s view, one of the reasons why Philip 
succeeded in acquiring his empire, whether authoritarian or not, was his care “not to 
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engage in a war by which he could not reap the least benefit.”63 In view of his vast 
ambition, this was definitely something to be acknowledged by the historians in his 
favor. Of course, such comment could at the same time be interpreted as Goldsmith’s 
answer to the eighteenth-century debate about Britain’s involvement in continental 
warfare. Coming from the Tory tradition, Goldsmith frequently demonstrated the 
Tory “horror of militarism.”64  
One could thus squeeze into a paragraph the insights into the question of 
empire that tended to depict Philip in a favourable light. The disapproval of Philip, 
on the other hand, was voluminous. It was Alexander’s empire rather than that of 
Philip that was seen as worthy of attention and appreciation in the Greek history texts. 
Leland’s claim that 
[i]f he was unjust, he was like Caesar, unjust for the sake of empire. If he 
gloried in the success acquired by his virtues, or his intellectual 
accomplishments, rather than in that which the force of arms could gain, the 
reason, which he himself assigned, points out his true principle,65                            
 
failed to create an atmosphere of sympathy for Philip’s authoritarianism. 
 
5.4 The Alexandrian Empire 
 
In the way the Alexandrian era was recounted, what strikes the reader most is 
that Alexander, unlike Philip, was treated as a Greek, not a Macedonian, and his 
empire truly Greek: the “crown” of “the pyramid of Grecian glory”66 or more simply, 
“the empire of the Greeks.”67 According to Gillies, he not only put an end to the 
humiliation of the Greeks, but “undertook and accomplished the most extraordinary 
enterprises in the history of the world.”68 Likewise, Goldsmith in his generous praise 
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of Alexander, argued that under him ancient Greece reached a state of perfection “by 
the arts of refinement, growing more than a match for the rest of the world united, 
and leaving mankind an example of the superiority of intellect over brutal force.”69 If 
Goldsmith was extreme in disapproval of Philip, he was equally the most enthusiastic 
in praising Alexander. His only reservation about him was the Macedonian king’s 
attachment to religion. Given Goldsmith’s aversion to mixing religion and political 
affairs, unlike Gillies and Gast, this stance is hardly surprising.70  
Although the first British empire was overtly Protestant, this aspect was 
emphasized mostly with the purpose of differentiating the British from the Spanish 
and French.71 Otherwise religion did not occupy a predominant place in the imperial 
discourse with respect to the American colonies and, it may be said, remained rather 
ineffective in the formation of imperial politics as well as in the cause of the imperial 
crisis. Nevertheless, this depiction of the first British empire, though a certain 
element of truth, could be deceptive, for J. C. D. Clark reminds us that alongside the 
disagreement over taxation and representation, the loss of the thirteen colonies could 
equally be explained through the contemporary religious tendencies. When the 
Church at home began to seek more pre-eminence in the colonies from the 1760s, the 
colonial Dissenters came to see this move as an instrument of pressure aiming at 
curtailing the liberties that they immensely treasured.72 In this way, Goldsmith’s 
commendation of keeping religion out of imperial politics was tested and confirmed 
as a valid prescription. The question of religion was to play an important role in the 
second British empire subsequent to the Evangelical Revival and the missionary raid 
on India. It should here, however, be stressed that the British government together 
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with the directors of the East India Company mounted guard over their delicate 
supremacy with utmost care and resisted forcefully to the missionary attempts at 
adorning the imperial discourse with religious messages.                  
All our historians sought to indicate the superiority and glory of Alexander’s 
empire. In their works, the episodes dedicated to Alexander aimed to demonstrate 
clearly how the Macedonian empire, with its regrettable character became the ideal 
of empire. Alexander’s reign was viewed from that perspective. In terms of imperial 
venture, he completed what the Athenians had started. Thus, treatment of Alexander 
generated numerous imperial maxims, set forth by the British historians for their 
compatriots. 
At the outset, Alexander embraced the rule of ‘common enemy’ by triggering 
the Greeks’ “ancient hatred of Persians, their perpetual and irreconcilable enemies, 
whose destruction they had more than once sworn.”73 The Persian hatred was the 
only common ground on which the states of the Greek league and Macedonia could 
have stood together and Alexander made good use of this legacy of his father. It was 
Philip who first pursued this policy of making the common enemy of the confederate 
states of the empire his own.74 The final pacification of Persia drew the Greeks and 
the Macedonians closer and enabled the latter to subdue the former. According to 
Gast, the overthrow of the Persian empire by the hands of the Macedonian king was 
an event destined to happen.75            
If Goldsmith disliked Philip’s authoritarian policies of empire, Alexander, in 
this respect, stood as the antithesis of everything Philip represented. He “applied 
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himself chiefly to morality which is properly the science of kings” and sought to 
acquire “the knowledge of mankind and of their duties.” 76  Evidently, this 
characteristic of Alexander rendered his empire inherently different from that of his 
father. Instead of pursuing conquests that would have drained the motherland of its 
economic and military resources, he fixed his eyes on the Indian subcontinent whose 
inhabitants were rich and unwarlike. As he proceeded in India “with the rapidity 
rather of a traveller than a conqueror,”77 this expedition appeared as the tangible 
result of Alexander’s ingenious imperial policies, now unveiled by Goldsmith for the 
imitation of contemporary and future kings. 
Philip represented the military aggression of empire which was increasingly 
frowned upon, or at least treated with reserve among eighteenth-century Britons 
reflecting on empire. Alexander was shaped to the image of the commended and 
non-aggressive ruler. Thus, Leland explained the greatness of Alexander’s empire by 
means of his virtue and the intelligence of his actions, rather than the force of his 
arms,78 and in this way his empire was dissociated from that of his father as well as 
from the Spanish and French empires. As a considerable part of Alexander’s reign 
remained out of the scope of Leland’s history, his assessment fell short of the 
comprehensiveness of those by others such as Gillies and Gast. Gillies grounded his 
arguments about Alexander’s governance on the assertion that Alexander had never 
been a monarch driven by “the madness of ambition.” He ruled only by “just views 
of policy” and consequently brought wealth and welfare wherever he marched.79 In 
every state he acquired, by the implementation of his just and moral policies -unlike 
those of his predecessors, who preferred simply to oppress- he “encouraged useful 
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industry and alleviated public burdens.” During his reign, the periphery developed 
along with Macedonia through cooperation for their mutual benefit. Additionally, as 
one of his most distinctive policies of empire, he allowed the subjugated states to 
retain their original governments and rights to a certain degree, though at the same 
time keeping a very close eye on their dealings, both domestic and foreign, in order 
to be able immediately to interfere when necessary. In so doing, Alexander departed 
from Aristotle’s teaching and, uniquely in antiquity, maintained an almost impossible 
balance among states of drastically varying character by considering “the barbarians, 
not as slaves, but as subjects, the Greeks, not as subjects but allies” and for that 
reason only, if not for the others, according to Gillies, Alexander’s empire achieved a 
state of perfection which had been experienced by neither “the despotism of Persia” 
nor “the domineering ambition of Athens and Sparta.”80  
Alexander’s moral conduct of imperial affairs thus singled him out as an ideal 
ruler in the eighteenth-century sense of the word. What the Scottish Enlightenment 
thinkers were preoccupied with in terms of “morality and human moral 
responsiveness,”81 Alexander seemed to have discovered, two millennia earlier, and 
accordingly created an imperial system. Thus, the Athenian empire, Gillies held, 
which could have been evaluated in its own historical context as a superior, non-
militaristic, well cohering entity, when compared with that of Alexander, was seen to 
be favoured did not achieve the perfection and emulation of the Macedonian empire 
under Alexander. As one of the attributes of moral government, the establishment of 
the rule of mutual benefit, associated with commercial activity. Once incorporated to 
the imperial governance could switch the category of an empire from disapproved to 
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commended. Thus, Alexander was reflected as “an ideal form of the Enlightenment’s 
Philosopher King.”82   
Gast, in arguments very similar to those of Gillies, laid great emphasis on 
Alexander’s scheme of governing a significant variety of states through a very 
delicate balance which gave them a considerable degree of liberty. On account of the 
successful maintenance of this balance, the Greeks and Persians peacefully coexisted 
under one common rule.83 Another sign of Alexander’s imperial genius, Gast thought, 
was his aspiration to acquire superior naval power, which the Macedonian empire 
originally lacked. Having rightly judged that a land empire could neither sustain 
constant growth nor secure new conquests without the assistance of an exceptionally 
sturdy navy, and for “the prize of empire,” Alexander annexed Syria, Phoenicia and 
the islands to Macedonia and made their navies Macedonian.84 This action and the 
acceleration in the expansion of his empire afterwards proved to Gast once again that 
in the imperial ventures naval excellence was the decisive factor in endowing a 
nation with success, glory and greatness.                                       
Alexander had never been simply another conqueror in history. He was 
understood as a singular, innovative ruler who considered the business of governing 
seriously as a science. In order to secure territorial acquisitions, he methodically 
acquired naval power, granted a certain degree of liberty to the colonies and cared 
much for their prosperity. Thus, he built and enhanced a tight link between the centre 
and periphery that permitted both parties to benefit. Under Alexander’s rule, the 
states which composed the Macedonian empire now without apprehension of a 
foreign threat, happily and peacefully prospered. Nevertheless, Alexander committed 
an error that was fatal to his empire. As Gast put it, Alexander, “like all founders of a 
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new empire,” had indulged himself in “the fond idea that this vast fabric of power, 
which he was labouring to establish would last for ages.”85 But earthly empires were 
not meant to last forever, especially those which had violated the first maxim of 
empire –never overstretch the boundaries. 
All historians agreed that Alexander in the end exceeded the optimum limits, 
previously foreseen by Philip. As Gast put it, Alexander’s ambition, which brought 
Macedonia greatness in the early phases of his reign, brought its ruin in later days: 
And had Alexander completed the plan and no more which his father seems 
to have traced out, had he contented himself with driving the Persians out of 
the lower Asia and freeing the Macedonians on that side form all future 
dread of invasion had he taken care to confirm and render permanent that 
sovereignty over the Greek commonwealths which their fears or their 
affections had yielded to him, he probably had rendered Macedon 
flourishing and powerful.  
 
Instead, having failed to tame his ambition, he exhausted his country’s resources “in 
making conquests, not only useless but pernicious to her.” 86  Thus, as Gast’s 
argument continued, Alexandrian rule was in effect not to be viewed as “the area of 
glory,” which blessed the Macedonians with “internal happiness and prosperity.” 
Eventually, because the size of the imperial territory made it unmanageable, the 
peoples of the empire were stripped of their previous prosperity, welfare and comfort 
and thus denied the right of good government. Such decline was inevitable in an 
empire whose sovereign was absent from the imperial seat for “a season of life,” 
travelling from the western to the eastern borders.87       
Although Alexander, as the British historians believed, had built the most 
commendable empire of the ancient world, he was blinded by his ambition and did 
not know when to stop the process of conquest and expansion. A ruler who desired 
imperial might and glory needed to be capable of repressing his instinct for 
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expansion just for the sake of expansion. The historians laid particular emphasis on 
the importance of the well-being of the governed. No conquest that would put it in 
jeopardy was to be pursued. In speaking of the post-Alexandrian era of the 
Macedonian empire, this belief came to the fore to generate further lessons.   
The fall of the Macedonian empire, just as its rise, would also “hold forth,”88 
according to Leland, maxims of empire. Once the boundaries were overstretched 
beyond the manageable in terms of distance, finances and military capacity, it was 
inevitable that, soon, domestic contentions would erupt and the states incorporated in 
the empire would compete for dominance and pre-eminence. The monarch who built 
such a vast entity may himself have succeeded in keeping it solidly together in his 
lifetime, but he was unlikely to leave a legacy of successful imperial governance. 
Alexander was the quintessential example of such a monarch, because, as Gillies 
stressed, during his reign “[t]he principles of royal succession were never accurately 
ascertained in Macedon.”89 When, with the hope of securing the endurance of his 
empire, Alexander said on his deathbed that he was leaving the Macedonian empire 
“to the most worthy,” he neither assigned an heir to his imperial throne nor decided 
on an imperial code to be subsequently observed. On this account, in Goldsmith’s 
words, “so few periods of history were ever left in greater darkness, doubt and 
confusion”90 by misgovernment than the post-Alexandrian era of Greek history.    
 
5.5 Persia  
 
In comparison with Athens and Sparta, Macedonia and Persia both 
represented the lesser empires of ancient Greece which were not believed to offer a 
true pattern of imperial greatness. On the contrary, the imperial experience of 
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Macedonia and Persia encompassed everything that the eighteenth-century British 
political writers approached with reserve in their quest for normative rules of empire. 
These empires overextended their territories beyond the manageable, fought their 
battles imprudently and failed to create a complete legislative code even for the 
administration of the metropolis, let alone the colonies. Nevertheless, when the 
references to Athens and Sparta were put aside and Macedonia and Persia alone were 
assessed, the British historians clearly treated Macedonia in a positive light and 
considered it less unacceptable than Persia. Macedonia may have been the black 
sheep of the Greek family; but Persia was a complete stranger.  
First of all, Persia was despotic and hence from the root, different from the 
city-states of ancient Greece. Of course, this emphasis on the despotism of Persia 
was not peculiar to the eighteenth-century British historians. The ancient Greeks 
themselves certainly regarded the Persians as alien and drew a line between Asia and 
Europe, distinguishing the inhabitants of the former from those of the latter.91 Asia 
was depicted as having a much less favourable geography than Europe and its 
inhabitants depicted as less refined and more warlike. Furthermore, in this picture the 
Persian government did not resemble in any way those prevailing in Greece. In his 
Politics, Aristotle fervently emphasised that “the peoples of Asia” lived “in 
continuous subjection and slavery” and, unlike the Greeks, would “endure despotic 
rule without distaste.”92 Aristotle’s judgement of the Persians became one of the 
most widely referred to, paraphrased and adopted views. Also, Xenophon’s Persian 
Expedition associated the Persian territories with corruption and luxury. 93  
Throughout the centuries, a view of the Persians, derived from Greek dealings with 
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Persians from 545 to 330 BC, was repeated in works on Greece. Thus was drawn a 
border between east and west, Greeks and Persians.  
The Greek encounter with the Persians helped to generate a sense of self-
identity among ancient Greeks, creating an awareness of sharing one common 
language, geography and political culture. The Greeks, particularly the Athenians, 
developed their self-identity in thinking about the Persians, who were what they were 
not. Persia was a civilisation alien to their own, because, in the first place, the ruler 
of the state was not elected, never accountable to his people and could levy any sort 
of taxation without the obligation of legally justifying it. Then again, the Persians 
lacked the Greek love of freedom and were corrupted by luxury and effeminacy. For 
Greeks, the Persian Wars was the occasion for them to understand and note these 
differences. 
Of course, the only accounts of the Greek-Persian conflict are those written 
by the triumphant Greeks and since the “victors rewrite history,” they naturally 
reflect the Greek side of the story only. Thus, the perceptions contained in them 
remained extremely influential, creating “a false image still maintained and presented 
in scholarly works.”94 Moreover, as some have asserted, this image came to be 
applied to the civilisations alien to that of Europe in other historical periods. As 
Edward Said put it in his well-known Orientalism, what began as the ancient Greek 
views of the Persians did not remain limited to them or to a specific period of time.95 
From ancient Greek writings the word Persian was extracted to be replaced by the 
name of whichever eastern people was then considered by Europeans as the hostile 
other. The claim that the ancients’ views of Persians served to assist the formation of 
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the later orientalisms has frequently been repeated since its first formulation by Said. 
Paul Cartledge’s below words are one example of the many: 
…the process of ‘othering’ and indeed inventing ‘the barbarian’ as a 
homogenized stereotype was well underway in Greece, in an early version of 
the specific form of derogatory stereotyping known as ‘orientalism.’96  
 
Even if we choose not to side with those who accept Said’s notion of 
orientalism, it must be acknowledged that the views of eighteenth-century British 
historians can be labelled as orientalist, though with acknowledgement of the need 
for commentary and qualification. Their attitude to Persia, ancient and modern, was 
by no means wholly negative. Certain chapters of the Persian history were in fact 
studied with considerable admiration. Still, ancient Persia was mostly presented to 
the reader in an unhidden disapproving tone as the antithesis of the Greek states.  The 
historians aimed to emphasise that Athens and Sparta, and even Macedonia, stood as 
equal components of the solid Greek front and shared a perception of the Persians as 
a threat to civilisation and a source of degeneration. What the Persians stood against 
was not the Athenians, Spartans or Macedonians, but the Greeks as one people 
sharing the same civilisation.  
 
5.6 Ancient Persia in Eighteenth-Century Britain 
 
Interestingly enough, contemporary Persia did not repulse the British as much 
as ancient Persia generally did in the eighteenth century. The Ottoman empire instead 
represented the alien power menacing civilisation. Eighteenth-century Persians, 
despite dwelling in the east under a government very much like that of the Ottomans, 
were neither so alien nor reprobated as the latter. While the Ottoman Empire 
constituted the quintessential example of despotism in the eyes of British literati, 
Persia was hailed as one of the most ancient nations on earth and in many ways 
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commended. Although it was still customary to refer mainly to Pedro Teixeira’s The 
History of Persia of 1610 until the publication of John Malcolm’s The History of 
Persia in 1815, the British gradually took more interest in Persian history, as well as 
in the country’s culture and language throughout the eighteenth century. In his 
translation of Teixeira’s history, John Stevens explained why he had undertaken this 
task in 1715, stressing the point that “Persia, is at this time, and has been for several 
ages, one of the greatest eastern monarchies” and the acquaintance of the English 
reader with it was unfortunately through accounts “no better than fragments.”97  
Stevens’ was one of the earliest examples of the eighteenth-century attempt to 
increase understanding of the Persians and their empire.  
Towards the end of the century, the publication of Persian allegories, either 
merely invented or adapted from Persian classics, from which moral lessons could be 
derived, became fashionable. It is worth noting the content of such writing. In a 
pamphlet entitled The Effects of Tyranny and Disobedience or the History of Persia, 
for instance, the author, who used the pseudonym Lawrence Lovesense, recounted 
the story of a fifteenth-century Persian king “to inspire the minds of youth with ideas 
of real virtue.” Here Persia is depicted as an empire adorned with “excellence, justice 
and virtue,” its kings as “merciful, just and valiant” and the statesmen as wise men 
who made “the welfare of the country their chief study.” 98 Thus, Persia was a source 
of moral instruction. The British were also becoming knowledgeable about a more 
real Persia. After the East India Company made a knowledge of Persian language 
mandatory for British officials and officers serving in India at the turn of the century, 
the British concern with Persian culture was also significantly boosted.   
                                                 
97 John Stevens, The History of Persia (London: Jonas Brown, 1715), unpaginated preface.  
98 Lawrence Lovesense, The Effects of Tyranny and Disobedience or the History of Persia: Calculated 
to Inspire the Minds of Youth with Ideas of Real Virtue (London: R. Bassam, 1790), 64, 5 and 7. 
 248
Eighteenth-century Britain attributed much that was commendable to the 
Persian state, literature and culture, though knowledge of these things was not often 
well-founded. Certainly, of the two powerful eastern states, Persia was pictured as 
the one closer to the West in terms of political administration. It was the Ottoman 
empire to which was ascribed an undeniably despotic character. Hebisci’s words 
suggesting that the Persian government was “not so tyrannical”99 as that of the 
Ottomans echo to a similar general conviction in France at the time. Perhaps 
Europeans were predisposed to take a favourable view of Persia, for the Persian state 
had the capacity to check Ottoman power, which terrorised and repelled Europeans. 
Persia, sometimes having troubled the Ottoman empire on its southeastern border, 
might distract the Ottomans from the northwest. Ogier Ghiselin de Busbeq, the 
ambassador of the Holy Roman Empire to Constantinople in 1554-62, whose letters 
for long remained as one of the most significant accounts of the Ottomans by a 
European and were excessively referred to, even by Mitford in his history,100 asserted 
that it was “only the Persian stands between us and ruin.”101  
In the eighteenth century, especially after the rise of theories of civilisation, 
the Ottoman empire came to represent the quintessential example of despotism in 
Britain. It was the Ottomans, rather than the Persians, who came into possession of 
the negative depiction of the east. Although the fear of Ottoman invasion was, 
particularly since the empires reversals in the late seventeenth century, much in 
decline, a new fear, reflecting moral concerns, came to the fore in thinking about a 
society perceived as wealthy, given to the cultivation of luxury, unrestrained by true 
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religion and despotic. Many among the western literati believed that any close 
contact with the Ottoman empire, especially cultural interaction, would result in the 
spread of a moral contagion to individuals and perhaps eventually a corruption and 
despotism which would be destructive of western societies and states. Particularly in 
the texts relating to Greece, both ancient and contemporary, this association of the 
Ottomans with despotism and corruption became more visible. Claude Etienne 
Savary’s Letters on Greece, which was received with much interest by British 
readers, argued that “the whole Ottoman history” could offer only “lessons for all 
despots.” The saddening proof of this was the Greeks’ subjection to the Ottomans, 
intruding on civilised lands:  
At the sight of these melancholy spectacles my heart groans and is filled 
with indignation my blood boils in my veins, and I could wish to excite all 
Europe to combine against these Turks, who, descending from the mountains 
of Armenia, have crushed the nations in their passage, and waded through 
rivers of blood to the throne of Constantinople. Nor have the beautiful 
countries they inhabit been able to soften the ferocity of their character. 
Power is their law; their justice is the sabre.102  
 
The histories of ancient Greece, particularly their introductory sections, often made 
remarks similar to those of Savary. Before plunging into the ancient phase of Greek 
history, the historians commonly called the reader’s attention to the current state of 
the Greeks under Ottoman rule, which wholly lacked redeeming features. It was 
among fashionable topics at that time to mourn, in Adam Ferguson’s words, for that 
“wretched race” the Ottoman conquerors “had vanquished.”103 And our texts too 
elaborated on the sufferings of modern Greeks. 
 
5.7 Describing Ancient Persia 
 
The British historians of ancient Greece understood the Persian empire with 
reference to despotism, as that was understood by the Scottish Enlightenment 
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thinkers. In the theories of civilisation and progress put forward in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, particular emphasis was laid on despotism, prescribing the ideal by 
offering its contrast. It should here be noted that in the formation of these theories, 
especially in their treatment of despotism, Montesquieu had an undeniable impact 
and was repeatedly cited by the British philosophes.104 It was when the contrast of 
despotism had been established that the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment sought 
to pin down the requisites for arriving at the ideal commercial state. The Scottish 
writers presented the most extreme contrast to underpin their arguments. In 
Ferguson’s words, 
[d]espotism is a monarchy corrupted, in which a court and a prince in 
appearance remain, but in which every subordinate rank is destroyed; in 
which the subject is told, that he has no rights; that he can not possess any 
property, nor fill any station, independent of the momentary will of his 
prince. These doctrines are founded on the maxims of conquest, they must 
be incalculated with the whip and the sword, and are best received under the 
terror of chains and imprisonment.105
 
Hume too made a clear distinction between despotism and refined free governments 
in his essays, repeating many times that “refinements require curiosity, security and 
law” and therefore “can never be expected in despotic governments.” The motor of 
civilisation was commerce and  
[t]he greatness of a state, and the happiness of its subjects, how independent 
so ever they may be supposed in some respects, are commonly allowed to be 
inseparable with regard to commerce; and as private men receive in greater 
security, in the possession of their trade and their riches, from power of the 
public, so the public becomes powerful in proportion to the opulence and 
extensive commerce of private men.106                                   
 
All of this was impossible in a despotic state and therefore despotism was the exact 
opposite of civilisation. In this light, the British historians evaluated the Persian 
empire.  
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Almost as intensively and committedly as they dealt with Athens, Gast, 
Gillies, Goldsmith, Leland and Mitford concerned themselves with the Greek 
encounter with the Persians. In this phase of ancient Greek history, ancient Persia 
was held up as completely incompatible with the Greek states in terms of religion, 
culture, legal system and, more importantly, imperial structure. Having grown 
mighty and restless on the Asian side of the Greek border, the Persians threatened the 
well-being of the Greeks, the security and welfare of their states, the balance of 
power among them and the one civilisation that was shared by all Greeks. And, the 
historians attempted to understand and reflect on the Persian empire from the 
perspective of the ancient Greeks. They thus, together with the Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers, depicted clearly the alien character of Persia. Persia was the 
despotic state, defined against the Greek states, built on respect for the lives and 
properties of their citizens. 
However, as mentioned above, classifying ancient Greek histories of the 
prescribed age altogether as anti-Persian would do injustice to these texts. It should 
be stressed that Mitford’s History, from the publication of the second volume on, 
which coincided with the troublesome aftermath of the French Revolution, argued 
that under the corrupting forces of democracy Athens had grown into a despotism, as 
late eighteenth-century France had just done. He even applied to Athens 
Montesquieu’s definition of despotism, the customary use of which was to 
distinguish the Ottoman Empire from the European states. Thus Mitford claimed that 
“the essence of despotism” was embedded in “the assembled Athenian people”107 in 
its full sense. Here the historian’s dislike of democracy and republic took over from 
the common dislike of barbarian Persia. He borrowed the vocabulary of despotism 
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from the Athenians in a similar way to that of his colleagues, but, for the sake of 
revealing the evil nature of the majority’s rule, atypically used it against its ancient 
inventors and reflected it on post-revolution France.  
There are, certainly, elements of the tendency to emphasize the alien 
character of Persia in Mitford’s history, as where he contended that ancient Persia 
was governed by “a despotic throne” and that Xerxes’s palace sheltered many 
intrigues, in accordance with the maxim that palaces were “fully of horrors in 
despotic countries.”108 However, because Mitford intended his work to champion 
monarchy, he avoided building his arguments entirely on the condemnation of 
ancient Persia as the enemy of Greek civilisation. Ancient Persia was a monarchy 
and therefore deserved some credit simply on that account. In this atypical 
assessment of ancient Persia, without having completely disregarded the influence of 
Xenophon on the Greek history-writing tradition, Mitford conveniently constructed 
his pro-Persian argument on Herodotus’s sympathy for the Persians, which had 
gained him the reputation of a barbarian-lover.109 His reliance on Herodotus as “the 
impartial historian” and his pro-monarchist campaign led him to offer singular views 
of ancient Persia, remarking, for example, that “every authentic account marks the 
Persians for a people of liberal sentiments and polished manners beyond almost any 
other in all antiquity.”110 Still, he could not avoid altogether the general conviction 
that they were “a warlike and conquering people.”111 The effect of this feature of 
Persians was deeply and frequently felt by their Greek neighbours.  
Another exception to our generalisation that Persia, in the eyes of the British 
historians, was an alien society, incompatible with the Greek civilisation, was the 
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way Cyrus was presented. Within their common approach to ancient Persia, the 
British historians treated Cyrus the Great exceptionally with significant veneration 
and did not depict him as a despot. For Gillies, he was the “extraordinary man who 
raised the Persian glory on the ruins of Medes and Babylonians.” “[T]he 
extraordinary abilities” that helped him achieve this allowed him at the same time 
“soften” despotism “without endangering his authority.”112 It seemed crucial for the 
British historians to detach Cyrus completely from the slightest implication that he 
himself was a despot ruling a despotic kingdom.113 This collective effort of the 
British historians to exempt Cyrus from any despotic practice was grounded in his 
positive depictions prevailing both in the ancient sources and, of course, the Old 
Testament. Of all the ancient sources covering the era of Cyrus the Great, 
Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus contributed most to the establishment of the highly 
romanticised picture of the Persian king as the best sort of ruler that any state could 
ever have had.114 As to the Old Testament, in the books of Isaiah, Ezra and Daniel, to 
Cyrus was ascribed the termination of the captivity of Jews in Babylonia. He was 
recounted as the king whose right hand was held by God. (Isaiah 45:1) Thus, in the 
form of an extension to this tradition Cyrus was depicted with reverence and 
admiration in eighteenth-century texts of ancient Greek history.  
The reflection of such a view of Cyrus could also be seen in the prefaces of 
the eighteenth-century translations of Xenophon. Maurice Ashley, for instance, held 
in his translation of Cyropedia that praising Cyrus would not mean to take stance “in 
favor of tyranny” in ancient Persia, which appalled the contemporary Britain. It 
seemed crucial to make a clear distinction between the emperor and the later version 
                                                 
112 Gillies, History of Ancient Greece, I, 227.  
113 See also Goldsmith, Grecian History, I, 335 and Gast, Rudiments, 370.  
114 See also Herodotus’s History (3.89) where he replicated the Persian proverb saying Cyrus was a 
‘father’ to his subjects.  
 254
of his empire, for the Persian empire was later degenerated to a despicable regime 
which caused “a general defection from all virtue” in the people of Persia.115 Still 
Ashley did not conceal his discomfort with speaking highly of someone of Persian 
origin, even if it was Cyrus. Nevertheless, because Cyrus was then commonly 
presented as the supranational ideal governor, Ashley’s concern was not substantial. 
Cyrus the Great was, in a way, detached from his Persian identity and exempted from 
the disgrace of being a Persian. As a matter of fact, Cyrus represented the 
universality of governorship and law. In the Preface to the French author Alexander 
Ramsay’s The Travels of Cyrus, he displayed his philosophical concerns and claimed 
that Cyrus could be seen as the evidence that  
all nations had originally the same fundamental principles that the duties of 
religion, morality and good policy flow from the same source, conspire to 
the same end and mutually support and fortify each other and in a word, that 
all the civil and human virtues, the laws of nature and nations are, so to 
speak, but consequences of the Love of Order, which is eternal and universal 
law of all intelligences.116         
 
He argued that Cyrus built an empire in compliance with the universal rules and that 
ancient Persia at his time was essentially no different from the Greek states or 
eighteenth-century Britain.     
Let us now put the exceptions aside and examine the views of the British 
historians to whom the Persians signified a barbarian people, in the derogatory sense 
of the term. In our quest for how the eighteenth-century British perceived ancient 
Persia from the perspective of empire, it appears that the attitude of dislike is 
predominant. At that time, the word ‘barbarian’ was already detached from its 
meaning of non-Greek speaking and had come to denote an inferior civilisation and 
hostile government. According to Ferguson, barbarian was the term “to characterize 
a people regardless of commercial arts; profuse of their own lives and not of those of 
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others; vehement in their attachment to one society and implacable in their antipathy 
to another.”117 It is noteworthy that in our texts of ancient Greek history, despite the 
negative remarks that they occasionally received, Athens, Sparta and Macedonia 
were never designated as barbarian and that was deliberate. For instance, in Gast’s 
Rudiments, which reflected the author’s unmistakable pro-Athenian line at the 
expense of Sparta, in the dialogue between the two imaginary characters, Palaemon 
forbade Cleanthes to call Sparta “barbarous.”118 Of course, in the very beginning, or 
in the fabulous age of world history, all peoples on earth, including the Greeks, were 
barbarians. The Greeks however uniquely evolved towards refinement and, in 
Mitford’s words, became “the first country of Europe that emerged from 
barbarism.”119 Nevertheless, as acknowledged commonly by the British historians, 
there were forerunners of the Greeks, aiding them in this extraordinary achievement. 
The Phoenicians and Egyptians might be regarded as civilised according to the 
eighteenth-century criteria, because of their mastery of “commerce, navigation and 
several other valuable sciences,”120 and through their communication with the Greeks 
transmitted to them this knowledge of civilisation. Strikingly, the Persians were 
expressly left out of the eastern nations through which civilisation was transmitted. 
Even Mitford’s praise of the civilised nations of the East was limited to the 
Phoenicians and Egyptians.121 Ancient Persia, as understood by both ancient and 
eighteenth-century British historians, was the antithesis of civilisation.  
This had something to do with mere geography. Having been influenced by 
Aristotle’s argument on climate, which was popularised in the eighteenth century by 
Montesquieu, Asia was believed to influence its peoples to accept slavery, the spread 
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of which into Greece needed to be prevented at all costs. Gillies, having described 
Aristotle’s suggestion that the country of the Greeks alone was possessed of a 
suitable climate as “too flattering,” enlarged the favourable area to encompass 
Europe. And the decline of Europe came when “the sloth and servility of Asia 
gradually crept into Greece.”122 Thus, the British historians laid particular emphasis 
on the point that the Persian threat was located in Asia and threatened Europe. What 
was therefore suggested as geographical containment. This emphasis on geography 
and the argument that the Persians should have been confined to Asia clearly in a 
way resembles the eighteenth-century idea voiced by Burke and others that the 
Ottomans should be expelled from Europe and closed up in Asia.123
5.8 Persia as Empire 
As an Asiatic empire, that of the Persians’ did not offer the normative rules of 
ideal imperialism. Nor did it provide the lessons of avoidance as Macedonia did in 
the eyes of the historians. Persia was rather analysed to suggest an appropriate 
relationship with an empire with an alien, or maybe dangerous, culture. Goldsmith 
stressed the point that the Persian empire in Asia had stood as “the greatest at that 
time in the world” before its confrontation with the Greeks. Once it “offered itself” 
as the “opponent” of Greece and its civilisation, it gradually sank into “total 
subversion.”124 It is here implied that the Persians could have chosen to be allies of 
the Greeks, instead of being their ‘terror.’ Then they would not have declined in the 
way they did and both parties could have co-existed with mutual benefit, though in 
different geographies. Nevertheless, since the Persians acted otherwise and attempted 
to settle in the Greek homeland, the general tendency was to label them as the enemy. 
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Of course, on the other side of the coin, however docile the Persians could have 
become, the Greeks would have never been eager to incorporate this other people 
fully to their system of states, for these Greek states, “though seemingly different 
from each other” were historically connected to each other “by one common 
language, one religion and a national pride” which taught them to consider all other 
nations as barbarous and feeble.125 Also, because ancient Greece was composed of 
similarly sovereign states with similar legislative systems, these states had developed 
a sense of togetherness. The Persian empire, which was inherently different from 
them, could at best choose between being a distant ally or an enemy to be destroyed.  
In what ways the imperial designs of a despotic king could affect the advance 
of a commercial empire remained as the central focus of the British historians in 
studying the Persian imperial pattern. As always, the legal system was believed to be 
the crucial source to reveal the nature of government, not only at home but in the 
colonies also. The “wise legislation” of the motherland would create an imperial 
system of mutual prosperity and definitely serve to secure colonial achievements.126 
The Persian legislation seemed to work only one way, always for the benefit of the 
ruler and at the expense of the people. Among the ancient Persian kings, Cyrus the 
Great alone was favourably described as the father of his subjects. This was a name 
never attached either to past or contemporary eastern monarchs, but commonly used 
to speak of the European ones, particularly in comparing them with despotic rulers. 
The Persian empire completely rested on the person of the Persian king.127 This fact 
set it as a contrast to the British empire in the first place. One of the reasons the 
Persian monarchs were disapproved of by the British historians was the ‘unlawful’ 
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title which they assumed. The “King of Kings” was, according to Gillies, “a title 
expressive of the nature as well as the greatness of their power.”128 The Persian kings 
naming their subjects as ‘slaves’ appeared equally repulsive to the British 
historians.129 Titles and terminology alone ensured that the ancient Persian monarchs 
came to be associated with absolutism, despotism and unlawfulness in the eighteenth 
century. The same was true for the contemporary Ottoman ruler who had been 
commonly named by the British the “Grand Seignior.” 130  As we know from 
Harrington’s Oceana, this was a title representing a monarch who was the sole 
proprietor of land or at best who would own the “three parts in four” and thus 
“overbalance the people.”131   
Although, as Gast stated, “the general policy” of the Greeks “was to consider 
the Persian monarch as a prince,”132  they had taken notice of how the Persian 
monarchs thought of themselves and its implications for the imperial policies of the 
Persians. On the issue of the nature of the Persian kingship, Mitford emphasised that 
the Persians had to remain obedient to the kings’ “right of inheritance” in the first 
place, which was a maxim rendering this rule unquestionable, fixed and absolute. 
Then came obeisance to the kings’ “character as conquerors.”133 These were in fact 
the two pillars of the Persian legal system, held to mark the character of the Persian 
empire. In the Greek history texts there was no deep analysis of the Persian legal 
system on the grounds of both the absence of a code like those of Lycurgos and 
Solon and more crucially, the general belief that Persian law was simply the arbitrary 
                                                 
128 Gillies, History of Ancient Greece, I, 227.  
129 Today it is clear that this conviction was derived from the mistranslation of the ancient Persian 
term mana badaka which stood for “my subject or vassal” into ancient Greek as doûlos which meant 
“slave.” Paul A. Rahe, ‘The Primacy of Politics in Classical Grece,’ American Historical Review, Vol. 
89, No. 2 (April, 1984), 278.   
130 See, for example, Anon., Nobleman’s Modern Europe, 10.  
131 Harrington, Oceana, 37.  
132 Gast, History of Greece, II, 118.  
133 Mitford, History of Greece, I, 307.  
 259
will of the monarch. The British historians stressed that the ancient Persian empire 
was the empire of the king. Their kings’ insatiable ambition rendered the Persians the 
“perpetual and irreconcilable enemies”134 of the Greeks and the Persian empire was 
thus incapable of being a peaceful ally.  
To our historians, the Persian legal system determined the character of the 
Persian empire also as the representative of an inferior civilisation. In comparison 
with the legal codes of Solon and Lycurgos, ancient Persian laws were, in Mitford’s 
words, “few and simple more in the nature of fundamental maxims than a finished 
system of jurisprudence.” Thus, even Mitford, who favored the Persians at the 
expense of Greeks, acknowledged the “inflexible rule that the laws were never in any 
point to be altered.”135 The inflexibility of the ancient Persian legal system did not 
allow any possibility of progress and change.  The laws themselves seemed to 
guarantee the unchanging status of despotism. Constrained by the rigidity of the 
despotic legal system, there was no space for manoeuvre or to improve a system that 
proceeded towards corruption. Having pointed to this feature of despotic states in 
general, Gast argued that, due to the inflexible character of the regime, change did 
not happen in the form of “revolutions of government” but was a “change of 
masters” only.136 For all these reasons, the common attitude, as expressed by Gast in 
his History, was to perceive the Persian empire as “corrupted and unwieldy.”137  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the British historians sought to pin 
down the force that had kept the imperial entities of ancient Greece united, in parallel 
with their theories of civilisation and progress. They maintained that commerce was 
proven to be the most important link connecting the periphery to the centre. In this 
                                                 
134 Goldsmith, Grecian History, II, 217.  
135 Mitford, History of Greece, I, 304.  
136 Gast, Rudiments, 359.  
137 Gast, History of Greece, II, 118.  
 260
regard, Athens came to the fore as the ideal empire subduing its colonies through the 
mutually beneficial bond of commerce. The Persian empire, on the other hand, with 
its despotic character signified an uncivilised entity or one that failed to become 
progressively civilised. As Goldsmith stated, all that ancient Persia could have 
promoted in the lands acquired was despotism. 
The Persian monarch, thus possessed of a very extensive territory placed 
governors over several cities that were subdued and as men bred up in a 
despotic court, were likely enough to imitate the example set them at home, 
it is probable that they abused their power.138             
 
Such was also the ground on which the pro-Grecian arguments were built in 
eighteenth-century Britain, in reflecting on Ottoman rule. On this account, the 
Ottoman empire inherently fell short of the criterion of facilitating civilisation and 
refinement in the lands under its rule and offered only the scourge of despotism.  
Having failed to establish commercial relations with the periphery and hence 
to fulfil a civilising mission, the imperial practices of the Persian kings forced their 
subjects to act slavishly. As Gillies stressed, the Persians “fought and conquered and 
plundered, only for the benefit of their prince whose slaves and property, they 
themselves were.” After all individual rights had been willingly surrendered to the 
‘King of Kings,’ this people conquered “as if they had been called to punish, not the 
enemies of their king, but their own personal foes; and as if each man had been 
entitled to reap the full fruits of his rapacious cruelty.”139
Besides being despotic in nature, the Persian empire was also considered 
structurally unfit to sustain its stability, prosperity and the welfare of its people. 
Mostly because the Persians greedily aimed at expansion at the expense of 
sustainability, they exceeded the optimum level of territorial acquisition, as pointed 
out, one of the preoccupations of the British historians. The political nation invested 
                                                 
138 Goldsmith, Grecian History, I, 81-2. 
139 Gillies, History of Ancient Greece, I, 239.  
 261
much time and effort in the discussions over the extent of the imperial territory. 
Particularly consequent to the Peace of Paris in 1763 when Britain acquired vast 
lands of Canada and Florida in return of leaving Guadeloupe to France and Havana 
to Spain, what the quantity and quality of expansion should be became one of the 
lively topics on the political agenda.140 The cautious expansionists even clashed in a 
pamphlet war with the overzealous expansionists. 141  Within this context, our 
historians too were preoccupied with this question of expansion. In their scrutiny of 
the Greek states, they laid particular emphasis on the necessity of reaching to the 
optimum territorial size and never exceeding that, for the sake of preservation. 
Within the Persian empire, “[t]he different members of this unwieldy body were so 
feebly connected with each other that to secure their united submission required 
almost as much genius as to achieve their conquest.” 142 Since the Persians lacked the 
required kind of genius they brought their empire, as Leland contended, to “the point 
of sinking under its own weight.”143                          
Overstretching the imperial borders thus brought along the problem of 
managing this gigantic entity. Persians sought so rapid an expansion that the centre 
could not have kept up with this hasty empire-building. 144  Where the central 
administration was proven insufficient, the Persian kings made use of the local rulers 
as the administrative instruments of their ungovernably, hence unwisely, extensive 
empire. This policy appeared to be highly controversial among the British historians. 
The employment of the local princes, who had sworn “their universal dependence on 
the emperor,” according to Gilles, might serve the temporary good of empires when 
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the colonies were out of reach of the centre. Nevertheless, this was a “system of 
government” which was proven to be “more favourable to the extent than the 
permanence of empire.” 145 However, Mitford with his atypically pro-Persian attitude, 
maintained that this instrument of empire should not be dismissed altogether. 
Because this method of appointing “the son of the conquered country” 146 as the chief 
governor granted this tyrant the chance of retaining his supremacy over the local 
people, he remained loyal to his conquerors. Mitford’s unusual view reflected neither 
those of his fellow historians nor those of others concerned with the notion of empire 
in eighteenth-century Britain.  
In the eighteenth century, the degree of interaction with the peoples of the 
conquered lands and rulers was often reflected on. Encounter with the natives had at 
the outset resulted in discussions stressing “the white claims to distinctiveness, 
originality or superior understanding.” Within this context, the prospects of “cultural 
mixing” with the natives and interaction with their rulers in the imperial 
administration, or in the system which is called by Wilson “the circuitry of empire,” 
had not been welcomed.147 In the course of the century, a notion of “the unity of 
man” was however developed and it coexisted with a conviction about “the diversity 
of mankind.”148 Nevertheless, the histories of ancient Greece rather endorsed the idea 
suggesting the superiority of one civilisation over another, hence one race over the 
other. For that reason, they excluded the sort of empire in which close cooperation 
with the natives of the acquired lands was established. What is more, openly 
subjecting and ruling nations with no ties of commerce and policies of mutual benefit 
involved was considered in the eighteenth century as an imperial way fit to “more 
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degenerate societies and more despotic constitutions.”149 Therefore what the ancient 
Persian empire enforced as an apt instrument for colonial governance was not seen 
compatible with the contemporary British practices of empire.          
The Persian empire earned disapproval in the eyes of the British historians 
also on account of its “opulence and luxury,” which spread through the entire 
imperial structure, slowly corrupted it and made the empire’s people effeminate and 
slavish. Though not as intensely as in the eighteenth-century Roman history texts, 
luxury inevitably appeared to be one of the predominant themes in texts dealing with 
Greece as well, for luxury was one of the most lively topics of the time and “a 
history of luxury and attitudes to luxury would come very close to being a history of 
the eighteenth century.”150  The source of wealth in the Persian empire was luxury 
goods. This was destructive of the character of its people into sluggishness and 
prevented them from engaging in more productive and profitable activities that 
would have promoted the liberating and refining effects of commerce.151 With the 
Persian encounter with Greeks, luxury with all its unwanted effects leaked into the 
Greek civilisation and contaminated it.  
Luxury, hence corruption, always poured into ancient Greece from the east. 
When they became acquainted with Persian wealth, as Goldsmith stated, the Greeks 
“began to lose their spirit of hardy and laborious virtue, and to adopt the refined 
indolence and captious petulance, and the boundless love of pleasure, which extreme 
wealth is ever known to produce.”152 Desiring the possession of the goods of great 
value seemed to be suitable for the slavish people of the despotic empires. Luxury 
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was a regime by which the barbarians sustained the existence of their government. 
The Greeks on the other hand, as the argument went, had stood as “a brave and 
refined people confederating against tyranny,” therefore, unavoidably, encountering 
the flow of wealth from Asia into their country. Interaction with empires of luxury 
corrupted empires of virtue.  
The prevalent British viewpoint on luxury for most of the eighteenth century 
was that “a ‘luxurious’ environment produced a weak character.”153 And contact with 
a society made up of persons of weak character would weaken the hardy and strong 
character of others. This concern about luxury that pervaded the ancient history texts 
may be related to concern about Britain’s contemporary and increasing involvement 
in India. Luxury resided in the east and the British presence there exposed Britain to 
all the corruptive effects of Indian wealth. There was abundant evidence in ancient 
Greek history proving that luxury was “a retreat from order” and “the introduction of 
chaos into the cosmos.”154 Consequently, texts about ancient Greece were written 
and referred to with the aim of dealing with this question. The common base on 
which the Greek states rose was intolerant of the infusion of luxurious habits into 
economic, political and other areas of society. Thus, when the Persian invasion 
introduced the Greeks to effeminacy and corruption, which were the natural 
outcomes of luxury, they began, in Richard Jackson’s words, “to sink from the 
zealous spirit of honour and integrity, concord and unanimity.”155 British historians 
measured the Persian invasion as obviously destructive, by virtue of the nature of the 
Persian empire’s economic practices. Such was the outcome of luxury being 
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commonly understood in the eighteenth century as a phenomenon with “disquieting 
implications for the future of civilisation.”156  
Although in the analyses of the Greek states, the issues of commerce were 
extensively elaborated, ancient Persia was not so investigated. Even the pro-Persian 
Mitford declined to praise this aspect of the Persian civilisation. Persia had an 
economy conducive to “all the refinements of the table, the bath and every 
circumstance of Asiatic luxury.” 157 A final implication of eastern luxury seemed to 
be the possibility that a despotic ruler could intervene in the affairs of western states. 
The importation of the luxurious goods of the east could result in the flow of money 
from the western states, hence their financial ruin. 158  The eastern ruler in the 
meantime might acquire the wealth to attack and subdue the west.                 
Another point recurrently stressed by the British historians of ancient Greece 
was the role of the Persian empire in the Greek balance of power. The balance of 
power was clearly a predominant theme in the conduct of British foreign affairs and 
a matter of particular interest among the British statesman throughout the eighteenth 
century as “a worthy end of itself.”159 It inevitably made its way into our texts on 
ancient Greek history. Nevertheless, not all of its aspects attracted the attention of the 
British historians. In other words, our historians of Tory tendency did not treat the 
topic of balance of power as the Whig apologists did. In their assessments of ancient 
Greek states, the allegory of balance of power was employed to stress the similarity 
between the states of ancient Greece in terms of civilization and hence to draw 
attention to the resemblance between ancient Greece and eighteenth-century Europe. 
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There was no glorification of it as a foreign policy instrument. As Gould contends, 
although the British nursed “little affection” for the neighbouring European states, 
“few were willing to deny that they belonged to a European nation.”160 By means of 
reference to the Greekness embedded in the ancient version of the balance of power, 
the British historians sought to emphasize the Europeanness that lay at the heart of 
the concert of states in eighteenth-century Europe.          
When dealing with the Persian empire also, the balance of power was a 
subject for consideration. This time, nevertheless, the difficulty of including a hostile 
empire into the system to avert the rise of another more hostile power. How to 
coexist with a civilization incompatible with that of the main participants of the 
balance of power and how to use this outside element most wisely were among the 
few concerns to which consideration of the Greek balance of power was looked to 
provide answers. The Persian empire verified that when desperate times called for 
desperate measures, a despised, if menacing, outsider could be welcomed to save the 
system. Such was the lesson acquired from this episode of ancient Greek history and 
it had some practical usage at that time in guiding the British statesmen through their 
fine policy adjustments towards the Ottoman empire. Once again, the ancient Persian 
empire was treated as the predecessor of the sort of empire whose quintessential 
example was the Ottoman empire in the eighteenth century.       
In his history of East Central Europe, Oscar Halecki discussed the topic of the 
eighteenth-century balance of power and how the positions of eastern elements in 
this game of balance were shifted.161 Thus, he explains how the Ottoman empire, 
once a formidable enemy aiming at the destruction of the European balance of power, 
was later included into that very system to counterbalance a perceived Russian 
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menace. The balance of power was grounded in the individual states’ will of forming 
alliances and changing the components of these alliances as the current situation 
required. For part of the eighteenth century, as the pamphlet entitled Modern Europe 
stated it was “the interest of Great Britain to be closely united with Austria, Russia 
and Sardinia, to the balance of power of France, Turkey, Sweden and Prussia.”162 
When the tides turned, however, Britain adjusted its foreign policy accordingly to 
admit the Ottomans into this game of power. As is known well, from the late 
eighteenth century on, because of its growing internal and external weakness the 
Ottoman empire allied with Britain to prevent the hastened access of Russia to 
Mediterranean.  
In our history texts, one may detect an echo of the British desire to include 
the Ottomans in the European balance of power as a check to France and Russia. The 
Spartans and Athenians, facing the formidable rise of Macedonia, froze their 
interminable hatred towards the Persians and incorporated them to the dynamics of 
the balance of power. Preserving the Greek balance of power intact was crucial, as 
Gast rather dramatically articulated, for “Persia was the only power that could 
balance the Macedonian; and if the former was once overthrown, their liberties must 
soon share the same fate.” Unexpectedly, “[t]he cause of Persia was become the 
cause of Greece.”163
In their quest for the ideal empire, the British historians of the eighteenth 
century carefully investigated the imperial structures of Athens, Sparta and even 
Macedonia with the hope of arriving at some normative rules for their own empire. 
On account of being perceived as despotic, effeminate and non-commercial, Persia 
was not included into this probe. The interest in the empire of the Persians was not 
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intended to contribute to the making of the British empire. Instead, in the eyes of the 
British, the ancient Persian empire was seen as fit to provide answers for a possible 
relationship with an empire of alien, if not hostile, civilization, such as that of the 
Ottomans.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
James William Johnson complained in 1967 that “[i]n the last two hundred 
years, theories of historiography have taken the work of Gibbon as a starting point.”1 
Despite the appearance of a few studies partially treating the eighteenth-century 
historiography of the pre-Gibbon era since then, such a tendency persists even today. 
This study has sought to break this tendency, provide the complete list of ancient 
Roman and Greek histories of eighteenth-century Britain and elaborate on them, with 
the exception of Gibbon’s work, from the perspective of the historians’ politics. To 
understand the aspirations of ancient history-writing, the contemporary political 
environment must be taken into account.  
This study has also striven to establish the importance of ancient Roman and 
Greek histories within the eighteenth-century literature on empire. The few scattered 
available analyses of these texts have concentrated only on the historians’ views on 
civic humanism, republican values and democracy. Nevertheless, “history’s lofty 
ethical and instructive purpose” 2  was not confined to these topics and ancient 
history-writing was concerned with a much wider range of subjects, which were 
related to contemporary discussions, political and non-political. Empire was a 
recurrent theme that appeared in our texts of ancient Greek and Roman history. The 
historians approached the topic with the aim of participating in the ongoing debates 
over the empire, but in a more subtle way than the political pamphleteers. The 
historians’ mission was twofold: first to produce a well-researched and well-written 
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philosophical ancient history and then to extend to the political nation their opinions 
on critical contemporary issues through the related experiences of the ancients. In the 
fulfilment of this mission, they avoided being explicit about the instructions which 
they saw fit to transmit.  
The impact of these histories on contemporary imperial policy is not certain, 
as the politicians did not use direct quotes from our historians while expressing their 
views on imperial affairs, though they made numerous references to the imperial 
experiences of ancient Greece and Rome. Nevertheless, the close contact between the 
historians and statesmen was an established fact. Most of them belonged to the same 
circle of friends. Furthermore, eighteenth-century histories were published for the 
attention of prominent statesmen. Also, given that the study of ancient history was 
considered imperative for statecraft and our texts of ancient history went through 
several editions, we have sufficient ground to argue that the insights of the British 
historians of Greece and Rome into the ideal sort of empire did reach contemporary 
politicians. Ancient history-writing therefore did play a certain role in shaping the 
imperial convictions.      
To the British, empire had never been “a monochrome, predictable entity.”3 
Thus, they looked into a multitude of sources with the hope of finding guidance in 
the unknown path to imperial greatness. Eighteenth-century ancient history writing 
offered insights into imperial matters such as expansion, colonial governance, the 
role of commerce as a substitute for military action, the desirable degree of 
interaction with natives and the fight against decline. Under the influence of Plutarch 
and a venerable literary genre, the ‘mirror of princes,’ ancient Roman histories 
elucidated those subjects. Most strikingly, the historians of Rome made a clear 
                                                 
3 Colley, Captives, 377. 
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distinction between empire as a constitutional arrangement and empire as a 
territorially extended state. A general distaste for empire as a constitutional 
arrangement permeated the history texts, whereas empire as a territorially extended 
state was commonly considered as desirable, even by those who wrote Roman 
history to glorify the republican virtue. Interestingly enough, although all historians 
elaborated on the imperial practices of Rome, only Kennet and Ferguson seemed to 
attempt at understanding the Roman empire in the way it actually was. Kennet, the 
first historian of Rome in eighteenth-century Britain, and Ferguson, the last, 
examined meticulously the nature of Rome’s imperial governance and all 
administrative divisions. The historians in between failed to exhibit the same degree 
of scholarship while authentically reconstructing the Roman empire.       
As for ancient Greek histories — the publication of which mostly coincided 
with the rise of the discussions about civilisation — they sought to deliver their 
remarks on empire through comparisons of the states and civilisations that ancient 
Greece sheltered. Athens and Sparta were the quintessential representatives of the 
refined Greek civilisation. Nevertheless, they were depicted as inherently different 
states within the contexts of democracy and empire. On one hand, when democracy 
was discussed, Athens was severely criticised for entrusting limitless power to the 
common people and Sparta was commonly commended for its commitment to 
monarchy. On the other, when the topic was empire, commercial Athens became the 
model to be emulated and militaristic Sparta stood for the negative example to be 
avoided. 
Historians of ancient Greece also took particular interest in the empires 
beyond Greece. They sought to understand the Macedonian and Persian empires too 
and depicted them as the undesirable manifestations of the phenomenon of empire. 
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Of course, unlike Persia, Macedonia was not completely viewed as non-Greek. To 
the historians, the Greekness of Alexander, in particular, was unquestionable and the 
Alexandrian empire was a world empire founded by the Greeks. The glory of this 
extraordinary empire and the wise imperial policies of Alexander were believed to 
inspire the British then creating an empire of their own. The rest of the imperial 
history of Macedonia was labelled unfit for British emulation. Ancient Persia, 
however, was entirely alien. For that reason, it was left out of the probe carried out 
by the historians to arrive at normative rules for the ideal empire. The interest in the 
empire of the Persians was fuelled by the interest in figuring out how to handle a vast 
empire, full of culturally alien elements.   
The historians dealt with here put particular emphasis on the imperial topics 
in the conviction that genuine commitment to lessons learned from ancient history 
would create the most durable empire on earth for the British nation. In doing so, 
they were often constrained by their sources. A superficial examination of our 
historians may often suggest simply a reworking of ancient statements. However, 
although sometimes they had little or no choice of ancient sources, sometimes they 
had and the one they actually made is informative. In any case, the revelation of their 
own political and other concerns, never explicitly stated, render the historians spoken 
of in this study constantly interesting.        
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